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Systematic violations of the rights of unauthorized migrants on the fault lines between developed and
developing countries expose the dialectic of transnationalism, a dynamic that occurs when both policy and
judicial review go transnational. Three concurrent patterns define the dialectic: First, executive and judi-
cial networks are bifurcated from each other, producing significant policies beyond the reach of judiciaries.
Second, judiciaries exacerbate their bifurcation from policymaking through transnational decisions. Third,
transnational law replaces absolute legal rules with pragmatic problem solving, eroding the normative
basis of human rights. Although these patterns seem to show that the violations are an intractable feature
of contemporary international law, this Article proposes countering them with “critical absolutism.” This
approach identifies opportunities in which the dialectic can be challenged by presenting states with an
existential dilemma: either treat people as humans and risk changing who you are (in terms of the
composition of your population), or give up human rights and risk changing who you are (in terms of your
constitutive commitments).
Introduction
Too many lives have already been lost. Too many others are in
danger of being lost.
—Houston Expert Panel Report, Australia1
Since the 1990s, the dominant theory of international law has been trans-
national legal theory, or “transnationalism.”2 This theory combines a descrip-
* J.S.D. candidate, Yale Law School. I am indebted to Tendayi Achiume, Dennis Curtis, Tom Dan-
nenbaum, Owen Fiss, David Singh Grewal, Julie Hunter, Paul Kahn, Darryl Li, Samuel Moyn, Judith
Resnik, Shira Shmuely, and Patrick Weil for their invaluable comments on various drafts of this paper.
Early versions were presented at Soldiering: The Afterlife of a Modern Experience, at the Humanities Center
at Harvard University (Apr. 2011) and at The Inaugural Doctoral Scholarship Conference at Yale Law School
(Dec. 2011). While Bill Frelick, Giota Massoridou, and Rupert Skilbeck contributed through numerous
conversations in the Article’s early research phase, Heather Alpino and Christopher Ferro of the Harvard
International Law Journal helped generously in finally preparing it for publication. Any errors are mine
alone.
1. Australian Government, Report of the Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers 13 (2012).
2. On the nature and importance of “transnational” law, see generally Harold Hongju Koh, Why
Transnational Law Matters, 24 Penn St. Int’l L. Rev. 745 (2006); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Thinking
Outside the Sovereignty Box: Transnational Law and the U.S. Constitution, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 1989 (2004); Peer
Zumbansen, Transnational Law, in Encyclopedia of Comparative Law 738 (Jan Smits ed., 2006). For
a representative (but non-exhaustive) list of major examples of transnational legal scholarship, see gener-
ally Martin Shapiro, The Globalization of Law, 1 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 37 (1993). For critical
accounts, see Martti Koskenniemi, Carl Schmitt, Hans Morgenthau, and the Image of Law in International
Relations, in The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations
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tive account of the nature and function of international law with a normative
account of its justification.3 Descriptively, the fundamental move of transna-
tionalism is to collapse the traditional distinction between domestic and
international law. Normatively, transnationalism’s basic tenet is that col-
lapsing this distinction is desirable.
Transnationalism appeared with the end of the Cold War and to some
extent partook in optimism about the “end of history.”4 Its normative vi-
sion focuses on the enforcement of human rights. This focus has been impor-
tant not only in producing scholarly insight but also in framing human
rights policy considerations by governments. Transnationalism’s ideals have
fueled legal initiatives to protect human rights internationally and have en-
couraged law students to participate in international human rights clinics
and choose human rights-oriented careers.
This Article’s examination of distinctly “transnational” responses to un-
authorized migration—at transnationalism’s twentieth anniversary—dem-
onstrates that while transnationalism’s description of law has proved prescient,
its normative claims are inadequate.5 By focusing on unauthorized migrants
and refugees, an increasingly contentious and paradigmatically transnational
policy issue, this Article argues that there is little evidence that transnation-
alism has helped to enforce human rights. Along the fault lines between
developing and developed countries, transnational law has been structurally
implicated in distinctly “transnational” violations of migrant and refugee
rights. Although lessons about the violation of migrant rights are not clearly
generalizable to other areas of policy, they undermine transnationalism’s
normative aspirations.
To examine transnational policymakers and enforcement agencies, this
Article relies on the work of Anne-Marie Slaughter, former Dean of the
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton.
For an understanding of transnational judiciaries, the Article turns to the
work of Harold Koh, former Dean of Yale Law School and State Department
and International Law 17, 17 (Michael Byers ed., 2001); Paul Kahn, Speaking Law to Power: Popular
Sovereignty, Human Rights, and the New International Order, 1 Chi. J. Int’l L. 1 (2000).
3. See José E. Alvarez, Do Liberal States Behave Better? A Critique of Slaughter’s Liberal Theory, 12 Eur. J.
Int’l L., 183, 186–88 (2001) (“Slaughter’s liberal theory professes to be, first, an accurate description
. . . Slaughter’s liberal theory is, secondly, prescriptive.”); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Pro-
cess, 75 Neb. L. Rev. 181, 184 (1996) (transnational legal process “embraces not just the descriptive
workings of a process, but the normativity of that process . . .”) (emphasis added); see also Koskenniemi,
supra note 2, at 33. R
4. See generally Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (1992). For a histori-
cal account of the role human rights took after the Cold War, and the way they were intertwined with
Cold War politics, see generally Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History
(2010). For some connections between the “end of history” and Anne-Marie Slaughter’s legal theory, see,
for example, Susan Marks, The End of History? Reflections on Some International Legal Theses, 3 Eur. J. Int’l
L. 449, 469 (1997); Alvarez, supra note 3, at 189–90. R
5. Since the major articulations of “transnational” in the 1990s, legal scholars have used the label
“transnational” in many different ways, some of which do not have normative claims. My argument here
only pertains to those theories that claim that transnational legal processes have progressive outcomes.
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Legal Adviser during President Barack Obama’s first term. Both scholars
offer exemplary linkages between the descriptive and normative aspects of
transnationalism. Both of their bodies of work prove today to be prescient
descriptions of the global legal environment in which we live, but are also
inappropriately optimistic about its normative appeal.
This Article aims to contribute to international legal theory by conceptu-
alizing the double-edged process caused by the collapse of the domestic/
international divide over the last two decades.6 In this legal environment,
state competences have been increasingly transferred to transnational net-
works acting beyond borders. These networks are composed of executive
agencies, international organizations, and judicial bodies, which developed
countries flexibly disaggregate and reassemble. Transnational law, premised
on intense cooperation beyond borders, was believed by its proponents to
better enforce human rights by tackling problems at their roots, while still
articulating global values.7 Transnationalism’s failure to do this is, of course,
not the result of nefarious intentions.
The dialectic of transnationalism is a dynamic that occurs when both policy
and its judicial review become transnational. Although this dynamic some-
times alleviates the hardships of unauthorized migrants, it tends to reduce or
even eliminate the human rights accountability of developed states. This
dynamic is defined by three concurrent patterns.
First, executive and judicial networks are pulled apart and bifurcated
from one another. This allows executive agencies to conduct overseas opera-
tions that are not subject to domestic judicial review. Imagine that transna-
tional executive and judicial networks are two webs placed one over the
other. As the logic of the judicial web is to follow only the places where the
executive web wields force, some parts of the executive web will remain sys-
tematically uncovered by the judiciary web. In these parts, executive agen-
cies of countries with relative economic power compel those of weaker
countries to police their borders—beyond the reach of their own domestic
courts. The dialectic of transnationalism should, however, by no means be un-
derstood as a story about “bad executives” and “good courts.”
The second pattern is that when transnational judicial bodies attempt to
review policies implemented abroad (aiming to act effectively on the trans-
national plane), they end up exacerbating their own bifurcation from poli-
6. Cf. B.S. Chimni, Globalization and Refugee Blues, 8 Journal of Refugee Studies 298, 298 (1995)
(“The dialectics of the globalization process has engendered a ‘power-geometry’ of time-space compres-
sion in which the power over mobility of some groups goes hand in hand with the incarceration of
others.”).
7. Related arguments have also supported recent scholarship on constitutional pluralism, and the
critique in this Article can therefore also be—with necessary amendments—a critique of that movement.
See, e.g., Miguel Poiares Maduro, Interpreting European Law—Judicial Adjudication in a Context of Constitu-
tional Pluralism (IE Law School Working Papers’ Series, WPLS08-02, 2008), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1134503; Alec Stone Sweet, A Cosmopolitan Legal Order: Constitu-
tional Pluralism and Rights Adjudication in Europe, 1 Journal of Global Constitutionalism 53
(2012).
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cymaking. In the transnational legal environment, courts’ opinions on
refugees and unauthorized migration instruct executive agencies on how to
further bifurcate executive and judicial functions, avoiding the costs im-
posed by human rights law.8
Third, transnational law erodes the normative basis of human rights by
consistently replacing absolute legal rules with pragmatic problem solving.
The transnational legal consciousness is thus epitomized by a motto recently
voiced by the Houston Expert Panel Report, which was commissioned by
the Australian government to address asylum policy. As the commission put
it, “the perfect should not be allowed to become the enemy of the good.”9
However, unlike the absolute human rights rules on which this Article fo-
cuses, this pragmatism does not apply equally to all human beings.10 The
normative world it heralds is one in which policies may reasonably be de-
scribed as enforcing or violating human rights, depending on from which
side of the gun one looks.
Since its major iterations in the 1990s, scholars have developed transna-
tional research agendas in many different directions. Some influential schol-
ars employ the descriptive aspects of transnationalism while not favoring it
over other kinds of law.11 The latter are not the subject of this Article.
Furthermore, this Article is far from being the first critique of transnational-
ism, which generated important debate while it was being developed.12
However, other critiques focusing on transnationalism’s normativity either
introduce alternative normative standards13 or question the very notion that
normative foundations exist at all.14 The present critique is unique precisely
in that it can examine transnationalism with the benefit of historical hind-
sight. This will prove crucial for assessing this influential school of interna-
tional law. Moreover, it is different from previous work in contesting
8. This pattern cautions against a naı̈ve adoption of one of transnationalism’s most central prescrip-
tive tenets. This, in José Alvarez’s terms, is the belief that “conscious attempts to engage in cross-border
judicial communication” should be promoted and encouraged. See Alvarez, supra note 3, at 188. R
9. Australian Government, supra note 1, at 7. R
10. Or, in other words, it divorces transnational law from international law’s traditional commitment
to universalism. See Alvarez, supra note 3, at 185 (arguing that Slaughter’s liberal theory “is touted as a R
corrective to the inclinations of universalist international lawyers”).
11. See, e.g., Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: from Medieval to Global Assem-
blages (2006); Kim Lane Scheppele, Global Security Law and the Challenge to Constitutionalism after 9/11,
Public Law (2011).
12. See, e.g., Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: the Rise and Fall of
International Law 1870–1960, at 413–509 (2001); Koskenniemi, supra note 2, at 17; Nico Krisch, R
International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the International Legal Order, 16
Eur. J. Int’l L. 369 (2005); Alvarez, supra note 3 (though Alvarez’s critique is directed towards earlier R
work by Slaughter, in which her emphases—as he points out towards the end of the essay—are different).
13. For a compelling early critique focusing on global distributive justice, see Benedict Kingsbury,
Sovereignty and Inequality, 9 Eur. J. Int’l. L. 599 (1998). For a more recent (and groundbreaking) critique
focusing on democratic participation, see Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch and Richard B. Stewart, The
Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 L. & Contemp. Probs., 15, 50 (2005).
14. See Koskeniemmi, supra note 2; Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law R
147 (2011) (discussing the “Indeterminacy of Rights”).
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transnational law’s capabilities to enforce human rights,15 a standard trans-
nationalism proclaims as its own.16 Leaving aside the question of what is the
philosophical justification for human rights, this article assumes the morality
of their demand—and that its realization would contribute to “A Just
World Order.”17 The relevant question is whether transnationalism ever
contributed to the realization of this demand.
Can those of us who do believe in the demand of human rights reasonably
expect to do anything to help enforce them? Today, this question must be
asked in light of the critique of transnationalism. Building on a dichot-
omy—introduced by sociologist Max Weber—between an ethics of conviction
and an ethics of responsibility,18 this Article proposes an approach called critical
absolutism. On the one hand, transnationalism’s conception of human rights
must be politically contextualized and subjected to the realistic cost-benefit
analysis Weber called an ethics of responsibility. On the other hand, if human
rights are to retain normative force, their non-compromising, indeed, funda-
mentalist claims must not be done away with; politicization must leave
room for an ethics of conviction. Practicing human rights lawyers have long
applied both kinds of reasoning, even without fully articulating their under-
lying assumptions and complicated relationships. The last part of the Article
is an attempt to do exactly that.
Part I, Toward a Critique of Transnationalism, is preliminary to the main
argument. It reintroduces transnationalism and articulates some of the as-
sumptions the Article will use throughout the argument as well as the rele-
vant historical background. The constitutive moment this Article signals as
the “birth” of transnationalism is a 1993 U.S. Supreme Court case called
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council. This case exhibits the first signs of processes
that would later shape transnational policymaking and adjudication world-
wide. These two aspects of transnationalism will be explored separately.
Parts II and III focus on policymaking and enforcement, employing “dis-
aggregated sovereignty” as the main analytic instrument. Part II, Disaggre-
gated Sovereignty and Unauthorized Migration, shows the foresight of
Slaughter’s description of disaggregated sovereignty through a comparative
review of the law and policy relating to unauthorized migration over the last
15. An important exception is B.S. Chimni’s work on refugees, from which this Article’s own account
partly follows. Chimni demonstrated the contribution, to the violation of fundamental rights, of global-
ization processes similar to those described here. See generally B.S. Chimni, Globalization, Humanitarianism
and the Erosion of Refugee Protection (University of Oxford Refugee Studies Centre, Working Paper No. 3,
2000); B.S. Chimni, The Meaning of Words and the Role of UNHCR in Voluntary Repatriation, 5 Int’l J.
Refugee L. 442 (1993); Chimni, supra note 6. Another project from which this Article received inspira- R
tion is Kim Lane Scheppele’s interrogation of the role of transnational legal processes in curtailing consti-
tutional rights since 9/11. See Scheppele, supra note 11. R
16. In that respect it is comparable to José Alvarez’s critique of Slaughter’s liberalism, which “exam-
ines liberal theory from the inside.” Alvarez, supra note 3, at 193. R
17. This is the title of Chapter 6 of A New World Order, a book that is at the center of this
Article’s own critique. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order 216 (2004).
18. Max Weber, The Vocation Lectures 92 (2004).
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two decades. This background is internationally fact-intensive; the dialectic
of transnationalism is not meant solely as a theoretical concept. Rather, it
should be identifiable in real-life legal processes, some of which are still very
much underway as this Article is being finalized. Part III, Disaggregated Vio-
lence, then highlights precisely how the disaggregation of sovereignty per-
petuated human rights violations, both as a historical and as a structural
matter. This Article focuses on the violation of the “absolute” rights that
unauthorized migrants are presumed to have: the right of non-refoulement,
and the right against inhuman and degrading treatment. Such violations are
deeply related to the way transnationalism put “slices” of the sovereignty of
developing countries on a global market. The implication was the bifurca-
tion of judicial and executive competences; developed countries could “buy”
developing countries’ executive competences, without adjoining judicial
ones. Instead of all branches of government being unified by sovereignty and
separated by borders, branches of single governments are now often separated
from each other but unified across borders.
Part IV, Transnational Legal Process and Unauthorized Migration, shifts focus
to transnational judiciaries. The fundamental analytic instrument here is
Koh’s transnational legal process. This Part reviews a series of landmark cases,
which seem to confirm many of Koh’s arguments and intuitions about the
augmented protections that transnational courts provide to the globally dis-
empowered. However, Part V, Dialectic of Transnationalism—the heart of the
argument—reveals the ambiguous relationship of transnational courts with
transnational executives in an environment of disaggregated sovereignty.
Here the three “patterns” defining the dialectic of transnationalism are laid
out and explained. The juxtaposition of judicial and policymaking networks
demonstrates not only that executive agencies act beyond the reach of courts;
it shows how courts have been active players in a process that reduces the
accountability of executive branches for human rights violations. If exterri-
torial jurisdiction “hangs from the mouth of a firearm,” as Judge Giovanni
Bonello of the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) recently wrote
in a landmark case, there is plenty of room to exercise policies abroad—
without exposure to judicial review.19
Finally, Part VI, The Normativity of Transnationalism, offers some prelimi-
nary insights into how transnationalism should be applied today, if we are to
retain its emphasis on human rights. This Part provides three provisional
answers to the question as to what a politics freer from the failures of the
dominant articulations of transnationalism might look like. The approach
this Article proposes, critical absolutism, is not far from Koh’s transnational
public law litigation. It presents, however, a more accurate assessment of the
normativity of transnationalism. In the migration context, critical absolutism
identifies opportunities in which a fundamental political challenge can be
19. Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011), available at http://
www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e2545502.html.
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presented to states: either treat people as humans and risk changing who you
are (in terms of the composition of the population), or give up human rights
and risk changing who you are (in terms of your constitutive commit-
ments).20 The second path is the one to which transnationalism has led us
thus far. The first is the one to which critical absolutism tries to lead us.
I. Toward a Critique of Transnationalism
A. Transnationalism’s Normativity
The first influential articulation of the “transnational” character of law
emerged with Phillip Jessup’s Storrs Lectures at Yale Law School in 1955.21
Jessup provided a holistic view of the rules bearing on any legal problem:
some are “domestic,” while others are “international”; some “private”,
while others “public.”22 He famously proposed that the term transnational
law should “include all law which regulates actions or events that transcend
national frontiers.”23 The overlapping and sometimes contradictory authori-
ties that come into play, in problems ranging from a divorce case to a peace
treaty, are illuminated by procedural questions—notably, questions of
jurisdiction.
Jessup’s contribution significantly altered international law’s traditional
focus on states.24 Since the emergence of Westphalian sovereignty through
nineteenth-century international legal positivism, formally equal sovereign
states were the sources of legal authority.25 Jessup’s messier conception of
law was comparatively compelling, not least because it seemed descriptively
more accurate.26 Jessup’s transnational law recognized that domestic rules
20. Theoretical context for this dilemma can be found in Seyla Benhabib, The Rights of Others:
Aliens, Residents and Citizens (2004); Ruti G. Teitel, Humanity’s Law (2011).
21. Philip C. Jessup, Transnational Law (1956). The relevant ideas have deeper roots in classical
international law. This Article refers exclusively to a transnationalism that began in the twentieth cen-
tury, influenced by the end of WWII, the Nuremberg trials, and the end of decolonization. For a more
nuanced historical view, see generally Edward Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius,
Colonialism and Order in World Politics (2002).
22. Jessup, supra note 21, at 2, 26. See also Zumbansen, supra note 2. R
23. Jessup, supra note 21, at 2. R
24. This Article employs the term “legal consciousness” as Duncan Kennedy defined it. See Duncan
Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in
America, 1850–1940, 3 Res. L. & Soc. 3, 6 (1980); for a discussion and assessment of the term’s legacy,
see generally Susan Silbey, After Legal Consciousness, 1 Annu. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 323 (2005).
25. The added layer of customary international law was understood as an articulation of preexisting
norms—binding because they were in fact respected. In this context, the doctrine of the “persistent
objector” meant that this area of the law, too, did not override sovereignty. Bilateral and multilateral
treaties organized the relationships between them, but in the lack of a full-blown international judiciary,
the primary remedy for breach was reciprocity. For an interesting account of the normative underpinning
of positing state sovereignty as the source of legal authority, see generally Benedict Kingsbury, Legal
Positivism as Normative Politics: International Society, Balance of Power and Lassa Oppenheim’s Positive Interna-
tional Law, 13 Eur. J. Int. Law 401 (2002).
26. It is not by chance that his account of transnational law first influenced the social sciences, mainly
sociology and political science.
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abroad could, at times, have more influence on a state’s population than its
own legislation. One paradigmatic example comes from immigration law;
legalizing or prohibiting certain categories of immigration in one country
may significantly influence the lives of its neighbor’s population.27
In the 1990s, several decades after Jessup’s original contribution, transna-
tionalism became the primary orientation toward international law in Amer-
ican law schools.28 The legacy that developed differed significantly from
Jessup’s original contribution. Now, an “absolutely central” aspect of trans-
nationalism was that it was “normatively tinged.”29 The normative empha-
sis of transnationalism was developed by two of its preeminent theorists:
Harold Koh and Anne-Marie Slaughter.
Koh focused on judicial and quasi-judicial processes when he introduced
his two central, and related, conceptual contributions to transnational legal
theory: transnational legal process30 and transnational public law litigation.31 He
embraced Jessup’s description of intertwined and co-generative relations be-
tween domestic and international law and argued that courts, as well as
other public and private agencies, are in constant cross-border dialogue.32
Through this dialogue, termed transnational legal process, these diverse insti-
tutions interpret international law and influence each other to “internalize”
and further enforce international law. The normative bite comes from the
fact that as human rights become part of that law, this process will promote
greater human rights enforcement.33 Examining the extent to which this
occurred—or failed to occur—provides a good lens through which to assess
transnationalism, as well as to theorize transnational normativity more accu-
rately. The twin concept of transnational public law litigation is defined as
27. See Jessup, supra note 21, at 3 (explaining that a traveler “whose passport or other travel docu- R
ment is challenged at a European frontier confronts a transnational situation”).
28. Or, as Martti Koskenniemi scathingly put it, this “interdisciplinary approach” to international
law and international relations “found no significant examples beyond the Universities of the American
Northeast.” Koskeniemmi, The Role of Law in International Politics , supra note 2, at 30. R
29. Koskeniemmi, supra note 2; Koh, supra note 3. R
30. Koh, supra note 3. R
31. Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 Yale L.J. 2347 (1991).
32. Koh, supra note 3, at 186; Koh, supra note 2, at 745. R
33. Koh’s full explanation is as follows:
The process can be viewed as having four phases: interaction, interpretation, internalization,
and obedience. One or more transnational actors provokes an interaction (or series of interac-
tions) with another in a law-declaring forum, which forces an interpretation or enunciation of
the global norm applicable to the situation. By so doing, the moving party seeks not simply to
coerce the other party, but to internalize the new interpretation of the international norm into
the other party’s internal normative system. Its aim is to “bind” that other party to obey the
interpretation as part of its internal value set. That party’s perception that it now has an
internal obligation to follow the international norm as it has been domestically interpreted
leads it to step four: obedience to the newly interpreted norm.
Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced? 74 Ind. L.J. 1397, 1414 (1999).
For an earlier explanation, which applied to international law more generally, see Harold Hongju Koh,
Why Do Nations Obey International Law? 106 Yale L.J. 2599 (1997).
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litigation in domestic or international fora aimed at enforcing human rights
through transnational legal process.
Although Slaughter’s work also includes invaluable insights into the
function of judiciaries,34 her most original contributions relate to the disag-
gregated nature of transnational policymakers, especially in executive
branches. It is primarily in this context that this Article will revisit her
work.
In her seminal book A New World Order,35 Slaughter developed the idea of
disaggregated sovereignty, focusing on cross-border networks.36 In this and in
her previous work, she articulates many of the same norm-enforcing poten-
tials for transnational judicial review as Koh. More importantly, however,
she draws attention to the exponential growth of low-level and informal
cooperation among executives across borders.37 These connections advance
common purposes through what she calls “horizontal” coordination, which
supplements traditional “vertical” or hierarchical coordination.38
Slaughter’s normativity is somewhat more elusive than Koh’s. Unlike
Koh, she invokes “liberalism” much more often than “human rights.”39 By
“liberalism” one might refer to a family of political theories based on a
social contract between formally equal individuals, constrained by funda-
mental values and institutions that protect them. However, the special na-
ture of Slaughter’s “disaggregated sovereignty” is that it surpasses a
34. See, e.g., Slaughter, supra note 17, at 13–65; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 R
Va. J. Int’l L. 1103 (2000); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 Harv. Int’l L.J.
191 (2003); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. Rich. L. Rev. 99
(1994); Laurence R. Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter, Towards a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudi-
cation, 107 Yale L.J. 273 (1997).
35. Slaughter, supra note 17. R
36. All references to “networks” in this Article refer to the transnational networks Slaughter wrote
about. For a different definition of networks, see David Singh Grewal, Network Power: The Social
Dynamics of Globalization (2008).
37. Slaughter, supra note 17, at 36–64, 131–65. See also Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New Order, R
76 Foreign Aff. 183 (1997). This insight should, in the final analysis, problematize and relativize the
notions of borders and territory. See generally Bertrand Badie, La fin des territoires: essai sur le
desordre international et l’utilite sociale du respect (1995).
38. It is crucially important to establish at the outset that “disaggregated sovereignty” does not mean
that sovereignty is diminished. What this process means is that sovereignty changes. See Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Disaggregated Sovereignty: Towards the Public Accountability of Global Government Networks, 39
Government and Opposition 159, 189 (2004) (“At first glance, disaggregating the state and grant-
ing at least a measure of sovereignty to its component parts might appear to weaken the state . . . But in
a world in which sovereignty means the capacity to participate in cooperative regimes in the collective
interest of states, expanding the formal capacity of different state institutions to interact with their
counterparts around the world means expanding state power.”). Koh, too, rejected the idea that the
internalization of international law characteristic of transnationalism reduces sovereignty. Rather, he em-
phasized how it can enhance “soft power.” See Harold Hongju Koh, Foreword: On American Exceptionalism,
55 Stan. L. Rev. 1479, 1480 (2003). For an alternative view according to which it is precisely the
“waning” of sovereignty that accounts for intensified borders, see generally Wendy Brown, Walled
States, Waning Sovereignty (2010).
39. For a critical analysis of Slaughter’s liberalism, and its grounding in neo-Kantian political theory
on the one hand and on an “empirical fact” on the other hand, see Alvarez, supra note 3, at 185–86. R
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contractual vision of sovereignty in important ways.40 Here, the social con-
tract between citizens can be preserved only as one contract among many;
others constitute a network of flexible agreements through which state agen-
cies connect to other entities outside of the state.
When Slaughter argues that disaggregated sovereignty will potentially ad-
vance “A Just World Order,” she means that it will promote a familiar set
of values, best understood in terms of the liberties and protections that we
think of when we talk about human rights. These are flexible and amenable
to varying interpretations. But there are some actions that such values must
categorically preclude: “Operating in a world of generalizable principles . . .
requires a baseline of acceptable normative behavior.”41 What this means,
minimally, is that it does not make sense to say that disaggregated sover-
eignty advances liberal values if it actually reproduces violations of these
baseline rights.
More generally, if the distinctly transnational characteristics of law are
implicated in violating human rights—even while otherwise promoting
their enforcement—then both Koh’s and Slaughter’s normative positions are
flawed. Transnationalism’s normative fervor should then be significantly
rethought.
B. Conviction and Responsibility in Human Rights
What justifies human rights law is an open philosophical question. In
particular, debate persists on the question as to whether they can be insu-
lated from cost-benefit concerns.42 This Article will assume their philosophi-
cal justifiability and highlight some of its entailments. In the legal
consciousness that does hold that human rights rules are morally binding,
they flow from a demand to protect human dignity.43 According to this
40. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971). Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, the most widely acknowl-
edged twentieth-century articulation of political liberalism, was premised on political life in a state. It
was only later that he attempted to apply his theory beyond the black box of sovereignty: “[T]he basic
structure is that of a closed society: that is, we are to regard it as self-contained and as having no relations
with other societies. Its members enter it only by birth and leave it only by death.” John Rawls,
Political Liberalism 12 (1993) (quoted in Bruce Ackerman, Political Liberalisms, 91 J. Phil. 364, 379
(1994) (critiquing Rawls)). Transnationalism challenges the domestic/international divide, and therefore
necessarily challenges the universal validity of the order of priorities that appears in Rawls.
41. Slaughter, supra note 38, at 190. R
42. The dilemma has been discussed endlessly in the context of the debate on torture and, particu-
larly, with respect to the “ticking bomb scenario.” See, e.g., Henry Shue, Torture in Dreamland: Disposing of
the Ticking Bomb, 37 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 231 (2006).
43. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights pmbl., G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/
3/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948); U.N. Charter. German law is unique in the fact it has an absolute right to
dignity. Grundgesetz fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law],
May 23, 1949, BGBl. I art. 1, § 1 (Ger.) (German Basic Law provision that human dignity is “inviola-
ble”). See also G.P. Fletcher, Human Dignity As a Constitutional Value, 22 U. W. Ontario L. Rev. 171,
171 (1984) (“No one would question whether the protection of human dignity was a primary task of
contemporary legal culture”). On the ambiguous status of dignity in U.S. law, and its relationship with
concepts of dignity in foreign and international law, see Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Dialogue and
Human Dignity: States and Transnational Constitutional Discourse, 65 Mont. L. Rev. 15 (2004). For an
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\54-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 11 11-JUL-13 11:47
2013 / Dialectic of Transnationalism 325
demand, there are certain evils from which every human being should be
protected at all costs, by virtue of membership in the human species. The
question of who should be responsible for such protections—or pay their
costs—can be deeply controversial. But the command of such rights is never
thought to depend upon citizenship or physical location, let alone other
more invidious distinctions between human beings. If transnational law sys-
tematically reproduces violations of the elementary obligations that follow
from dignity, then it can no longer claim to help enforce human rights.
Human rights are broadly divided into two families. One family of rights
is subject to legitimate limitations, on which states decide through political
process. These include, among others, the right to privacy, freedom of ex-
pression, voting rights, and the right to property. This family of rights is
subject to the considerations of social costs and benefits, which sociologist
Max Weber called an ethics of responsibility.44 Such determinations can be
made by citizens, their representatives, or judges. Their articulation is
“slow, strong drilling through hard boards, with a combination of passion
and a sense of judgment.”45
However, some rights are defined in positive law precisely by the idea
that one must not take into account the social costs of protecting them. The
rules that relate to them remain binding regardless of political determina-
tion. Weber called the relevant reasoning an ethics of conviction, which applies
in moments when one has no choice but to act according to absolute impera-
tives: “[H]ere I stand, I can do no other.”46 One of the most perplexing
aspects of human rights law is, indeed, the attempt to define such moments
by legal rules and doctrine.
Imperatives that “brook no compromise” are familiar to Americans from
the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The absolute nature of the prohi-
bition on torture grants it extraordinary importance in contemporary politi-
cal discourse. Virtually all of the European bills of rights include a core set
of such imperatives, which are best understood in terms of a Weberian ethics
of conviction. These absolute commitments are imagined to be “the founding
principle of a global order of reason in a post-sovereignty world.”47 Such
prohibitions are supposed to transcend political debate, and courts that en-
force them are presumed to be acting outside of the political arena.48 In
European bills of rights, as in CAT, the scope of such absolutist, transcen-
alternative argument, according to which dignity is not the foundation value underlying human rights,
see Jeremy Waldron, Is Dignity the Foundation of Human Rights? (NYU School of Law, Public Law Re-
search Paper No. 12-73, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2196074 or http://dx.doi.org/10.
2139/ssrn.2196074.
44. Weber, supra note 18. R
45. Martti Koskenniemi, Human Rights Mainstreaming as a Strategy for Institutional Power, 1 Humanity
47, 55 (2010) (quoting Max Weber, The Profession and Vocation of Politics, in Political Writings (Peter
Lassman and Ronald Spiers eds.)).
46. Weber, supra note 18, at 92. R
47. Paul Kahn, Torture and the Dream of Reason, 78 Soc. Res. 747, 764 (2011).
48. Id.
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dent rules extends further than just torture. The rules also apply to “inhu-
man and degrading treatment” (as provided for, for example, in Article 3 of
the European Convention of Human Rights (“ECHR”)).49 While the duty
to grant Refugee Status does allow for exceptions, here, too, we find an
underlying obligatory rule—that of non-refoulement.50
What a court declares as inhuman or degrading treatment is prohibited
activity for all agencies and organs on which the court has authority. These
obligations, which all fall under Article 3 of the ECHR,51 figure in the
transnational legal consciousness as a law on which all other law must de-
pend; indeed, a kind of global Grundnorm, under which legal and moral
49. European Convention on Human Rights art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter
ECHR]. The relationship between these two categories is not always clear and has been growing exceed-
ingly controversial in the last decade or so. In this context, however, we can afford to avoid a deeper
discussion about what these words should denote. For such a discussion, see Ronald Dworkin, Cruel,
Inhuman and Degrading Treatment, (New York Univ. Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers, Paper
No. 98, 2008), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/98. For the point made above, note language
like that of the European Court of Human Rights in Gäfgen v. Germany:
Societies that are founded upon the rule of law do not tolerate or sanction, whether directly,
indirectly or otherwise, the perpetration of treatment that is absolutely prohibited by Article 3
of the Convention. Neither the wording of Article 3 nor that of any other provision of the
Convention makes a distinction between the consequences to be attached to torture and those
attaching to inhuman and degrading treatment. There is thus no legal basis, in our view, for
regarding inhuman treatment as different from torture in terms of the consequences that flow
from the perpetration thereof.
Gäfgen v. Germany, App. No. 22978/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010).
50. The principle of non-refoulement asserts the right not to be deported to where one is expected to
suffer egregious human rights violations. It is put forth in Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, which
provides the following:
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever
to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there
are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is,
or who, having been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime, constitutes
a danger to the community of that country.
For the exceptions to the obligation to grant refugee status (but not to the rule of non-refoulement) see
Article 1F of the Refugee Convention, stating that:
The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are
serious reasons for considering that: (a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or
a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provi-
sion in respect of such crimes; (b) he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the
country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee; (c) he has been guilty of
acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jul. 28, 1951 [hereinafter Refugee Convention];
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967 [hereinafter Protocol]. Derogation in the case
of “mass influx” does not appear in the Convention or its protocol, but was introduced, for example, in
Article 2 of the European Temporary Protection Directive, July 20, 2001. For more on this, see generally
Ann Vibeke Eggli, Mass Refugee Influx and the Limits of Public International Law (2002).
51. See, e.g., Abdolkhani v. Turkey, App. No. 30471/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009).
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imperatives converge.52 If one expresses support for violating such rights,
the position is judged as morally illegitimate; the adversity with whoever
advances such a position is no longer political, insofar as politics requires
discourse. The relationship becomes one of enmity.53
Weber did not write about human rights, but his distinction is very use-
ful in order to stress a doctrinal difference between different kinds of rights.
Weber thought that these two modes of ethical reasoning were complemen-
tary. Although the ethics of responsibility is described as a result of political
processes and the ethics of conviction is described as beyond politics (Weber’s
image is one of a prophet), “authentic” political life always involves both:54 a
pragmatic, utilitarian willingness to strike compromises, and a deontologi-
cal, indeed, fundamentalist vision leading us beyond what is merely given
by circumstances. A meaningful commitment to human rights is fruitfully
characterized as being bound to this dual foundation.55
The focus of this Article will be on the non-derogable human rights that
require an ethics of commitment. Through an examination of transnational law
along the fault lines between developed and developing states, this Article
shows that transnationalism’s distinctive characteristics have often repro-
duced their violation. Interestingly, these violations never occurred with a
manifest denouncement of human rights. Rather, what we see throughout
the last two decades is a constant push toward pragmatism. But, as this
Article argues, once this push is complete, human rights lose their norma-
tive content.
C. The Haiti Paradigm
In the context of transnationalism, unauthorized migration is not just
another policy issue. As many have shown in the social sciences, its salience
around the world is a result of transnational processes.56 Unauthorized mi-
gration is a paradigmatically transnational issue, and findings with respect
to unauthorized migrants go to the heart of any normative assessment of
transnationalism.
This is true not only analytically, but also historically. The Haitian refu-
gee crisis, which began in the early 1980s off the coast of Florida, is a crucial
52. Paul Kahn, The Question of Sovereignty, 40 Stan. J. Int’l L. 259, 262 (2004) (discussing a transna-
tional legal consciousness in which human rights replaced sovereignty as “the foundation of the interna-
tional legal order”). See also Kahn, supra note 2, at 11–12 (discussing the role of jus cogens norms and R
explaining that “[h]uman rights norms establish the minimal conditions of the new legal order, without
which we cannot speak of it as a legal order at all”).
53. Such obligations thus delineate “the borders of tolerance” for a particular legal consciousness
centered on universal human rights. For a related analysis of liberal tolerance, see Stanley Fish, The Trouble
with Tolerance, The Chronicle Review, Nov. 10, 2006, at B8.
54. Weber, supra note 18, at 92. R
55. For a similar point made in a different context, see Itamar Mann, The Dual Foundation of Universal
Jurisdiction: Towards a Jurisprudence for the ‘Court of Critique’, 1 Transnat’l Legal Theory 485 (2010).
56. See, e.g., Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assem-
blages 291–96 (2006).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\54-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 14 11-JUL-13 11:47
328 Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 54
starting point for understanding the significance of migration problems for
transnational legal theory.57 Koh, responding to these events, articulated his
ideas on transnational legal process as well as on transnational public law litiga-
tion, as he represented Haitian refugees in U.S. courts.58 Moreover, the role
of bilateral relations between the United States and Haiti in this crisis fore-
shadowed the dark sides of disaggregated sovereignty.59 For better or worse,
Haiti provided a paradigm for international law in the next two decades.
The model of law that came out of the Haiti affair, combining bilateral
relations, a treaty, and a domestic court, later migrated outside of the
United States.60
Facing an increasing number of Haitian refugees and unauthorized mi-
grants, President Ronald Reagan published Executive Order 12,324 in Sep-
tember 1981.61 The Order, “the model . . . for all that has followed,”62
allowed the U.S. Coast Guard to intercept Haitians on the high seas. These
passengers of often-unseaworthy boats were then returned to Haiti under a
bilateral agreement with the Haitian government.63 Traditionally, interna-
tional law does not allow states to perform enforcement tasks on the high
57. For an overview of the relevant history, see generally Harold Hongju Koh, America’s Offshore Refu-
gee Camps, 29 U. Rich. L. Rev. 139 (1994).
58. See generally Koh, supra note 57. R
59. This Article ascribes considerable weight to bilateral treaties in shaping the international legal
environment. One justification for this approach appears in Gabriella Blum, Bilateralism, Multilateralism,
and the Architecture of International Law, 49 Harv. Int’l L.J. 323, 379 (2008) (arguing that “the role of
BLTs as a source of international law and a tool of international relations should be restored from its
currently neglected place in international law scholarship”).
60. The idea that law “migrated” is borrowed from Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Excep-
tionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 Yale L.J. 1564, 1576 (2006). Koh
believed there was a wide divide on the relevant legal issues between American and foreign law on these
issues. While the U.S. Supreme Court could flout international law, foreign courts were bound by “prin-
ciples of comity, sanctity of treaty, and respect for human rights that must form the bedrock of any new
world order.” Harold Hongju Koh, Reflections on Refoulement and Haitians Centers Council, 35 Harv.
Int’l L.J. 1, 20 (1994). The same general idea appears in the work of Jürgen Habermas, who believes
there is a considerable gap between American and European ideas of law on a global scale: “The crucial
issue of dissent is whether justification through international law can, and should, be replaced by the
unilateral, world-ordering politics of a self-appointed hegemon.” Jürgen Habermas, Interpreting the Fall of
a Monument, 4 Ger. L.J. 701, 706 (2003). See also Martti Koskenniemi, International Law as Political
Theology: How to Read Nomos der Erde?, 11 Constellations 492, 493 (2004). This Article, however,
emphasizes the continuum between the behaviors and policies of developed countries, even if legal reason-
ings sometimes differed. It turns out that it is precisely values like comity and sanctity of treaty that can
contribute to human rights problems characteristic of “the new world order.”
61. Exec. Order No. 12,324, 46 Fed. Reg. 48, 109 (Sept. 29, 1981).
62. Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Right to Seek Asylum: Interception at Sea and the Principle on Non-Refoule-
ment, 23 Int’l J. Refugee L. 443, 443 (2011). Koh was the first person to argue that the Haitian
refugee crisis should be understood “not as sui generis, but as illustrating a paradigmatic crisis of the New
World Disorder.” Harold Hongju Koh, Refugees, The Courts, and the New World Order, 1994 Utah L.
Rev. 999, 1009 (1994). See generally Harold Hongju Koh, The “Haiti Paradigm” in United States Human
Rights Policy, 103 Yale L.J. 2391 (1994). For a broader account of Haiti’s place in the history of world
politics, see generally Susan Buck-Morss, Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History (2009).
63. Migrants—Interdiction: Agreement Effected by Exchange of Notes, U.S.-Haiti, Sept. 23, 1981,
33 U.S.T. 3559.
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seas (under the doctrine of the “freedom of the high seas”),64 but the state of
embarkation is not bound by this rule.65 The way around this limitation was
therefore for the United States to obtain Haiti’s permission. When this co-
operation was established, Haitians seeking asylum were sent to a facility in
Guantanamo Bay, where their requests for protection were processed.
After Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was ousted in September
1991 by a military coup d’etat, the number of refugees and migrants seeking
asylum in the United States surged.66 President George H.W. Bush re-
sponded to this influx in May 1992 with Executive Order 12,807. Under
this new, more restrictive measure, President Bush authorized the U.S.
Coast Guard to return all fleeing Haitians to their country—this time, with
no process at all.67 The legality of the policies put in place by the earlier
Executive Order 12,324 was questionable and led to “transnational public
law litigation.”68 But many activists and scholars believed that the new or-
der even more flagrantly violated both domestic and international obliga-
tions.69 Under the 1967 Protocol to the 1951 Refugee Convention, the
United States was required to grant access to asylum and to not return peo-
ple to places where their rights would be violated (“non-refoulement”).70
Several court cases were brought during a campaign against the “policy of
refoulement” launched by the Haiti Centers Council and other organizations.71
Some courts granted refugees and unauthorized migrants important reme-
dies.72 However, the efforts of these activists reached a dead end in Sale v.
Haitian Centers Council, where the principal question came before the U.S.
64. This is not something the court discusses in Sale, presumably (among other reasons) because the
United States is not a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”).
However, many of UNCLOS’s provisions are considered to be part of customary international law. For
this reason, such an agreement was presumably required to offset Article 87 of the Convention. The
provision, codifying the ancient principle of “the freedom of navigation,” bars the interception of boats
on the high seas. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 87, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397, 432 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
65. Under Article 94 of UNCLOS, the “flag state” maintains jurisdiction over its own boats when
they are on the high seas. UNCLOS, supra note 64, at 434. “These asylum seekers were interviewed . . . R
aboard Coast Guard cutters,” and twenty-eight “were found to have credible asylum claims . . . .” U.S.
Processing of Haitian Asylum Seekers: Testimony before the Subcomm. on Legis. and Nat’l Security of the H. Comm.
on Gov’t Operations, 102d Cong. 1 (1992) (statement of Harold J. Johnson, Director, Foreign Econ. Assis-
tance Issues, Nat’l Security and Int’l Affairs Div., Gov’t Accountability Office).
66. From 1981 to 1991, approximately 24,600 Haitian asylum seekers were interdicted at sea en
route to the United States. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, The State of the World’s Refugees 1993:
The Challenge of Protection, ch. 2, at 15 (Jan. 1, 1993), available at http://www.unhcr.org/4a4c6da96.html.
67. Exec. Order No. 12,807, 3 C.F.R. 303–04 (1993). This order came to be known as the “Ken-
nebunkport Order.” See also Koh, supra note 62, at 2396. R
68. See generally Koh, supra note 67, at 2398–2409. R
69. Jeffrey Sterling Kahn, Islands of Sovereignty: Haitian Migration and the Orders of Empire (Mar.
2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with author).
70. See United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1, Jan. 31, 1967, 606
U.N.T.S. 268, 268.
71. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 60, at 13. R
72. The Haitian Centers Council won an important district court judgment that ordered the release to
the United States of more than 200 Haitian refugees, who were being held in Guantanamo. See Haitian
Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
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Supreme Court: did interception on the high seas violate the United States’s
obligations under the 1967 Protocol to the Refugee Convention?73
Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the majority, found that the duty of
non-refoulement does not extend to the high seas. Choosing a narrow textual
interpretation of the Convention centered on the fact that the French verb
“ refouler” means “to expel” or “to deport,” he held that its obligations are
strictly territorial.74
Justice Harry Blackmun wrote a minority opinion that would subse-
quently prove important in the precedent’s transnational legal trajectory.
According to Blackmun, the policy introduced by Executive Order 12,807,
intercepting unauthorized Haitian migrants at sea and returning them to
Haiti, violated the Convention’s central provision—the rule of non-refoule-
ment.75 He thus rejected Stevens’ textual interpretation.
Blackmun’s opinion rests upon an alternative underlying theory of when
Convention obligations apply. The important factor, according to this the-
ory, is that agents and organs of the U.S. government were intercepting
refugees. These agents remain bound to treaty obligations, even when they
act exterritorialy.76 Though Blackmun does not use the (technical) term, the
underlying rule here is one of effective control.77 The United States is, of
course, not required to grant access to asylum to all asylum seekers the
world over. Only when it uses force beyond its own borders does it create
certain rights (of access to asylum) to the people upon whom it uses force.
Blackmun considers fulfilling those rights—and the obligations that fol-
low—as a conviction deeply related to a historical experience. Thus, he
closes his opinion with dramatic lines: “The convention that the Refugee
Act embodies was enacted largely in response to the experience of Jewish
73. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 158–59 (1993). Although the case raised
important issues in domestic U.S. immigration law, this Article chooses to focus here on the interna-
tional law issues, as they are the ones relevant to the general argument.
74. Justice Stevens wrote:
The drafters of the Convention . . . may not have contemplated that any nation would gather
fleeing refugees and return them to the one country they had desperately sought to escape;
such actions may even violate the spirit of Article 33; but a treaty cannot impose uncontem-
plated extraterritorial obligations on those who ratify it through no more than its general
humanitarian intent. Because the text of Article 33 cannot reasonably be read to say anything
at all about a nation’s actions toward aliens outside its own territory, it does not prohibit such
actions.
Id. at 183.
75. See id. at 188–90.
76. Sale, 509 U.S. at 190–93.
77. Relatively recently, the European Court of Human Rights developed this concept significantly in
Al-Skeini, supra note 19. Compare id. with Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 770–71 (2008) (requiring R
de facto sovereignty in order to apply habeas corpus); David Jenkins, Habeas Corpus and Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction after Boumediene: Towards a Doctrine of ‘Effective Control’ in the United States, 9 Hum. Rts. L.
Rev. 306 (2009). The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause is arguably “[t]he most important human rights
provision in the Constitution.” Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Most Important Human Right in the Constitution,
32 B.U. L. Rev. 143, 143 (1952).
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refugees in Europe during the period of World War II. The tragic conse-
quences of the world’s indifference at that time are well known.”78 Immedi-
ately thereafter, the words that come directly before “I dissent” espouse a
theory of dignity centered on a right to be heard: “We should not close our
ears” to the refugees, says Blackmun.79 The moral force of this obligation,
which Blackmun understood to be above and beyond the bilateral relations
the United States has formed with Haiti, binds one as a matter of an ethics of
conviction.
However, no less important than the differences between the two opin-
ions—and this is worth emphasizing—are their common underlying as-
sumptions. These assumptions may seem so obvious as not to require
explanation.80 They are common to any court engaged in rights-based judi-
cial review—at least so long as no such court has truly universal jurisdic-
tion.81 Both opinions implicitly imagine a plain of executive policies, some
of which take place inside of and some of which take place outside of U.S.
sovereign territory. Under both of these opinions, only part of these policies
(and the effects they have) is judicially reviewable. This may seem inconse-
quential, but it is not. Blackmun, like Stevens, focused exclusively on the
policies established by Executive Order 12,807. The earlier policies of Exec-
utive Order 12,324 were beyond his consideration, as was the bilateral
agreement with Haiti, which allowed U.S. agents to intercept Haitian na-
tionals on the high seas.
One might imagine executives and judiciaries as having perfectly compat-
ible authorities and competences, neatly folding into each other under a
unitary sovereignty.82 According to such a picture, all executive acts are
potentially subject of rights-based judicial review.83 With respect to actions
taken abroad, however, this is never true; both Stevens and Blackmun omit-
78. Sale, 509 U.S. at 207.
79. Id. at 208.
80. This is a truism about adjudication, in the sense that Scott Shapiro discusses truisms about law.
Scott Shapiro, Legality 15–16 (2011). Cf. Duncan Kennedy, supra note 24, at 6. R
81. Some courts have universal criminal or civil jurisdiction, but the idea of a universal human rights
court, though not new, is far from any serious implementation. For a review of the history of this idea
and its possible contemporary relevance, see Manfred Nowak, On the Creation of a World Court of Human
Rights, 7 Nat’l Taiwan U. L. Rev. 257 (2012).
82. The position that judicial review should potentially reach every state act is associated with Aharon
Barak’s jurisprudence, and expounded in Owen M. Fiss, Law is Everywhere, 117 Yale L. J. 257, 275, 278
(2007). In the context of administrative acts, see Kingsbury et al., supra note 13, at 17 (explaining that R
“[d]omestic law presumes a shared sense of what constitutes administrative action, even though it may
be defined primarily in the negative—as state acts that are not legislative or judicial—and even though
the boundaries between these categories are blurred at the margins[,]” but immediately contrasting this
characterization with the form that law takes in the transnational condition, stating that “[b]eyond the
domain of the state, no such agreed functional differentiation prevails; the institutional landscape is
much more variegated than in domestic settings.”).
83. See Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011), for the most recent
articulation of the latter view. See also Edwin D. Dickinson, Jurisdiction at the Maritime Frontier, 40 Harv.
L. Rev. 1, 1 (1926) (“The maritime frontier presents some unique jurisdictional difficulties . . . . If
jurisdiction on the one side is primarily territorial in nature, on the other side it would seem to be
primarily personal or national.”).
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ted a discussion of the agreement with Haiti, placing that aspect of U.S.
policy beyond Supreme Court review.
Thus, the Haiti affair raises a structural issue that recurs throughout the
following two decades. Where do obligations that particular states owe to all
human beings begin? And where do they end? The unfolding of the dialectic
of transnationalism over this period will be a story about the difficult at-
tempts to negotiate this line.
One can trace to the present day a red thread of related and incrementally
developing policies, passing through various jurisdictions and flowing from
the 1981 “model for all that followed.”84 The idea that a bilateral agree-
ment would grant a developed state enforcement authorities that initially
belonged to a developing one became a paradigm for the next two decades.
The relevant history leads from Haiti to Europe, Africa, Australia, and
Southeast Asia. It contains important lessons on how transnationalism deliv-
ered on its promises—and where it failed to do so. The 1993 Sale v. Haitian
Centers Council decision is our point of departure.
II. Disaggregated Sovereignty and Unauthorized Migration
A. The Migration of Regulation
The New York Times report on Sale foresaw key features of what was to
follow in the next two decades.85 It already suggested that the border en-
forcement practices that the Supreme Court upheld in Sale would be
adopted in legal systems abroad.86 This Part aims to demonstrate that the
disaggregation of sovereignty provides the most accurate analytic model of
how this occurred. As the newspaper reported:
[L]ast week, when the Supreme Court, in an 8-1 decision, upheld
the Haitian repatriation policy, immigration experts could not
help but wonder: Will this ruling by one of the most influential
courts in the world set a tempting precedent, particularly for de-
veloping nations? If the United States, with imprimatur of its
highest court, appears to put the protection of its borders above
its responsibilities under international law, will others be enticed
to follow suit?87
Although developing states would later play a critical role in the history
that unfolded, the most direct importers of the American precedent were
developed ones.
84. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 62, at 443. R
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In March 1997, Italy concluded a bilateral agreement with the Albanian
government, which would allow Italy to intercept boats of unauthorized
migrants on the high seas.88 The legality of this measure was premised on
Executive Order 12,807. The Italians have reportedly been pushing back
Albanian migrants and refugees with no process at all since 1991.89 But
now, the measure was justified in light of President Bush’s Executive Order.
Like Bush’s order did in Haiti, the Italian-Albanian agreement established a
maritime blockade around Albania, while a growing number of people fled
Tirana. As one Italian legal scholar clarified, citing Sale, the freedom of the
high seas is merely a presumption of international law; it can be altered
under bilateral agreements.90
Four years later, the Australian government followed suit with the more
ambitious “Pacific Solution.”91 This milestone policy was ignited by the
August 2001 MV Tampa Affair.92 The Tampa, a Norwegian boat that saved
438 Afghans from drowning off the coast of Australia, sought to disembark
in Australia. The Australian government refused to accept the Afghans and
instead deployed Australian Special Forces to prevent the ship from
disembarking.93
Determined to prevent such events from happening again, Australia
adopted several measures that removed thousands of Pacific Islands from
Australia’s “migration zone.”94 With the “Pacific Solution,” the islands
were redefined so that they would no longer constitute Australian sovereign
88. See Tugba Basaran, Security, Law and Borders 78 (2010); International Organization for
Migration, Return and Readmission to Albania: The Experience of Selected EU Member States, at 102–04 (2006),
http://www.iomtirana.org.al/en/E-Library/Books/EC%20research.pdf.
89. See id.
90. The inspiration coming from the U.S. arrangement was likely quite direct; in a 1999 treatise on
the Rules of International Law on Illegal Immigration by Sea, Italian legal scholar Tullio Scovazzi specifi-
cally cites Reagan’s Executive Order 12,324 as a precedent for the legality of the Italian-Albanian agree-
ment. Scovazzi, a leading authority on maritime law, clarifies that the “freedom of the high seas” is
merely a presumption of international law, and can therefore be altered under bilateral agreements pro-
viding otherwise. See Tullio Scovazzi, Le Norme di Diritto Internazionale Sull’immigrazione Illegale via Mare
Con Particolare Riferimento Ai Rapporti Tra Albania e Italia, in La Crisi Albanese Del 1997 (Andrea de
Guttry and Fabrizio Pagani eds., 1999). See also Efthymios Papastavridis, ‘Fortress Europe’ and FRONTEX:
Within or Without International Law?, 79 Nordic J. Int’l L. 75, 87–88 (2010).
91. Penelope Mathew, Australian Refugee Protection in the Wake of the Tampa, 96 Am. J. Int’l L. 661,
661 (2002). See generally Peter Mares, Borderline: Australia’s Response to Refugees and Asy-
lum Seekers in the Wake of the Tampa (2003); Austl., Report of Select Comm. on a Certain Mari-
time Incident, Senate, Oct. 23, 2002, 1–12.
92. Mathew, supra note 91, at 661; Austl., Report of Select Comm. on a Certain Maritime Incident, R
supra note 91, at 1–4. R
93. The measure was upheld by the Australian High Court in its landmark decision in Ruddock v.
Vadarlis. While the two majority judges in the application for habeas corpus held that closing the mari-
time borders was the prerogative of the executive branch, the minority judge found that such measures
would require a parliamentary act. And indeed, with the “Pacific Solution,” the legislature took that
invitation to put in place a much wider framework for offshore processing. See Ruddock v. Vadarlis (2001)
110 FCR 491 (Fed. Ct.) (three-judge panel) (Aus.).
94. Mathew, supra note 91, at 662; Australian Parliament, supra note 91, at 5. R
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territory for the purpose of refugee protection.95 Australia employed its navy
to intercept migrants and asylum seekers who sailed in. These people origi-
nally came mainly from Afghanistan, but also from Iraq, Iran, China and
Vietnam. Under this policy, asylum seekers could more easily be intercepted
extraterritorially, and sent to detention and offshore processing sites on
Christmas Island, Manus Island in Papua New Guinea, and the tiny island
nation of Nauru.96 According to the new law, the Australian government
had discretion as to whether it would hear the asylum applications of those
held outside the “migration zone.”97
The new policy was based upon the idea that Australia was not required
to grant access to Refugee Convention rights to those intercepted outside of
Australia’s “migration zone.”98 This demanded legal justification, which
Australian government lawyers were quick to provide.99 One comment is
particularly indicative of their inspiration: “Support for this conclusion is to
be found in the US Supreme Court case of Sale v. Haitian Centers Council
Inc. . . . [I]n an 8:1 decision the Court considered the terms of the Conven-
tion and the travaux préparatoires and concluded that the Convention did
not place any limits on the President’s authority to repatriate aliens inter-
dicted beyond the territorial seas of the United States.”100 Australia adopted
the American position.101
Both Italy and Australia were pioneers in establishing fruitful new part-
nerships with developing states to solve their migration problems.102 In the
95. For detailed accounts of the legislation that this required, see Mathew, supra note 91, at 661; R
Michelle Foster, The Implications of the Failed ‘Malaysian Solution’: the Australian High Court and Refugee
Responsibility Sharing at International Law, 13 Melbourne J. Int’l L., 1, 4–6 (2012); Australian Par-
liament, supra note 91, at 5. R
96. For a detailed account of the relevant navy operation (“Operation Relex”), see Australian Par-
liament, supra note 91, at 13–30. R
97. This arrangement was not challenged again in the Australian High Court after Ruddock, supra note
93. R
98. Australian Parliament, supra note 91, at 5. R
99. See, e.g., Article 31—Refugees Unlawfully in the Country of Refuge—An Australian Perspective, Refugee
and Humanitarian Division Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (Oct.
2002).
100. Id. at 129.
101. One Australian scholar cites this as a possibility in a “current development” piece about the
Pacific Solution, granting more evidence that the precedents occupied the minds of Australian lawyers at
the time. See Mathew, supra note 91. However, the truth is that the influence was more direct: R
The Australian government appears to think that interdiction is compatible with the Refugee
Convention. In support of this view, it could cite the precedent of the United States’s interdic-
tion of Haitian asylum seekers. However, although at various times the U.S. program did
provide for some sort of hearings (albeit unsatisfactory ones) regarding the Haitians’ claims,
refugee advocates fear that many genuine refugees were rejected. In any event, the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s 8-1 decision upholding the practice (Justice Harry Blackmun dissented) which
rests on the supposed territorial scope of the Refugee Convention has been criticized.
Id. at 666. See also Azadeh Dastyari, Refugees on Guantanamo Bay: A Blue Print for Australia’s ‘Pacific
Solution’?, 79 Australian Q. 4 (2007).
102. On Italy, see, for example, Mateo Tondini, Fishers of Men? The Interception of Migrants in the
Mediterranean Sea and Their Forced Return to Libya, INEX Paper, 4–10 (2010); Salvatore Coluccello and
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next years, Southern European countries—which under the Schengen Con-
vention had largely opened their own internal borders—faced an influx of
unauthorized migrants, particularly from the Middle East and Africa.103
Across the Mediterranean and the Western coast of Africa, European mem-
ber states established agreements with authorities in migrant-sending coun-
tries and “transit countries.”104 Under these agreements, European member
states provided equipment such as boats to African navies or coastguards,
and manned these boats with their own personnel, often termed
“experts.”105
The migration of law from U.S.-Haiti relations to other parts of the world
is consistent with Slaughter’s descriptive account of disaggregated sover-
eignty. It suggests, first, that—like property—sovereignty is conceptualized
as a “bundle of rights” which one can add to or detract from at will.106 It
also suggests that policymakers learn from each other, across borders.107
However, “disaggregated sovereignty” implies a stronger claim. More than
just a study of sovereignty’s un-bundling, or a comparative study of mutual
influences, it is a theory of how such processes are generated. The next three
subsections focus precisely on that how. Cross-border influence is generated
through (1) policymaking networks; (2) enforcement networks; and (3)
human rights and refugee protection networks.
1. Policymaking Networks
How did the numerous bilateral (and multilateral) agreements on migra-
tion control develop? In the United States, Europe, and Australia, these
agreements were the result of negotiations, which spawned fruitful poli-
cymaking networks. These networks are composed of diplomats and regula-
tors and, occasionally, domestic legislators.108
Simon Massey, Out of Africa: The Human Trade between Libya and Lampedusa, 10 Trends Organ. Crim.
77, 81–84 (describing partnerships with Tunisia, Morocco and Libya). On the cooperative frameworks
Australia developed immediately after the Tampa Affair, see, for example, Australian Parliament,
supra note 91, at 291–313. R
103. Perhaps the most familiar example is the cooperation between Italy and Libya. For a good review
of the most important bilateral treaty between the two, see Natalino Ronzitti, The Treaty of Friendship,
Partnership and Cooperation between Italy and Libya: New Prospects for Cooperation in the Mediterranean?, Paper
presented at the Mediterranean Strategy Group Conference on “Is regional cooperation in the Maghreb
possible? Implications for the Region and External Actors,” in cooperation with German Marshall Fund
of the United States (Genoa, 11–12 May 2009), www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iai0909.pdf.
104. See, e.g., Tine Van Criekinge, The EU-Africa Migration Partnership: A Case Study of the EU’s Migra-
tion Dialogue with Ghana and Senegal, EUI Migration Working group papers (2010).
105. See, e.g., Tondini, supra note 102; Coluccello and Massey, supra note 102; see also Jamaa v. Italy, R
Eur. Ct. H.R. (Grand Chamber No. 27765/09, Feb. 23, 2012) (discussed infra Parts IV–V).
106. On sovereignty as a “bundle of rights,” see Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in
an Age of Globalization 39–41 (1996).
107. Slaughter, supra note 17, at 25. R
108. Slaughter, supra note 17, at 264 (explaining that policy networks “permit a loose, flexible R
structure that can bring in national officials from a wide range of different countries as needed to address
specific problems. [The networks] can target problems at their roots, plug loopholes in national jurisdic-
tions, and respond to goods, people, and ideas streaming across borders.”).
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In Europe, these migration networks became incredibly complex.109 The
vast majority of networks connect European capitals to policy centers in
Africa.110 One such representative initiative is the “Global Approach to Mi-
gration,” a framework that has been implemented by executive as well as
legislative networks since 2005.111 The basic premise here is that African
and European countries could establish partnerships on migration enforce-
ment, if the latter would “pay” the former with various forms of develop-
ment aid.
For example, in 2005, the European Commission put forth a policy focus-
ing on migration from “the Mediterranean area and Africa.”112 The stated
objective, “improving global migration,” was framed to impartially pro-
mote European interests, alongside the interests of African countries. “[I]f
well managed,” reads the document the Commission published, migration
“can be beneficial both to the EU and to the countries of origin.”113 The
European Council adopted the Commission’s proposal and released its
“Global Approach to Migration: Priority Actions Focusing on Africa and
the Mediterranean.”114 Here, border control was not cast simply as an en-
forcement issue but also as a way of regulating markets. The policymakers
who wrote this document were aware not only of the need to keep people
out but also of market demands for workers. Furthermore, immigrants’ po-
tential capacity as consumers was also noted.115 However, the proposal fo-
cused on border enforcement rather than on legal migration.116
This global approach embeds illegal migration in a host of international
economic and security policies, aimed to address the “root causes” of illegal
109. A good summary of policymaking network activities involving Libya appears in Sylvie
Bredloup & Oliver Piez, The Libyan Migration Corridor (2011).
110. The legal architecture of this network is a considerable set of bilateral and multilateral agree-
ments. The Cotonou Agreement, “the most comprehensive partnership agreement between developing
countries and the EU,” both constituted this network, and prepared the grounds for its further develop-
ment. Cotonou Agreement, available at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/overview/cotonou-agree-
ment/index_en.htm. The Contonou Agreement contains provisions on trade, development, criminal
enforcement, the Interational Criminal Court (ICC), and unauthorized migration. Id.
111. Van Criekinge, supra note 104, at 4. R
112. Priority Actions for Responding to the Challenges of Migration: First Follow-up to Hampton
Court COM (2005) 621 final (Nov. 30, 2005).
113. Id.
114. European Council, Global Approach to Migration: Priority Actions Focusing on Africa and the
Mediterranean 15744/05 of 13 Dec. 2005.
115. For example:
While immigration should be recognised as a source of cultural and social enrichment, in
particular by contributing to entrepreneurship, diversity and innovation, its economic impact
on employment and growth is also significant as it increases labour supply and helps cope with
bottlenecks. In addition, immigration tends to have an overall positive effect on product de-
mand and therefore on labour demand.
Priority Actions for Responding to the Challenges of Migration, supra note 112 (preamble). R
116. Id.
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migration.117 As it developed, it named poverty, oppressive regimes, human
rights violations, and gender discrimination as reasons for emigration.118 It
also takes into account the costs migration imposes on African countries in
terms of “brain-drain”119 and the benefits it creates through remittances
(often representing a considerable part of a sending country’s GDP).120
But the Commission does not envision replacing enforcement tasks with a
global fight against poverty and human rights violations. The idea is to
integrate enforcement strategies with aid, reducing the incentives people
have to leave their own countries, while augmenting countries’ incentives to
enforce the EU’s borders from without.121 The language used by the Council
is not one of control but one of management.122 The first concrete recom-
mendation the Council adopts is thus framed somewhat opaquely—to “im-
plement border management measures in the Mediterranean region.”123
Three countries are identified in the document as “high priority partners”:
Morocco, Algeria and Libya.124 The first addressee the Council turns to with
concrete tasks of implementing the Global Approach is Frontex, the EU’s bor-
der control agency, established in 2004.125
One important step the EU took to implement the global approach was
the “Joint Africa-EU Declaration on Migration and Development” con-
cluded in Tripoli, Libya, in late November 2006. The declaration, negoti-
ated between African and European ministers of foreign affairs, migration,
and development, is a pledge to create additional networks for all areas of
117. For a paper arguing for this approach, see Andrew Geddes, Migration as Foreign Policy?
The External Dimension of EU Action on Migration and Asylum 25 (2009).
118. Commission Staff Working Paper on Migration and Development, accompanying the Commu-
nication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility
COM (2011) 743 final of Nov. 18, 2011.
119. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, The Global
Approach to Migration one year on: Towards a Comprehensive European Migration Policy COM (2006)
735 final of Nov. 30, 2006, at 6–8, 23.
120. For up-to-date information, see Leon Isaacs, Carlos Vargas-Silva and Sarah Hugo, EU
Remittances for Developing Countries, Remaining Barriers, Challenges and Recommen-
dations (2012).
121. On the development of this idea and initial reluctance to embrace it in the EU, see, for example,
Carl Levy, The European Union after 9/11: The Demise of a Liberal Democratic Asylum Regime?, 40 Govern-
ment and Opposition 26, 45–46 (2005). The Council’s Global Approach document is indicative in
this context. While its first page eloquently presents the anti-poverty policies through a “genuine part-
nership” with “Africa and the Mediterranean Countries” its second more operative part specifies that the
partnership in question will be realized through policing. Global Approach to Migration: Priority Ac-
tions Focusing on Africa and the Mediterranean, supra note, at 3, 4, 7. R
122. Id.
123. Global Approach to Migration: Priority Actions Focusing on Africa and the Mediterranean, supra
note 114, at 4. R
124. All these countries had had crucial roles in anti-migration networks, both before and after the
Arab Spring. See Migreurop, European Borders: Controls, Detention and Deportations 5
(2009–2010).
125. Frontex Website, http://www.frontex.europa.eu/. Frontex’s role will be discussed in more detail
below (under “enforcement networks”).
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border management.126 Thus, we encounter what Slaughter terms “networks
of networks.”127
Slaughter, however, is interested less in ministers than in lower-level offi-
cials.128 Indeed, the EU—itself Slaughter’s most celebrated network—has
freestanding bodies responsible for continuous networking on the develop-
ment-migration nexus.129
One sees a similar cooperative paradigm in the case of Australia. Al-
though Australia had a certain level of cooperation on migration issues with
its regional neighbors since at least the late 1970s, the MV Tampa affair
signaled a new era.130 As in Europe, migration became an area of disaggre-
gated policymaking, in which enforcement and policing tasks were closely
linked with foreign aid.
The Pacific Solution extended to several Pacific islands a role similar to
the one Guantánamo Bay served during the 1980s in Reagan’s earlier frame-
126. Joint Africa-EU Declaration on Migration and Development, Tripoli, 22–23 Nov. 2006 (final
version), 11.
127. Slaughter, supra note 17, at 132. Another similar example was the “Euro-African Ministerial R
Conference on Migration and Development.” After it met for the first time in July 2006 in Rabat,
Morocco, France invited the network of “ministers in charge of migration” to a meeting in Paris, held in
November 2008. The countries represented were (in alphabetical order): Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bulga-
ria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Cote D’Ivoire, Central African Republic, Congo, Cy-
prus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia,
Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liberia, Libya, Lithua-
nia, Luxemburg, Mali, Malta, Morocco, Mauritania, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Por-
tugal, Democratic Republic of Congo, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain,
Switzerland, Sweden, Togo, Tunisia, United Kingdom; and the European Commission. Third Euro-
African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development, available at http://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/news/intro/docs/Dakar%20strategy_%20Ministerial%20declaration%20migration%20and%20
development_%20EN.PDF (last visited Mar. 27, 2013 8:48 PM). This meeting concluded with a
“Three-Year Cooperation Programme.” The program similarly created a framework for providing aid
and simultaneously revamping borders.
128. Slaughter, supra note 17, at 63 (arguing that “regulators are the new diplomats”). R
129. One such initiative is Euromed, the members of which are Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Leba-
non, Morocco, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Tunisia, Turkey and Syria (with which cooperation
has been suspended). Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EUROMED), European Union External Action,
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/euromed/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2013 8:52 PM). Another one is
European Migration Network (EMN), which aims to provide policymakers with migration-related infor-
mation. Similar initiatives include the Berne Initiative, launched in June 2001 under the auspices of the
Swiss government and in cooperation with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), promotes
informal intergovernmental dialogue on migration among sending, transit and destination countries
aimed at information sharing and other related initiatives; the 5+5 Dialogue, launched in Rome in
1990, following a high-level meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of France, Italy, Spain, Portugal,
Malta, Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya, fosters regional political and economic coopera-
tion in the Western Mediterranean. 5+5 Mediterranean Dialogue, International Waters Learning Ex-
change & Resource Network, http://iwlearn.net/news/iwlearn-news/5-5-mediterranean-dialogue (last
visited Mar. 27, 2013 8:55 PM). Furthermore, the Rabat Declaration, organized by Morocco, Spain and
France, gathered the EU member states as well as countries from West, Central and South Africa. It was
held in July 2006, when fifty-seven countries signed the Rabat Declaration, which aimed to foster “a
close partnership on the management of legal and illegal migration.” Rabat Declaration, available at
http://www.maec.gov.ma/migration/Doc/RABAT%20DECLARATION_EN.pdf. The United States,
too, is represented in some of these networks. See, for example, the Center for Strategic and International
Studies, which has sponsored work on this topic.
130. Mathew, supra note 91. R
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work.131 The policy required engagement with the governments of these
small nations. One month after the Tampa affair, René Harris, president of
Nauru, and then Australia’s Minister of Defense, Peter Reith, signed a
“Statement of Principles.” The two declared that Nauru will house 800
detainees in a new facility, and Australia would pledge $26.5 million for the
country’s development.132 On December 11, 2001, a Memorandum of Un-
derstanding was signed between Australia and Nauru, further expanding
this framework both in terms of detention capacity and Australian aid.133 As
this memorandum clarifies, Australia became the implementer of a Nauruan
asylum system, complete with processing, detention, and deportation.134
This overhaul of the Nauruan Ministry of the Interior by a neighboring
country illustrates the disaggregation of both Nauruan and Australian
sovereignty.135
But the bilateral process quickly developed into a much thicker network,
in policies advanced in “the Bali Process,” sponsored by Australia; following
large numbers of illegal boats, the Bali Ministerial Conference on People
Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons, and Related Transnational Crime was
held in February 2002.136 This conference brought together thirty-eight
source, transit and receiving (destination) countries from throughout the re-
gion.137 In order to carry out ambitious regional policy, “[m]inisters agreed
that senior officials develop practical plans of action.”138 The United Na-
tions High Council for Refugees (“UNHCR”) and the International Organ-
ization of Migration (“IOM”) were also brought to the table, as were human
rights organizations.139
131. The Australian model in turn influenced policymakers in Europe. See Levy, supra note 121, at R
47–48.
132. Australian Parliament, Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident (2002),
xliii.
133. Id. at 297.
134. “Australia will continue to meet all costs associated with the transfer, processing and accommo-
dation of the asylum seekers, in addition to meeting the operating costs of the processing centres. The
MOU also guarantees that Australia will ensure no persons will remain in Nauru after appropriate
processing procedures are completed.” http://www.dfat.gov.au/media/releases/foreign/2001/fa177_01.
html.
135. As pointed out by an Australian parliamentary committee, “Critics of the arrangement have
contended that Australia is using its economic power to export its problems to its poorer neighbors,
imposing significant pressures on already limited natural resources and undermining regional aid objec-
tives of good governance and sustainable development.” Australian Parliament, supra note 91, at R
295.
136. Bali Process Website, http://www.baliprocess.net/index.asp?pageID=2145831401.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. A similar Memorandum of Understanding signed under the auspices of UNHCR, demonstrated
how far the Australian government went in reaching for “root causes.” For more than a decade, Pacific or
Southeast Asian countries have not been sending the most migrants to Australia. Consistently, it was
Afghanistan; in January 2011, Australia was finally able to sign an agreement with that country. By now,
unsurprisingly, the agreement delegates decision-making tasks down the administrative ladder, authoriz-
ing the parties to “invite representatives of relevant organizations in an advisory capacity.” See Memoran-
dum of Understanding between the Government of Australia, the Government of the Islamic Republic of
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It is almost as if transnational migration policy—at least in the cases of
Europe and Australia—was devised to fit Slaughter’s model:
The new model . . . assumes disaggregated states in which na-
tional government officials interact intensively with one another
and adopt codes of best practices and agree on coordinated solu-
tions to common problems—agreements that have no legal force
but that can be directly implemented by the officials who negoti-
ated them.140
As Slaughter continued,
[A]ctive engagement in enforcement cooperation that does and
can take place in government networks can give government offi-
cials in weak, poor, and transitional countries the boost they need.
Their counterparts in more powerful countries, meanwhile, can
reach beyond their borders to try to address problems that have an
impact within their borders.141
The next subsection demonstrates in more detail how these notions of en-
forcement played out in practice.
2. Enforcement Networks
“[W]hat do government networks do?,” asks Slaughter, who immediately
answers, “Their members talk a lot.”142 This clearly applies to policymaking
networks in the migration context. However, as Slaughter explains,
In a second category of networks, talk leads to action – direct aid
in enforcing specific regulations against specific subjects. These
are enforcement networks, which also encompass training and
technical-assistance programs of developed-country regulators for
their counterparts in developing countries in order to build the
recipients’ capacity to enforce their own domestic regulations.143
Frontex, mentioned above, is at the center of the most impressive Euro-
pean enforcement network. This EU executive agency was conceived of as a
body of experts.144 Frontex was mandated to “coordinate” and “implement”
Afghanistan and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on Migration and
Humanitarian Cooperation (Aug. 10), Art. 6.
140. Slaughter, supra note 17, at 263. R
141. Id. at 266.
142. Id. at 51.
143. Id. at 52.
144. Indeed, Frontex has been described as a:
[S]pecialised expert body tasked with improving the coordination of operational cooperation
between Member States in the field of external border management should therefore be estab-
lished in the shape of a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at
the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union.
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cooperation under agreements with non-European countries.145 Its founding
regulation reiterates the language Slaughter uses with respect to “enforce-
ment networks”; just as she speaks of “technical assistance,” the regulation
speaks of “necessary technical support and expertise.”146 The description be-
low demonstrates how Frontex is a paradigmatic example of a disaggregated
enforcement network.
Since it was established, Frontex has organized these “joint operations” in
which the forces of European member states would act in “solidarity” when
enforcing borders.147 For example, in a 2006 to 2007 operation designated
“Hera”—like many other operations named after Greek gods—Frontex
deployed ships from Italy, Portugal, and Finland along the coasts of Mauri-
tania, Senegal, Cape Verde, and the Canary Islands.148 These ships moni-
tored migrant boats that left Africa for the Canary Islands, which are under
Spanish control.149 Once they had been spotted by “joint operations,” Sene-
galese and Mauritanian navy boats could be summoned to intercept them.150
Council Regulation 2004 O.J. (L 349) 1.
145. Id. See also Frontex Agency: Which Guarantees for Human Rights?, A Study Conducted by Migreurop on
the European External Borders Agency with View of the Revision of its Mandate, The Greens—European Free
Alliance (2011) (for background on the human rights concerns that have been raised regarding the
actions of this agency); see also Council Regulation 2004 O.J. (L 349) 5–6.
146. Council Regulation 2004 O.J. (L 349) 3 (stating that “[t]he Agency shall also provide the
Commission and the Member States with the necessary technical support and expertise in the manage-
ment of the external borders and promote solidarity between Member States.”
147. For a concise explanation of the legal foundations of these joint operations, see Seline Trevisanut,
Maritime Border Control and the Protection of Asylum-Seekers in the European Union, 12 Touro Int’l L. Rev.
157, 157–58 (2009).
148. This is how the agency describes its operation in West Africa:
Senegal, Mauritania and Cape Verde have all been integrated into Frontex operations for many
years with good results, always demonstrating a willingness and capacity to work for the same
aims and goals as their European colleagues. Although we do not have formal working ar-
rangements in place yet with these countries, we are able to work together on the basis of their
existing bilateral provisions with Spain. This cooperation has had measurable results in reduc-
ing people smuggling via the Canary Islands and in preventing the loss of human lives at sea.
See Frontex Signs Cooperation Agreement with Cape Verde, Frontex (Jan. 23, 2011); Frontex Signs
Working Arrangement with Nigeria, Frontex (Jan. 19, 2012), available at http://www.frontex.europa.eu/
news/frontex-signs-working-arrangement-with-nigeria-E980f4.
149. Trevisanut, supra note 147, at 157–58. R
150. The latter countries have bilateral enforcement agreements, on which other cooperation with
other EU countries also rested, with Spain. Frontex Annual Risk Analysis 2012, at 19, available at http://
migrantsatsea.files.wordpress.com/2012/05/frontex_annual_risk_analysis_2012.pdf; S.O.S. Europe:
Human Rights and Migration Control, Amnesty International, at 3, available at http://www.amnesty.
org/en/library/asset/EUR01/013/2012/en/bc2ed705-d497-4a50-8c47-5995d3e2eb64/eur010132012en.
pdf. This preemptive strategy is reflected in the agency’s reports and public statements. For example, in
its 2006 general report, Frontex noted that it was able to “avoid the departure of more than one thousand
people” from Senegal. See Frontex, Annual Report 12 (2006). Similarly, the advocacy group
Migreurop has reported that in 2009 it has seen documents in which the Mauritanian police (Sûreté
Nationale) prevented migrants from leaving the Coast. See id.; The Green in Group in the European
Parliament, supra, note 145, at 13. R
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This “externalization” of European border controls has received noteworthy
scholarly attention in recent years.151
According to Frontex’s assessment, this cooperation diverted migrants
further east,152 causing a mass influx into Greece and a human rights crisis
there. On September 21, 2010, the United Nations High Commissioner on
Refugees (“UNHCR”) declared a “humanitarian emergency” in Greece.153
Like the policies that caused it, the response to this crisis was not a matter
solely for the Greek government alone but rather a cooperative one. Execu-
tive agencies from various countries, as well as from other public and private
entities, shared nearly all responsibilities, once again in networked and dis-
aggregated fashion.154
After being “exported” and reshaped extra-territorially,155 the European
border was now brought into the territory of the EU.156 In October 2010,
151. As migration has been high on Europe’s list of policy issues, it developed into an obsession of
sorts, with a growing number of universities, think tanks, and governmental research institutions dedi-
cating considerable energy and funds to examining its legal and economic foundations. See, e.g., Extra-
territorial Immigration Control: Legal Challenges (Bernard Ryan and Valsamis Mitsilegas,
eds., 2010); Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, Access to Asylum: International Refugee Law
and Globalisation of Migration Control (2011); Jorrit J. Rijpma and Marise Cremona, The Extra-
Territorialisation of EU Migration Policies and the Rule of Law (European Univ., EUI Working Paper LAW
No. 2007/01, 2007); Jorrit J. Rijpma, Building Borders: The Regulatory Framework for the Manage-
ment of the External Borders of the European Union (2009) (On file with author); Lori Nessel, External-
ized Borders and the Invisible Refugee, 40 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 625 (2009); Maria-Teresa Gil-Bazo,
The Practice of Mediterranean States in the Context of the European Union’s Justice and Home Affairs, 18 Int’l J.
Refugee L. 571 (2006); Madeline Garlick, The EU Discussions on Extraterritorial Processing: Solution or
Conundrum?, 18 Int’l J. Refugee L. 601 (2006); Trevisanut, supra note 147. R
152. See Frontex, FRAN Quarterly, April–June 2010, at 9–12, Reference No. 13792 (Sept. 2010).
According to Phil Woolas, former British Minster for Borders and Immigration, Frontex was first able to
block migration via the western coast of Africa; this caused the diversion of movement from sub-Saharan
Africa into the Sahara desert to North Africa, and from there people embarked with boats, typically to
Libya. See European Union Committee, The Stockholm Programme: Home Affairs, 2008–09,
H.L. 175, Minutes of Evidence 8 (U.K.), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld
200809/ldselect/ldeucom/175/175.pdf. Other countries on the margins of Europe experienced, at various
times, similar problems. For an analysis of the case of Malta, see Derek Lutterbeck, Small Frontier Island:
Malta and the Challenge of Irregular Migration, 20 Mediterranean Q. 119 (2009). An EU-wide readmis-
sion agreement was in its final stages of drafting when the Gaddafi government fell. See Remarks by EU
High Representative Catherine Ashton at the end of her visit to Egypt, EU Doc. A 067/11 (Feb. 22,
2011), at 1–2, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/
119445.pdf.
153. Alongside criticizing Greece for violating the basic rights of asylum seekers, the organization
called upon the EU to “step up its assistance to help Greece to comply with its international and Euro-
pean obligations.” Briefing Notes, UNHCR Says Asylum Situation in Greece Is ‘a Humanitarian Crisis’,
U.N. High Comm’r on Refugees (Sept. 21, 2010), available at http://www.unhcr.org/4c98a0ac9.html.
154. Frontex, RABIT Operation 2010 Evaluation Report (Aug. 2011), available at http://www.frontex.
europa.eu/assets/Attachments_News/fer_rabit_2010_screen_v6.pdf.
155. On the extraterritorial construction of the border, see generally Elspeth Guild, Danger: Borders
Under Construction: Assessing the First Five Years of Border Policy in an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, in
Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union: Implementation of the Hague Pro-
gramme 45 (Jaap W. de Zwaan & Flora A.N.J. Goudappel eds. 2006); Nick Vaughan-Williams,
Borderwork Beyond Inside/Outside? Frontex, the Citizen-Detective and the War on Terror, 12 Space & Polity 63
(2008).
156. With the revolution and civil wars that set North Africa ablaze, and threats to the power of chief
EU partner Mouammar Gaddafi, the “exported border” collapsed in other places as well, and was tempo-
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Frontex agents first arrived at the Greek border with Turkey, initially exam-
ining the possibility for a land deployment.157 High-ranking officials toured
the detention centers in the border region of Evros and saw squalid condi-
tions.158 By the start of November, 175 Frontex “guest officers” were
deployed on the Greek-Turkish border, in what was initially defined as a
temporary emergency measure.159 Border guards from almost all other Euro-
pean member states, (in addition to several non-EU states), patrolled in their
national uniforms. Frontex quickly replaced this temporary mission—called
Rapid Border Intervention Team, or “RABIT”—with a permanent force.160
As of the writing of this Article, the permanent force regularly performs
enforcement tasks alongside Greek policemen.161
The EU was now sharing the Greek government’s “monopoly on the le-
gitimate use of violence” in two important ways: (1) Frontex border guards,
provided by EU Member States from their own security forces, apprehended
migrants and transferred them to Greek detention facilities and (2) once in
detention, Frontex agents conducted interviews, which helped determine
where migrants came from and thus facilitated their deportation.162
Deportation is also managed cooperatively by Frontex and rests on a net-
work of partner organizations and bilateral agreements.163 Either EU mem-
ber states or the EU sign “readmission agreements” with “source” or
“transit” countries, and migrants are sent there for refugee status determi-
nation or for repatriation.164 For this purpose, Frontex provides detention
rarily imported into Italy. In the Face of Revolution: the Libyan Civil War and Migration Politics in Southern
Europe 445–49, in The EU and Political Change in Neighbouring Regions: Lessons for EU’s Interaction with the
Southern Mediterranean (Stephen Calleya, Derek Lutterbeck, Monika Wohlfeld, and Omar Grech, eds.,
2011).
157. Human Rights Watch, The EU’s Dirty Hands: Frontex Involvement in ill-treatment of migrant detain-
ees in Greece, at 21 (2011), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/greece0911
webwcover_0.pdf.
158. Id. at 20–21.
159. Human Rights Watch, supra note 157, at 2. See also Press Release, Frontex, Frontex to Deploy R
175 Specialist Border Personnel to Greece (Oct. 29, 2010), http://www.frontex.europa.eu/news/frontex-
to-deploy-175-specialist-border-personnel-to-greece-JSRbF4.
160. Human Rights Watch, supra note 157, at 2. R
161. When operation RABIT 2010 ended, Frontex deployed Joint Operation Poseidon to the Greek-
Turkish border, where it conducted essentially the same tasks. Press Release, Frontex, RABIT Operation
2010 Ends, Replaced by JO Poseidon 2011 (Mar. 3, 2011), http://frontex.europa.eu/news/rabit-opera-
tion-2010-ends-replaced-by-jo-poseidon-2011-pWiZjT.
162. Human Rights Watch, supra note 157, at 38–40. R
163. Operations: Return, Frontex, http://www.frontex.europa.eu/operations/return (last visited Mar. 2,
2013).
164. Readmission agreements are a whole other area for policymaking and enforcement networks,
which I cannot go into in detail here. Here too enforcement policy is closely linked with development
and foreign aid. One commentator explains this in terms that ring familiar from Slaughter’s theorization
of disaggregated sovereignty:
The issue of readmission tends not to be tackled in isolation but in close connection with other
issues of common concern. Given the asymmetry in benefits that characterizes cooperation
between Mediterranean countries and EU member states, alternative solutions have been found
to ensure flexible cooperation on readmission. The objective remains unchanged, but in rela-
tions with Southern Mediterranean countries, the emphasis has been placed more on pragmatic
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facilities with language experts who interview the migrants and employ
their expertise in vocabulary, dialect, and accent in order to identify where a
migrant is from.165 The authorities of the “host state”—in this case,
Greece—are formally responsible for the determination.166 A Frontex expert
passes a recommendation to a Greek border guard, who then confirms it.167
Similarly, in Australia, enforcement networks complement cooperative
policy frameworks. For example, in 2004 Australia established the Jakarta
Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation, designating $36.8 million for a
five-year budget.168 The center prides itself on being a resource for the
Southeast Asia region in the “fight against transnational crime, with a focus
on counter-terrorism.”169 In fact, many of the resources are dedicated to
training Indonesian and other police forces to prevent migration to Austra-
lia.170 On the operational level, the Australian Federal Police worked closely
with the Indonesian National Police to “disrupt” migration flows.171
All of the central aspects of Slaughter’s enforcement networks exist in
both the European and Australian contexts; she writes that “[a]t a very con-
crete level, enforcement cooperation is exactly the sharing of information
and the collaborative development of specific enforcement strategies in indi-
vidual cases.”172 Such information sharing exists in Frontex activities, as
well as in the Bali Process; “[m]easures to promote compliance in turn can
lead to consultation on the provisions of the law in the first place.”173
steps than on the conclusion of formal agreements. Actually, the operability of the cooperation
on readmission has been prioritized over its formalization.
Jean-Pierre Cassarino, Informalising Readmission Agreements in the EU Neighbourhood, 42(2) The Interna-
tional Spectator 179, 192 (2007).
165. Human Rights Watch, supra note 157, at 40. R
166. Id.
167. Id. at 3.
168. Since the establishment of the center, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom,
the United States, and the Netherlands have all contributed and increased its funds and activities. Speech
by Australian Foreign Minister at JCLEC, Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation, www.jclec.
com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=75&Itemid=2&limit=1&limitstart=2 (Dec. 9,
2005); Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation Annual Report 2011, available at http://www.jclec.
com/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=305&mode=view; About JCLEC,
JCLEC (May 12, 2005), http://www.jclec.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=14&
Itemid=28.
169. About JCLEC, supra note 168. R
170. Id.
171. When asked if legal advice had been sought with regard to this “disruption strategy,” the
Australian Federal Police Commissioner, Mick Keelty, answered in a way that nicely illustrates how
disaggregation allows different agencies to act together while imagining themselves under separate legal
rules: “No. there is no reason to. Nothing untoward came to our attention. As far as we are aware and can
possibly be aware, the Indonesians were acting lawfully in Indonesia and we were acting lawfully in
Australia.” Australian Parliament, Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident, supra note 91, at R
8–12.
172. Slaughter, A New World Order, supra note 17, at 56–57. R
173. Id. at 57.
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Slaughter identified this back-and-forth movement between consultation
and lawmaking.174
Slaughter understood, however, that this cooperation requires giving
something in return.175 In policymaking networks, what was given in return
could be anything from an apology for the colonial past, to foreign aid, to
increased economic opportunities.176 In enforcement networks, on the other
hand, consideration was in the form of operational capacities: maritime and
military technologies, training, and greater access to information.
3. Human Rights Networks
Human rights and refugee protection agencies also organize themselves in
the transnational networks Slaughter described. These networks are divided
into two traditionally distinct groups: governmental and non-governmental
agencies. These organizations often have as their stated goal the “main-
streaming” of human rights.177
One such agency is the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights
(“FRA”). The FRA “helps to ensure that fundamental rights of people liv-
ing in the EU are protected.”178 It does this by collecting evidence about the
situation of fundamental rights across the European Union (“EU”) and pro-
viding advice, based on evidence, about how to improve the situation.179
The FRA conducts sophisticated human rights reporting. It has formu-
lated recommendations on asylum seekers’ and unauthorized migrants’
rights in the EU. In a report titled The Duty to Inform Applicants about Asylum
Procedures: The Asylum Seeker Perspective, the FRA conducted a country-by-
country analysis of asylum seekers’ procedural rights in EU Member
174. Id.
175. Id. (“[A]ll of these activities will come to naught if some members of the network do not have
sufficient capacity—buildings, computers, personnel, training—actually to engage in enforcement activ-
ity. All the will and cooperation in the world cannot compensate for lack of capacity. One of the principal
activities of enforcement networks thus becomes capacity-building through technical assistance and
training.”).
176. In the context of the Italian-Libyan agreement, Berlusconi said that “in the name of the Italian
people, as head of government, I feel it is my duty to offer an apology and make plain our sorrow for that
which happened so many years ago, and which affected so many of your families.” Italy to Pay Libya $5
Billion, N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 2008.
177. Christopher McCrudden defines this phenomenon: “By ‘mainstreaming’, I mean the reorganiza-
tion, improvement, development and evaluation of policy processes, so that a human rights perspective is
incorporated in all policies at all levels and at all stages, by actors normally involved in policy-making.”
Christopher McCruden, Mainstreaming Human Rights 1, Research Paper No. 47, University of Michigan
School of Law Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=568642. For a compelling critique of “mainstreaming,” see generally Kos-
kenniemi, supra note 45. R
178. About the FRA, European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, http://fra.europa.eu/en/about-
fra (last visited Mar. 27, 2013, 9:37 PM).
179. Asylum Procedures Should be Harmonised and Improved, FRA (Sept. 13, 2010), http://fra.europa.eu/
fraWebsite/media/mr-080910_en.htm.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\54-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 32 11-JUL-13 11:47
346 Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 54
States.180 It has demanded a “harmonization” of asylum procedures across
the Union,181 and it has reported the violation of asylum seekers’ rights in
EU territories, most importantly in Italy and Greece.182
The agency engages with Frontex through an interagency cooperation
agreement. After the agreement was signed on May 27, 2010, Ilkka Lai-
tinen, Frontex’s Executive Director, expressed hope that “[t]his new cooper-
ation arrangement with our colleagues at the FRA will provide us with
access to valuable expertise.”183 Frontex has also commissioned a report on
the “Ethics of Border Security.”184
Intimately related with human rights networks are Slaughter’s “networks
of networks.” In Australia, for example, the Bali Process involves human
rights and refugee protection groups (“NGOs”).185 This participation of In-
ternational Governmental Organizations and NGOs in intergovernmental
processes—also familiar from the European context—is just one more in-
stance in which it may seem like actors in the field of migration have read A
New World Order.
III. Disaggregated Violence
A. Migrants’ Rights Compromised
As developed countries increase their involvement in developing coun-
tries, limited evidence shows that disaggregated sovereignty has advanced
human rights protections. Such evidence suggests that disaggregated
processes led by developed countries have positive externalities—that ex-
porting borders has also meant exporting human rights.186
180. Fundamental Rights Agency, The Duty to Inform Applicants about Asylum Procedures: The Asylum Seeker
Perspective (Sept. 2010), available at http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/research/publications/publications_
per_year/2010/pub_asylum-seekers_en.htm.
181. Id. at 3.
182. Fundamental Rights Agency, Coping with a Fundamental Rights Emergency: The Situation of Person
Crossing the Greek Land Border in an Irregular Manner (Mar. 2011), available at http://fra.europa.eu/en/
publication/2011/coping-fundamental-rights-emergency-situation-persons-crossing-greek-land-border.
183. Press Release, FRA: Frontex Signs Cooperation Arrangement with Fundamental Rights Agency
(May 27, 2010), available at http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/media/mr-270510_en.htm.
184. See Centre for the Study of Global Ethics, University of Birmingham, Ethics of Border Security,
(2010), available at http://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Research/Ethics_of_Border_Secur-
ity_Report.pdf.
185. About the Bali Process, The Bali Process: On People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons
and Related Transnational Crimes, http://www.baliprocess.net (last visited Mar. 2, 2013).
186. One case in point is Nauru, which has ratified the Refugee Convention and its Protocol in June
2011, quite clearly as a result of its engagement with Australia. Further below, this Article discusses
similar processes that have now been ignited with regards to other countries in the region. European
engagement in North Africa has similarly sought Libyan accession to the Convention and Protocol. Some
have cited the end of the Qaddafi’s regime as an auspicious moment for such change. Motion for a Resolu-
tion, European Parliament (Nov. 20, 2012), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?
type=MOTION&reference=B7-2012-504&language=en. In Mauritania, a working group was created
at the end of 2010 to develop “a national strategy on asylum.” Update on UNHCR’s operations in the
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) – 2011, Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Pro-
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Both policymaking networks and enforcement networks foster highly “le-
galized” processes. The relevant documents on border enforcement coopera-
tion often include language requiring all parties to the negotiations to
protect human rights and observe the principle of non-refoulement.187 The as-
sumption is that the whole process helps build important governance capa-
bilities and thus allows developing countries to improve their positions in
the global arena—which is followed by human rights compliance.
The evidence for this happening, however, remains sparse. Even when
new law is introduced, it sometimes advances violation, rather than protec-
tion, of human rights.188 More importantly, disaggregated policymaking
and enforcement networks have contributed to human right violations—
often through collaborations with longstanding human rights violators.189
As opposed to the few indicators of advancement in human rights protec-
tions—which largely relate to law in the books—noticing such violations
requires some attention to facts on the ground.190
Since Europe’s engagement with Africa on migration issues began, efforts
to prevent unauthorized migration have worked around the absolute prohi-
gramme (Sept. 29, 2011), available at http://www.unhcr.org/4e85836f9.pdf. Within the territory of Eu-
rope, Greece has in recent years been subject to considerable pressures from policymaking, enforcement
and human rights networks—which have all tried to push it to meet its international obligations. See
Greece gets Frontex help, told to improve refugee conditions, The Sofia Echo (Mar. 2, 2011 5:09PM), http://
sofiaecho.com/2011/03/02/1053207_greece-gets-frontex-help-told-to-improve-refugee-conditions;
UNHCR says asylum situation in Greece is ‘a humanitarian crisis’, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/4c
98a0ac9.html (Sept. 21, 2010); 2013 UNHCR regional operations profile – North Africa, UNHCR,
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e4860d6.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2013 9:57PM).
187. See, e.g., Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004, pmbl. ¶ 22.
188. To name only one example, in 2004, the Tunisian government introduced new laws to counter
illegal migration. New criminal provisions included sentences of up to twenty years for crossing a border
without the necessary documents, as well as heavy fines. Such laws are designed to deter refugees and
other migrants from crossing borders. See Nadine Sika, Irregular Migration in North Africa: Libya, Tunisia
and Algeria, Partners in Development Research Paper, 15.
189. Migreurop made this case forcefully in its report. Migreurop, supra note 124. With respect to R
Mauritania, Amnesty International has argued that:
Since 2006, thousands of migrants, accused of setting out from Mauritania with the intention
of entering the Canary Islands (Spain) irregularly, have been arrested, then forcibly returned to
Mali or Senegal without any right of appeal to challenge the decision before judicial authority
. . . . This policy of arrests and collective expulsions by the Mauritanian authorities is the result
of intense pressure exerted on the country by the European Union (EU), and Spain in particu-
lar, as they seek to involve certain African countries in their attempt to combat irregular
migration into Europe.
Mauritania: Nobody Wants to Have Anything to Do With Us: Arrests and Collective Expulsions of Migrants
Denied Entry to Europe, (Amnesty International, New York, N.Y.), July 1, 2008 at 2 [hereinafter
“Mauritania”] . With respect to Frontex, see, e.g., Les Verts/ALE, Agence Frontex: Quelles Granties pour les
Droits de l’Homme? 20 (2010), available at http://europeecologie.eu/IMG/pdf/dossier_frontex.pdf.
190. The claim here is not that “aggregated” forms of government—whatever those may be—would
necessarily have resulted in the enforcement of the rights of unauthorized migrants. As the latter are
some of the world’s most disempowered groups, it may very well be that they would be victimized
anyways, even if in different ways. But just as a strict “but for” causation is not required when one aids a
crime that would have been carried out anyway, here, too, the fact that violations may have occurred in
other patterns is not a redeeming factor.
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bition of violating non-refoulement.191 Italy, for example, has repeatedly been
criticized for its complicity in violating the rights of migrants in Libya.192
This complicity includes not only returning asylum seekers to potential per-
secution but also funding detention facilities that hold people with no access
to asylum in inhuman conditions.193 But Italy is not alone. The Nouadhibou
detention center, which Spain established in Mauritania, developed a partic-
ularly bad reputation.194 While Mauritanian authorities referred to
Nouadhibou as a “welcome center,” locals preferred the name
191. Trevisanut, supra note 147, at 160. Historically, the Italian government was the European pio- R
neer of this model, first implemented in its response to Albanians that fled their country during a series
of crises there in the nineties. See Ted Perlmutter, The Politics of Proximity: The Italian Response to the
Albanian Crisis, 32(1) Int’l Mig. Rev. 203 (1998). Note that these bilateral agreements do not always
meet public international law standards. Often, they are concluded in the form of non-binding memo-
randa of understanding between Ministries of Interior. As one commentator noted, “this means that they
escape parliamentary scrutiny in Member States.” Jorrit J. Rijpma, Building Borders: The Regula-
tory Framework for the Management of the External Borders of the European Union
(2009), at 3. He notes that “[o]nly with Cape Verde does Spain have a fully-fledged bilateral agreement
in place that allows joint patrols in the territorial waters of this island state.” Id. Compare this with the
interception of Haitian refugees and migrants seeking access to the United States, as described generally
in Harold Koh, The “Haiti Model” in United States Human Rights Policy, 103 Yale L.J. 2391 (1994).
192. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, supra note 178. R
193. Id. Coluccello and Massey describe the depth of this complicity, explaining that:
Italy pressed for the United Nations sanctions on Libya to be lifted and on 24 August 2004 an
agreement to combat illegal immigration was concluded. A further agreement was concluded
between the Prodi government and Libya in September 2006. Libya agreed to control its 2,000
km coastline and 7,000 km land borders and to put in place barriers against immigration from
the south. Ghadafi also agreed to accept the readmission of illegal migrants from Italy. In
return Libya receives material assistance in terms of planes, helicopters, boats, all-terrain vehi-
cles and surveillance equipment, as well as the assistance of officers from the Servizio Centrale
Operativo (SCO), the security agency charged with coordinating the intervention squads and
special units in the fight against organized crime. Italy also finances a detention camp in
northern Libya and two more in the south of the country. Perhaps most persuasive, the deal
offered the opportunity to be seen to be cooperating in combating the smuggling of persons,
enhancing Libya’s reputation as a responsible state. With the agreement in place the Berlus-
coni government established a “fast-track” repatriation policy with a significant number of
illegal migrants arriving in Lampedusa being peremptorily sent back to Libya without poten-
tial claims for asylum being considered. In October 2004, Libya accepted 1,000 such returnees
from Italy and since it is not a signatory of the Geneva Convention redeported them, at Italy’s
expense, to Egypt and Nigeria without checking whether they had a valid claim for asylum
(Schuster 2005). These “fast-track” deportations have been suspended by the Prodi
government.
Coluccello & Massey, supra note 102, at 84. R
194. Guantanamito, 45 Africa Research Bulletin 17560 (2008). In a report about this place,
Amnesty International said it was “extremely concerned about the security policy of the EU and its
Member States . . . . These States are in the process of externalizing their policy of migration flow
management by pressing the migrants’ countries of origin, or countries through which they pass—
especially certain countries of the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa—to themselves manage the flow of
migrants who attempt to reach Europe from their territory. These countries have become the de facto
‘policemen of Europe.’” Mauritania, supra note 189, at 22. See also The Externalisation of Migration and R
Asylum Policies: The Nouahibou Detention Centre, Social Watch National Reports (2009),
www.socialwatch.org/sites/default/. . ./ESW2009_spain_eng.pdf.
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“Guantanamito,” meaning “little Guantanamo.”195 The nickname reflected
a globalized political imagination inspired by the U.S. “war on terror”196
but ironically echoes the earlier function of the prison in Guantanamo Bay,
housing unauthorized Haitian and Cuban migrants.197 In a 2008 report,
Amnesty International alleged that with this facility, Mauritania was be-
coming Europe’s police force.198
When Mark Boulware, the U.S. Ambassador to Mauritania, visited the
premises in June 2009, he learned that Spain was “providing patrolling
services, technical assistance and training to help Mauritanians fight illegal
migration networks and prosecute traffickers.”199 Notably, the ambassador
wrote to colleagues in Washington that “the conditions in the center are not
dire but are poor and could be improved, particularly because this detention
center is a European-driven endeavor.”200 He added that “the conditions for
detainees are no worse than those of average Mauritanians.”201
European policymakers largely believed that the EU’s involvement in Af-
rica to be a success; it reduced the number of illegal migrants.202 Some un-
derstood, however, that this reduction would entail circumventing human
rights standards. Although “there are people who would like it to apply
everywhere,” explained Phil Woolas, British Minister of State, in his testi-
mony on cooperation with Libya, “we have to recognise that the European
Convention on Human Rights applies in Europe.”203 The tension between
these jurisdictional limits and the universal promise of absolute human
rights imperatives is at the center of the dialectic of transnationalism.
The diversion of unauthorized migrants into Greece came to a peak in
2010, when ninety percent of the clandestine entrants came from the land
border between Greece and Turkey.204 The burden on Greece was further
195. Cable from Mark Boulware, U.S. Ambassador to Mauritania, Long Detention Periods and Poor
Conditions at the “Mauritanian Guantanamo” (June 8, 2009), available at http://www.cablegatesearch.
net/cable.php?id=09NOUAKCHOTT379.
196. Mark Boulware, U.S. Ambassador to Mauritania, referred to Nouadhibou as the “Mauritanian
Guantanamo” in a cable. Id.
197. See Dastyari, supra note 101. R
198. Mauritania, supra note 189, at 22. R
199. Cable, supra note 195. R
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. This is reflected in the way that the cooperative measures were continuously augmented by
policymakers since the wake of the Global Approach to migration in 2005. See e.g., Communication from the
Commission on Policy Priorities in the Fight Against Illegal Immigration of Third-Country Nationals, COM
(2006) 402 final (July 19, 2006) (discussing policy priorities in the fight against illegal immigration of
third-country nationals).
203. European Union Committee, supra note 152, at 9. Chimène Keitner’s recent comparative R
work confirms that even in a context in which courts increasingly face claims regarding the rights of
people located beyond their countries’ borders, they largely remain bound to territorial adjudication.
Chimène I. Keitner, Rights Beyond Borders, 36 Yale J. Int’l L. 55, 57–58 (2011).
204. See generally Christal Morehouse and Michael Blomfield, Irregular Migration in Europe, TransAt-
lantic Council on Migration, available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/tcmirregularmigration.
pdf. As reported by the EU authorities at the border, “the most commonly detected nationalities were
citizens of Asian countries (Afghanistan and Iraq), but there was also an increasing number of detections
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increased by the Dublin II Regulation, which provided that migrants appre-
hended all over the Union could be returned to the first EU country they
entered.205 Both the increased number of migrants entering through Greece,
and the fact they were expected to remain there, are aspects of the EU’s
disaggregated sovereignty.
As early as 2005, this considerable pressure created a crisis in Greece,
which has not yet ceased.206 As the Council of Europe’s Committee for the
Prevention of Torture (“CPT”) said in a public statement dated March 15,
2011:
[T]he 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2009 visits all paint a similar pic-
ture of irregular migrants being held in very poor conditions in
police stations and other ill-adapted premises, often disused ware-
houses, for periods of up to six months, and even longer, with no
access to outdoor exercise, no other activities and inadequate
health-care provision.207
In one detention center, detainees, some of them children, were crammed
behind bars in unlit cells in which sewage was running on the floors.208
Greek guards “wore surgical masks when they entered the passageway be-
tween the large barred cells.”209 The conditions were unsanitary, inhuman,
of irregular migrants coming from North Africa. General Report 2010, at 8, FRONTEX (2011), available
at http://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/About_Frontex/Governance_documents/Annual_report/2010/
frontex_general_report_2010.pdf. Most Africans detected at the Greek land border with Turkey had first
taken a plane to Istanbul, taking advantage of low fares and Turkish visa liberalisation. Id.
205. M.S.S. v. Belgium, App. No. 30696/09 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011). In this Article’s analysis of M.S.S.
below, there will be some more discussion about this Regulation. First, however, this Article will provide
a more theoretical analysis of how disaggregated executives operate more generally.
206. This case was built over a few years by a variety of human rights monitors. See generally U.N.
High Comm’r for Refugees, Asylum in the Eur. Union: A Study of the Implementation of the Qualifica-
tion Directive, (Nov. 2007), http://www.unhcr.org/47302b6c2.html; No Place for an Asylum-Seeker in
Greece, Amnesty International, (Feb. 28, 2008, 2:23 PM), http://www.amnesty.org.au/news/com-
ments/9711/; Left to Survive: Systemic Failure to Protect Unaccompanied Migrant Children in Greece, Rep.,
(Human Rights Watch, New York, N.Y.), Dec. 2008; Alexia Vassiliou, The Dublin Dilemma—“Burden
Shifting” and Putting Asylum Seekers at Risk, Greek Council for Refugees (Feb. 15, 2009), available at
http://www.proasyl.de/fileadmin/proasyl/fm_redakteure/STARTSEITE/Griechenland/Greek_Refugee_
Council_DublinSituationNote.pdf; Out the Back Door: The Dublin II Regulation and Illegal Deportations from
Greece, Rep., (Norwegian Helsinki Comm., Norwegian Org. for Asylum Seekers & Aitima, Oslo/Athens),
Oct. 2009; Greece: Unsafe and Unwelcoming Shores, Human Rights Watch, (Oct. 12, 2009), http://www.
hrw.org/news/2009/10/09/greece-unsafe-and-unwelcoming-shores; The Dublin II Trap: Transfers of Asy-
lum-Seekers to Greece, (Amnesty Int’l, London), Mar. 2010; Spec. Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Promotion and Protection of all Human Rights, Civil,
Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/16/
52/Add.4 (Mar. 4, 2011) (by Manfred Nowak); European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Cop-
ing with a Fundamental Rights Emergency: The Situation of Persons Crossing the Greek Land Border in
an Irregular Manner (2011), http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/1500-Greek-border-situa-
tion-report2011_EN.pdf.
207. Press Release, European Comm. for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, Public Statement Concerning Greece, CPT/Inf (2011) 10 (Mar. 15, 2011), http://
www.cpt.coe.int/documents/grc/2011-10-inf-eng.htm.
208. Human Rights Watch, supra note 157, at 3. R
209. Id.
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and entailed an absolute loss of privacy, along with the risk of contracting
disease and occasional physical violence.210 One fourteen-year-old Eritrean
said in an interview:
I have been here 26 days, after I came from Turkey. For three days
in the beginning I was sleeping on the floor. Now I’m sharing a
bed with another five people: a Somali, a Bangladeshi, an
Afghani, an Egyptian, and one other Eritrean. We use the bed in
shifts, which means that some use the bed during the day and
others during the night. In general, we are 83 people in a room
with 30 beds.
There is no way to go out for fresh air, and it is impossible to use
the toilets because they are too filthy. We don’t brush our teeth
because we do not have toothbrushes. They took our belongings
from us outside, and did not let us take them back until now.
There is only cold water and no soap. Only recently they gave us
three pieces of soap and after many days I was able to wash myself.
The worst problem is that they don’t tell us how long we’ll have
to stand this. Every week they say, “one more week.”211
As explained in a report, for Human Rights Watch, authored by the
writer of this Article, this testimony could have direct bearing on the nor-
mative assessment of enforcement networks in the EU. Frontex officials were
deployed on the premises and knew about the conditions.212 Nevertheless,
they participated on joint patrols with Greek border guards, arrested unau-
thorized migrants, and handed them over to this place and other equally
disturbing places.213
In 2011, at the height of Frontex’s emergency intervention in Greece, the
ECtHR released M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece.214 The court explained that by
deporting an Afghan migrant to Greece under the Dublin II Regulation,
Belgium violated the prohibition on inhuman and degrading treatment: the
country “knowingly exposed” him to the possibility of ill treatment in
Greek detention facilities.215 Frontex conducted actions very similar to those
for which Belgium was blamed. Rather than knowingly exposing migrants
to unlawful detention in Greece from Belgium, Frontex agents—some of
them Belgian—were doing the same thing from within Greek territory.216
By and large, the agency did not intervene in detention facilities or in refu-
gee protection procedures.217 High-ranking officers explained they were not
210. Id. at 29–37.
211. Id. at 30–31.
212. Id. at 53.
213. Id. at 46–52.
214. M.S.S. v. Belgium, App. No. 30696/09 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011).
215. Id. ¶¶ 367–68.
216. Bill Frelick, Sharing Greece’s Asylum Shame, European Voice, Sept. 22, 2011.
217. Human Rights Watch, supra note 157, at 29. R
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mandated to help.218 The limited mandate that granted the agency authority
to wield state force, but not to protect from state force, is the hallmark of
disaggregated violence. This violence emanates from a powerful transnational
actor assuming some aspects of sovereignty, in this case enforcement, while
not overtaking other aspects of it, in this case human rights protections.
In its RABIT 2010 Evaluation Report,219 the agency described its mis-
sion in Greece in celebratory terms: “RABIT 2010 will be remembered as a
milestone. . . . For the first time the officers and assets of the Agency’s
Rapid Pool were called upon to act and the resultant show of European
solidarity was an event unprecedented in European history.”220 What consti-
tutes the environment in which the same behavior can be characterized by a
transnational court (for example, the ECtHR) as inhuman and degrading
treatment, and by the executive (Frontex) as a milestone in European his-
tory? This Article contends that this pattern is typical of disaggregated
sovereignty.
After the January 2011 revolution in Tunisia and the events that followed
in Libya, cooperation between European and North African countries was
destabilized, but it is quickly recovering.221 It now appears that cooperation
with Europe on migration control has become one of the main interests of
the new Libyan government.222
218. Id. at 38–40. The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) described the condi-
tions that existed in the detention facilities in January 2011, while border guards from all over Europe
were sending people there:
Police and border guard stations continued to hold migrants in ever worse conditions. For
example, at Soufli police and border guard station, in the Evros region, members of the Com-
mittee’s delegation had to walk over persons lying on the floor to access the detention facility.
There were 146 irregular migrants crammed into a room of 110m2, with no access to outdoor
exercise or any other possibility to move around and with only one functioning toilet and
shower at their disposal, 65 of them had been held in these deplorable conditions for longer
than four weeks and a number for longer than four months. They were not even permitted to
change their clothes.
Public Statement Concerning Greece, European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, (Mar. 15, 2011), ¶ 7. Alongside unacceptable detention condi-
tions, explained Manfred Nowak, Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment or punishment for the UN Human Rights Council, allegations of physical violence abounded.
Human Rights Council, supra note 206, at 11. Furthermore, he said, the condition in the facilities R
“creates an environment of powerlessness for victims of physical abuse and may perpetuate a system of
impunity for police violence.” Id. at 1.
219. Frontex, supra note 154. R
220. Id. at 4.
221. An Aljazeera report from that period explained how the Tunisian border police would not allow
Italian boats into Tunisia’s territorial waters—but did take financial compensation and equipment in
return for preventing unauthorized migrants to leave their territorial waters. See Deal Reached Over Tunisia
Exodus, Aljazeera, (Feb. 15, 2011), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2011/02/20112151318218
1420.html.
222. Ilkka Laitinen, the Finnish Executive Director of Frontex, proposed to “create a completely new
border security system for Libya, for instance.” Frontex Director says EU Could take part in border security in
Arab countries, Helsingin Sanomat (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.hs.fi/english/article/Frontex+direc-
tor+says+EU+could+make+part+in+order+security+in+Arab+countries/1135270037144.
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B. Migration and the Global Market for Sovereignty
The normative shortcomings of disaggregated sovereignty do not only stem
from the recognition that its realization heralded human rights abuses as a
contingent historical matter. More interestingly, the evidence from the mi-
gration context suggests that the normative aspirations voiced in transna-
tionalism are misleading with regard to its very structure.
Slaughter emphasizes cross-border cooperation between states on issues
that are in the interest of all states involved.223 However, she understands
these interests as pre-determined, rather than as themselves constructed by
global power relations. She does not sufficiently take into account how inter-
ests are constituted, particularly the role of money in transforming conflict-
ing interests into common interests.224 In other words, unauthorized
migration was not always a cross-border policy problem. Before that, it was
perhaps a problem for developed countries but often a blessing for develop-
ing countries, as remittances represented a significant portion of their
GDP.225
When enforcement is mobilized as a result of such economically driven
interests, state violence can be intensified and redirected against populations
that would not otherwise have been targeted. If such enforcement denies a
refugee access to asylum, the result is not only protecting violations from
judicial review, but also producing violations abroad.
Slaughter is clear about the fact that enforcement cooperation is often
conducted between developing and developed counties.226 These countries
do not come to the relevant networks on equal footing. As a result, “one of
the principal activities of enforcement networks thus becomes capacity-
building through technical assistance training.”227
Capacity building programs, like those Australia has with its neighboring
island states, are always conditional.228 Slaughter’s characterization in this
context is confusing. This characterization suggests that a developing state
223. Slaughter, supra note 17, at 15. R
224. Oona Hathaway has illuminatingly discussed such incentives to enter into international legal
obligations, which she calls “collateral consequences.” See Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle:
An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 469, 469 (2005). For an analysis (and
comparison) of the ways in which cooperation on migration issues changed the interest calculus for
Ghana and Senegal, see Van Criekinge, supra note 104, at 23. For a general theory of how money trans- R
forms opposing forces into interacting ones, see Georg Simmel, The Philosophy of Money 120
(David Frisby, ed., 3rd ed. 2011).
225. A 2005 study by two researchers at the World Bank found that remittances from migration
reduce poverty in developing countries. While this conclusion applies to both authorized and unautho-
rized migration, the study includes a reservation regarding the level of poverty reduction, as many mi-
grants—especially unauthorized ones—tend to send remittances back home through informal channels,
which make it hard to estimate how much money they send. See Richard H. Adams Jr. & John Page, Do
International Migration Remittances Reduce Poverty in Developing Countries? 33(10) World Development
1645, 1660 (2005).
226. Slaughter, supra note 17, at 4, 19, 63. R
227. Id. at 57.
228. Australian Parliament, supra note 91, at 293–302. R
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wants to attain a certain policy goal that is common to it and to a developed
state, but simply does not have the means to do that. She does not talk
about altruism but does talk about mutual interests. To forward its inter-
ests, the developed country will help the developing one by providing it
with the required capacities, equipment or training.229 The story is a com-
pletely different one if the very goals or priorities the developing country is
expected to fulfill are shaped by the aim to obtain these “capacities.”
Enforcement networks are entrusted with the authority to execute violent
policies on the state’s behalf. At the same time, the sovereignty of develop-
ing states can be apportioned and distributed, or “sold” to foreign countries.
The Weberian idea—that states have a monopoly over the legitimate use of
violence within their own territories—no longer applies.230
This dissection of sovereignty, now sold on a global market, also poten-
tially influences the accountability of enforcement networks toward domes-
tic constituencies in developed countries.231 It has the effect of transforming
decisions regarding absolute rights into cost-benefit decisions. In other
words, decisions that legally require an ethics of conviction transform into deci-
sions sustained by an ethics of responsibility.
Slaughter focuses on the cooperation between branches of government
across borders and on their partnerships with NGOs and private actors in
common networks of governance.232 However, the more that government
branches cooperate with one another across borders, the more the internal
cohesiveness between them deteriorates. This, in turn, allows transnational
branches of various governments to carry out autonomous policy, protected
from other branches of their own governments. Instead of branches of gov-
ernment unified by sovereignty and separated by borders, branches of disag-
gregated sovereigns are unified across borders.
229. Slaughter, supra note 17, at 57. R
230. See generally The Globalization of Political Violence: Globalization’s Shadow (Rich-
ard Devetak & Christopher W. Hughes eds., 2008).
231. In the context of Australia’s Pacific Solution, several policymakers noticed these perils in real
time. For example, Noel Levi, Secretary General of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, said in October
2001:
The emerging refugees market in the region where Forum Island Countries lease out their
territories for quarantine and processing services carries unknown risks. Yet it is evolving
rapidly without the necessary legal and policy framework to ensure its proper and equitable
regulation. Such a substantial population influx places extreme pressure on our already very
limited resources, exposing our small and vulnerable economies to further social and economic
problems which we can ill afford.
Australian Parliament, supra note 91, at 295. Anthony Audoa, a Nauruan Member of Parliament also R
expressed his concern, in quite direct terms:
I don’t know what is behind the mentality of the Australian leaders but I don’t think it is
right. A country that is desperate with its economy, and you try to dangle a carrot in front of
them, of course, just like a prostitute . . . if you dangle money in front of her, you think she
will not accept it. Of course she will, because she’s desperate.
See id. at 299; Australian Parliament, supra note 91, at 295–99. R
232. Slaughter, supra note 17, at 9. R
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In an environment of disaggregated sovereignty, multiple spaces of im-
munity appear. However, in order to fully appreciate the structure of immu-
nity that characterizes this environment, one must also take a much closer
look at transnational adjudication. Part IV moves on to discuss judiciaries. It
shifts attention to Koh’s transnational legal process, both as an analytic instru-
ment for understanding the contemporary transnational condition, and as an
object of critique.
IV. Transnational Legal Process and Unauthorized Migration
A. The Migration of Precedent
In the wake of the Haitian refugee crisis, several of Koh’s important con-
tributions were closely linked to his role as advocate on behalf of the Haitian
refugees. In The “Haiti Paradigm” in United States Human Rights Policy, Koh
speculated that the precedent set in Sale would be overturned when transna-
tional legal process set transnational public law litigation in motion.233 The nar-
rative is heroic. Transnational public law litigation will lead foreign courts to
decide on the issues that were decided in Sale. Unlike the U.S. Supreme
Court, such courts will interpret the applicable law correctly, protecting
non-refoulement and allowing human rights to prevail. The U.S. Supreme
Court will be bound, in turn, to follow. Koh likened the process to what he
believed were the rather routine dynamics in European human rights courts:
“adverse Supreme Court decisions are no longer final stops . . . . However
unfamiliar this argument may be to American lawyers, European civil rights
litigants have long understood that adverse national court decisions may be
‘appealed’ to and even ‘reversed’ by the European Court of Human
Rights.”234
While Slaughter’s disaggregated sovereignty speaks primarily to academics
and policymakers, Koh’s version of transnationalism speaks not only to legal
scholars, but also to a community of human rights lawyers and activists. It
grants license to believe that human rights litigation can become universal,
and to harbor the hope that a professional toolbox of norms will promote
global justice. Two decades after Sale, is there any evidence that such hopes
are justified? Recent landmark cases suggest that transnational courts have
made every attempt to answer this question affirmatively.235 The journey
between these cases may at first glance seem like the unfolding of moral
truth, in which Koh so adamantly believed. The following summary of the
relevant case law first shows how Koh’s hypothesis seems to be confirmed;
but after that, the way in which courts have partaken in the “disaggregated
violence” described above will be demonstrated.
233. Koh, supra note 67, at 2406. R
234. Id.
235. See infra Part IV.A.1–3.
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1. Haitian Centre for Human Rights v. United States (1997)
The first case that should be discussed was decided upon basically the
same facts as Sale. In March 1997, the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights decided on a petition filed by several refugee rights groups
and Haitian refugees.236 The Commission found that by intercepting Hai-
tian refugees on the high seas and returning them to Haiti, the United
States violated its non-refoulement obligations under the Protocol.237 The
Commission received the petition in October 1990, and the proceedings
took a long time, following U.S. policy through considerable fluctuations.
During this period, the Coast Guard shifted from the Reagan policy of in-
terception at sea and offshore processing to direct returns to Haiti under the
first Bush Administration; later, it reverted back to offshore processing
under Clinton. The Commission found that all these policies violated unau-
thorized migrants’ rights.238
Though the Commission’s findings yielded a declaratory decision that the
applicants’ rights were violated, it had no power to bind the U.S. govern-
ment.239 It was thus sufficient for the United States to respond by saying
that the Commission’s analysis was “legally flawed.”240
In itself, this does not undermine the assumptions of transnational legal
process. Contrary to what may seem to be the implication of the language
above—an “appeal” that will ostensibly “reverse” a wrong decision—the
theory does not aim to establish such hierarchies. Rather, it emphasizes
“horizontal process,” echoing the language that Slaughter had also used.241
The relevant actors interact with and interpret international law in a gradual,
discursive manner, finally leading them to internalize the law.242 The idea is
not that there would be a higher world-court with universal jurisdiction
that would tell the U.S. Supreme Court what to decide.243
The expansive opinion—covering practices under Executive Order
12,324 as well as those under Executive Order 12,807—realizes Koh’s belief
that transnational courts would pay special heed to human rights.244 What
allowed the Commission to reach such a conclusion was the fact that it was
not satisfied merely with interpreting the relevant law; it discussed the rele-
vant facts in detail. Unlike the Supreme Court, the Commission discussed
236. Ctr. for Human Rights v. United States, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 51/96, OEA/
Ser.L/VII.95, doc. 7 rev. at 550 (1997).
237. The United States also violated a host of other international legal instruments that the U.S.
Supreme Court did not make reference to. Id. ¶¶ 88, 163, 171, 177, 183–88.
238. Id. ¶ 90.
239. Id. ¶ 182.
240. Id.
241. See Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 Ind. L.J. 1397,
1401, 1406 (1999).
242. Id. at 1406.
243. See Slaughter, supra note 17, at 68 (explaining that “neither national nor international tribu- R
nals hold the definitive upper hand”).
244. See Koh, supra note 67, at 2406. R
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evidence of what happened to refugees and unauthorized migrants after dis-
embarking in Haiti.245
This attention to facts revealed that even when unauthorized migrants
were politically persecuted, they did not have opportunities to appropriately
voice their claims. Pierre Esperance, a researcher for the National Coalition
for Haitian Refugees, gave particularly interesting testimony on the treat-
ment of Haitian repatriates upon their arrival at Port-au-Prince.246 Esper-
ance “experienced a pattern of intimidation, threats and summary arrests on
the docks against returned boat people by the Haitian army and attachés in
full view of United States officials and humanitarian agencies.”247 As he ex-
plained, prior to the coup in September 1993, U.S. officials, Haitian soldiers
and armed civilians, the Red Cross, the media, and some human rights
monitors were present at the docks. However, since September 1993, only
U.S. officials, the Red Cross, Haitian soldiers, and armed civilians were al-
lowed on the docks.248 Journalists and human rights monitors were no
longer allowed.249 This reflected the involvement of U.S. officials in Haiti’s
internal policies. Engaging in such issues, transnational public law litigation
inched beyond formal sovereignty, seeking, as it were, a de facto analysis of
the responsibility for returnees.
The United States, foreshadowing arguments later voiced both by the
Italian and Australian governments, argued that its policies realized human
rights values.250 The argument, which had previously been voiced in front of
the Supreme Court in Sale,251, was that if it were not for interception activi-
ties, a larger number of Haitian refugees would surely die drowning: “Sus-
pending interdiction would be tantamount to adopting a policy of
promoting exodus at the cost of potentially large loss to life.”252
2. M70/2011 v. Minister of Immigration and Citizenship (2011)
Another milestone in this history is M70/2011.253 In this Australian
High Court judgment, a majority held that asylum seekers intercepted in
areas distanced from Australia by the “Pacific Solution” could not be sent to
Malaysia for offshore processing.254
On May 7, 2011, the Prime Ministers of Australia and Malaysia an-
nounced an agreement that would see up to 800 asylum seekers arriving by
245. The Centre for Human Rights, supra note 236, ¶¶ 15–34. R
246. Id. ¶ 23–28.
247. Id. ¶ 26 (emphasis added).
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. ¶ 54.
251. See generally Sale, 509 U.S. 155.
252. Id.
253. Plaintiff M70/2011 v. Minister for Immigration and Citizenship; and Plaintiff M106/2011 v.
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, [2011] HCA 32, (Austl.).
254. See id. ¶ 148.
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sea to Australia transferred to Malaysia for asylum screening. In exchange,
“Australia [would] expand its humanitarian program and take on a greater
burden-sharing responsibility for resettling refugees currently residing in
Malaysia.”255 Australia committed to resettling 4,000 refugees then residing
in Malaysia in its own territory.256
Under the arrangement, Malaysia was to provide transferees with the op-
portunity to have their asylum claims considered by UNHCR, and would
“respect the principle of non-refoulement.” 257 When a transferee was deter-
mined to be a refugee, she would be referred to resettlement countries “pur-
suant to the UNHCR’s normal processes and criteria.”258 Australia was to
“meet all costs arising under the arrangement,”259 including transportation,
health, welfare and resettlement (voluntary, or by force). The countries spec-
ified that the arrangement represented “a ‘record of [their] intentions and
political commitments’” but was not “legally binding.”260
The majority was not satisfied that this arrangement would properly en-
force the rights of asylum seekers. It was concerned about the fact that Ma-
laysia was neither a signatory to the Refugee Convention or Protocol nor did
it take on Convention responsibilities “bilaterally.”261 It was also concerned
that the agreements were undermined by the fact that there was no protec-
tion for transferees against being charged with crimes of illegal entry.262 As
the opinion notes, illegal migrants in Malaysia were liable to imprisonment,
fines, or a caning penalty consisting “up to six strokes.”263
With its decision to strike down the arrangement, the Australian court
extended its review to areas with direct foreign policy consequences.264 In-
deed, the decision struck a considerable blow not only to the Australian
government’s bilateral relationship with Malaysia but also to similar
frameworks around the region. As Australia’s Solicitor General Stephen
Gageler observed in his analysis immediately after the decision, the judg-
ment called into question longstanding relations with Nauru, dating back
to the September 2001 Statement of Principles.265 It imperiled similar ar-
rangements with Papua New Guinea.266
255. Id. ¶ 19.
256. Id.
257. Id. ¶9.
258. Id. ¶ 22.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. ¶ 131.
262. Id. ¶ 33.
263. Id. ¶ 30.
264. Plaintiff M70/2011 v. Minister for Immigration and Citizenship for Offshore Processing of Asy-
lum Seekers under the Migration Act 1958 (CTH), SG No. 21 of 2011, Opinions of Solicitor General
Stephen Gageler, Sept. 2, 2011.
265. Id. ¶ 3.
266. Id. ¶ 38–45.
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These were Australia’s principal policymaking and enforcement networks,
constituting the core of the country’s version of “the Haiti Paradigm.” At
the very least, it seems that a vigilant judiciary halted Sale’s migration to
faraway jurisdictions. This, once again, would confirm Koh’s hypotheses.
However, Part V below reveals how the opinion worked in reality.
3. Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy and Others (2012)
In Hirsi,267 the ECtHR even more directly addressed the principal issues
that the U.S. Supreme Court considered when it decided Sale.268 At the same
time, the case provided valuable insights on how a transnational judiciary
can respond to central perils of disaggregated executive authority (detailed
in Part II above).269 The question as to what the value of such a response is
will be discussed separately below. For now, suffice it to say that Hirsi is a
transnational judgment par excellence.270
The applicants to the Court, eleven Somalis and thirteen Eritreans, were
part of a group of about 200 people who left Libya in three vessels, aiming
to reach Italy. On May 6, 2009, three ships from the Italian Revenue Po-
lice271 and the coastguard intercepted their boats on the high seas, thirty-
five nautical miles south of the Italian Island of Lampedusa. As the court
recounts:
The occupants of the intercepted vessels were transferred onto
Italian military ships and returned to Tripoli . . . . On arrival in
the Port of Tripoli, following a ten-hour voyage, the migrants
were handed over to the Libyan authorities. According to the ap-
plicants’ version of events, they objected to being handed over to
the Libyan authorities but were forced to leave the Italian ships.272
The applicants said that they requested international protection.273
The next day, the Italian authorities announced that the operation was
performed under bilateral agreements with Libya, and “represented an im-
portant turning point in the fight against clandestine immigration.”274 On
267. Jamaa v. Italy, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Grand Chamber No. 27765/09, Feb. 23, 2012).
268. Id. at 80.
269. Id. at 73. On the Hirsi decision generally, see Tondini, supra note 102, at 10–11. R
270. The list of sources that the court discusses includes domestic Italian law; bilateral agreements
between Italy and Libya; the 1951 Refugee Convention; human rights law; various instruments of the
international law of the sea; European Union law; and a variety of soft-law documents by various interna-
tional organizations. The factual basis on which the decision was made included, among other sources,
reports by leading human rights monitors such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International,
which reflected NGO participation that Koh celebrated. Indeed, alongside the applicants and the Italian
government, the sides to litigation included the UNHCR as well as the Columbia Law School Human
Rights clinic, which were granted permission to intervene as third parties. Hirsi, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Grand
Chamber No. 27765/09), ¶¶ 7, 22-44.
271. The “Guardia di Finanzia.”
272. Hirsi, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Grand Chamber No. 27765/09), ¶ 12.
273. Id. ¶ 133.
274. Id. ¶ 13.
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May 25, the Italian Minister of the Interior told the country’s Senate that
between May 6 and May 10, “471 . . . migrants had been similarly inter-
cepted on the high seas and transferred to Libya.”275 The applicants’ princi-
pal argument was that Italy violated their rights under Article 3 of the
ECHR.276 In its decision, the ECtHR goes into some detail regarding the
relevant agreements between Italy and Libya.277 The court quotes Article 2
of a relevant bilateral cooperation agreement, dated December 27, 2009:
Italy and the “Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya”
undertake to organise maritime patrols using six ships made
available on a temporary basis by Italy. Mixed crews shall be pre-
sent on ships, made up of Libyan personnel and Italian police of-
ficers, who shall provide training, guidance and technical
assistance on the use and handling of the ships. Surveillance,
search and rescue operations shall be conducted in the departure
and transit areas of vessels used to transport clandestine immi-
grants, both in Libyan territorial waters and in international wa-
ters, in compliance with the international conventions in force
and in accordance with the operational arrangements to be de-
cided by the two countries.278
As the court explained, “Italy undertook to cede to Libya, for a period of
three years, three unmarked ships (Article 3 of the Agreement) and to en-
courage the bodies of the EU to conclude a framework agreement between
the EU and Libya (Article 4 of the Agreement).”279
The composition of “mixed crews” in which Italian police officers provide
“training, guidance, and technical assistance” should be familiar. They are
reminiscent of the RABIT teams deployed in Greece, in which “guest of-
ficers” from all European states were coupled with local Greek border
guards.280 The Italian officers, whose country had promoted the interest in
controlling this particular border, are cast in technical roles emphasizing
expertise rather than command, in this case in “handling of the ships.” The
“operational arrangements” of the last clause leave room for the low-level
cooperation between executive agencies.281 Implicitly, not all the terms of
275. Id.
276. See id. ¶ 83–158. The applicants also argued that Italy violated their rights under Article 4 of
protocol no. 4: “Collective expulsion of aliens in prohibited”; Article 13 taken together with Article 3 of
the Convention and Article 4 of Protocol no. 4; Articles 46 and 41 of the Convention. See id. ¶¶
159–215.
277. Hirsi, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Grand Chamber No. 27765/09), ¶ 19.
278. Id.
279. Id. As exposed by a July 14, 2008 Wikileaks cable, the Libyan government was keenly interested
in such a framework agreement, which it saw as a potential source of significant revenue. See The EU-
Libya Framework Agreement: Veni, Visas, Veto, The Telegraph, (Jan. 31, 2011, 9:36 PM), http://www.
telegraph.co.uk/news/wikileaks-files/libya-wikileaks/8294843/THE-EU-LIBYA-FRAMEWORK-
AGREEMENT-VENI-VISAS-VETO.html.
280. Human Rights Watch, supra note 157, at 39. R
281. Hirsi, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Grand Chamber No. 27765/09), ¶ 19.
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the agreement are specified in the bilateral treaty. All of these demonstrate
the continuity and similarity between this operation, which the ECtHR in-
tervened against, and other similar operations like the U.S. presence in Haiti
and the Joint Operations and mixed European/Greek land patrols that
Frontex facilitates.
The most important part of the judgment for present purposes is the
discussion of jurisdiction. While the court emphasizes that jurisdiction is in
principle territorial, it adds that ex-territorial jurisdiction accrues from effec-
tive control.282 The Italian government argued that it did not have non-refoule-
ment obligations towards the migrants, because it was acting to rescue them
from drowning. But the court dismisses the argument:
[I]taly cannot circumvent its “jurisdiction” under the Convention
by describing the events at issue as rescue operations on the high
seas. In particular, the Court cannot subscribe to the govern-
ment’s argument that Italy was not responsible for the fate of the
applicants on account of the allegedly minimal control exercised
by the authorities over the parties concerned at the material
time.283
But the court’s reasoning is slightly more complex. The determination
that the Italian policemen had effective control over the migrants—and that
the court therefore has jurisdiction to review their actions—rests on two
different aspects of the operation: “In the court’s opinion, in the period be-
tween boarding the ships of the Italian armed forces and being handed over
to the Libyan authorities, the applicants were under the continuous and ex-
clusive de jure and de facto control of the Italian authorities.”284 The court
goes further than just considering which one of the forces physically detained
the migrants when they were on the boats.285 Under the guidance of the
relevant maritime law provisions, the court grants considerable weight to
the rule that the flag under which a vessel sails determines state jurisdiction
over that vessel.286 In this case, Italian flag vessels intercepted the migrants
and returned them to Libya.287
Was Italy guilty of violating the absolute prohibitions on inhuman and
degrading treatment and refoulement? The court answered this question in
the affirmative and found that migrants are regularly ill-treated in Libya.288
It also found that these migrants are at risk of being sent back to dangerous
countries such as Eritrea and Somalia, without access to asylum.289 More
282. Id. ¶ 73.
283. Id. ¶ 79.
284. Id. ¶ 81.
285. Id.
286. Hirsi, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Grand Chamber No. 27765/09).
287. Id. ¶ 85.
288. Id., at 57.
289. Id. ¶¶ 146–58.
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interestingly, however, the court identified the underlying structural dan-
gers of disaggregated sovereignty. It seemed to announce rather boldly that
enforcement networks cannot bifurcate executive agencies from judicial re-
view. Contract must not replace obligation. The court says:
[I]taly cannot evade its own responsibility by relying on its obli-
gations arising out of bilateral agreements with Libya. Even if it
were to be assumed that those agreements made express provision
for the return to Libya of migrants intercepted on the high seas,
the Contracting States’ responsibility continues even after their
having entered into treaty commitments subsequent to the entry
into force of the Convention or its Protocols in respect of these
States.290
Hirsi is important in illustrating the dialogue among transnational courts,
to which Koh calls our attention. ECtHR reaches back to the constitutive
moment that occurred with Sale. Although the U.S. Supreme Court of
course has no precedential force in ECtHR, Judge Pinto De Albuquerque
symbolically overturned the by-now historical decision.291 The final words of
his concurring opinion—incidentally also the final words of the judg-
ment—are devoted to Justice Harry Blackmun’s minority opinion:
The words of Justice Blackmun are so inspiring that they should
not be forgotten. Refugees attempting to escape Africa do not
claim a right of admission to Europe. They demand only that
Europe, the cradle of human rights idealism and the birthplace of
the rule of law, cease closing its doors to people in despair who
have fled from arbitrariness and brutality. That is a very modest
plea, vindicated by the European Convention on Human Rights.
“We should not close our ears to it.”292
Reading Hirsi along with the other decisions described in this subsection
leaves the unrelenting impression that transnational legal process can realize
the promise of transnationalism. This vision, coupling a universalist com-
mitment to certain legal protections for all humans with the limitations of
jurisdiction, seems tenable. All three judgments are especially impressive
since across the globe, the rights of unauthorized migrants have become one
of the most contested issues of public policy. The jurisprudence coming out
of ECtHR paints a picture according to which there are fundamental values
that remain insulated from politics. An ethics of conviction is defended.
Like both the Inter-American Commission and the Australian High
Court, ECtHR in Hirsi went quite a ways further than Blackmun in Sale.
Neither Stevens nor Blackmun discussed the details of the bilateral agree-
290. Id. ¶ 129.
291. See id. at 80.
292. Id.
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ment between Haiti and the United States, leaving it to the executive’s
prerogative. In Hirsi, on the other hand, the ECtHR Grand Chamber con-
sidered all the relevant law—including the bilateral agreement between
Libya and Italy—under one human rights umbrella and within its wider
diplomatic context in the EU.293 This allowed the court to push toward a
substantive rather than a merely formal notion of jurisdiction: the Somali
and Eritrean asylum seekers who were intercepted were under Italian respon-
sibility not only de jure (as the vessels sailed under an Italian flag) but also de
facto (as the Italians had the power to decide on the asylum seekers’
plight).294
ECtHR thus responded in Hirsi to something that had been beyond the
considerations of the U.S. Supreme Court in Sale. While policymaking and
enforcement networks could function as a veil over human rights violations,
transnational legal process could potentially pierce that veil. But could it re-
ally? And, under what conditions?
V. Dialectic of Transnationalism
A. Transnationalism as Dialectic Process
As is the case with Slaughter’s transnationalism, today Koh’s vision of
transnationalism is questionable. Most obviously, the U.S. Supreme Court
never in fact overturned Sale, and is not likely to do so in the foreseeable
future.295
Part II above demonstrated that violations of migrant and refugee rights
persisted in the last two decades, at the fault lines between developing and
293. See Hirsi, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Grand Chamber No. 27765/09), ¶¶ 22–44.
294. See id. ¶¶ 80–82.
295. Koh acknowledged this, but did not believe it to be relevant to the central issue, taking instead a
pragmatic approach:
In the end, the Supreme Court rejected our arguments, leaving the United States legally free to
continue the extraterritorial return policy. But other international forums, such as the U.N.
High Commission on Refugees, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and other
bodies began to condemn the U.S. action. Various legislative efforts were made to overturn the
Supreme Court’s ruling, and the issue later became the subject of domestic political pressure
from the African-American community, the Congressional Black Caucus, and Trans-Africa, all
of whom began to promote the notion of a safe haven for Haitian refugees. Finally, in the fall
of 1994, the U.S. government changed its Haitian policy, and intervened to return the refu-
gees. When the issue arose again the following year, with regard to fleeing Cuban refugees, the
Administration first resisted, then ultimately admitted into the United States those Cuban
refugees being detained at offshore refugee camps. Although the U.S. stated policy remains
problematic, at this writing, the actual practice of the U.S. government has moved into greater
compliance with international law.
Koh, supra note 33, at 1415–16. There is a related ongoing debate about exterritorial detainees’ habeas R
rights under the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, After Guantanamo: Extraterritori-
ality of Fundamental Rights in U.S. Constitutional Law, 3 Jus Politicum (2009), http://www.juspoliticum.
com/IMG/pdf/JP3_neuman.pdf.  Though undoubtedly important (and independently thorny), that is of
course not the issue that was decided in Sale, and not the issue discussed here.
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developed countries. This ongoing concern shows transnationalism’s failure
to bring about a brave new world order of human rights in a paradigmati-
cally transnational area of policy. The way developed states were able to
“buy” sovereign capacities of developing states and use them as instruments
of domestic policies foreshadowed the dynamic this Article refers to as the
dialectic of transnationalism. The invocation of “dialectic” in this context
means that seemingly opposing powers had mutually constituted one over-
arching process.296
In the history of philosophy, the synthesis of opposing forces has at times
been thought to reveal “higher” forms of knowledge, value, or social or-
der.297 Such an optimistic worldview is implicit in Koh’s transnational legal
process. Transnational legal process assumes that repeated litigation and argu-
mentation before transnational courts will produce more robust political and
social commitments to human rights. But dialectical processes have also
been associated with movements in the opposite direction; the clash of op-
posing political and cultural forces can lead to gradual moral or political
degradation.298 The relevant literature describes such processes as self-defeat-
ing; the more one strives to discover the truth or realize the good, the more
one strays away from doing so.299
Why did the most robust human rights decisions by transnational judi-
ciaries prove not to protect the rights of migrants and refugees in real life?
The question may seem to contrast “law on the books” with “law in ac-
tion.” But an answer relying on this familiar distinction would not suffice.
A fuller account has to do with the disorientation that transnationalism pro-
duces with respect to the most basic question of legal theory, namely, what
is law? What is the relationship between law and transnationalism’s vision
of global justice, epitomized by the imperatives of human rights?
Examining transnational law and policy relating to unauthorized migra-
tion in the last two decades reveals a self-defeating dialectic process. The
dialectic of transnationalism can be summarized by the following three funda-
mental insights, which will be described at greater length below:
(1) When executive and judicial competences are reformulated as transna-
tional capacities, they become bifurcated from each other.
296. In the history of philosophy, dialectic processes were the building blocks of narratives of histori-
cal progress. Most famously in the philosophical works of G.W.F. Hegel and Karl Marx, dialectics were
theorized as processes of a gradual exposure of the truth, or a realization of the moral good. For a classical
exposition of this philosophical tradition, see generally Sidney Hook, From Hegel to Marx (1994).
297. The view that humanity is in a state of moral progress is a general tenet of enlightenment.
Specifically, this theory is associated with G.W.F. Hegel’s dialectic. See generally G.W.F. Hegel, Phe-
nomenology of Spirit (1977).
298. This position is especially associated with Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer,
Dialectic of Enlightenment (2002) (“What we had set out to do was nothing less than to explain
why humanity, instead of entering a truly human state, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism.”).
299. See generally Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment
(2002); Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics (1981).
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(2) When transnational judiciaries aim to defend human rights, they
show a tendency to accelerate disaggregation processes and, hence, to further
their own bifurcation from policy. Transnational judiciaries thus unwit-
tingly participate in diluting the accountability of executives in future cases.
(3) Transnational legal process advances policy solutions that reformulate
absolute human rights rules as political compromises, transforming an ethics
of conviction into an ethics of responsibility. But the result is that transnational
policies may reasonably be described as enforcing or violating human rights,
depending on which side of the gun we are looking from.
1. The Bifurcation of Executive and Judicial Competences
While all transnational courts, by definition, have limited jurisdiction
(reducible to either national sovereignty or treaty), transnationalism’s nor-
mative claim is universal; it aims to make the world a better place. However,
as already demonstrated above with regard to Sale, executives and judiciaries
never have perfectly coinciding capacities. No matter how far transnational
courts will go, executives acting internationally will remain incongruent
with judiciaries that act within their own jurisdictional limits.
As was discussed above, transnationalism appeared to put “slices” of de-
veloping states’ sovereignty on the global market. The implication is that
developed states could “buy” their executive competences independently,
without adjoining judicial ones. Alternatively, they could aggregate rela-
tively strong enforcement agencies with relatively weak courts, through net-
works of bilateral and multilateral agreements. Transnational courts hand
down magnificent human rights judgments. But the transnational bifurca-
tion of judiciaries from policymaking leaves significant areas of policy be-
yond judicial reach, or under diminished judicial oversight.
We see the simplest version of this disaggregation in the institutional
making of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights. This transna-
tional body did not have binding authority over the United States, the poli-
cies of which it aimed to review. The emphasis on non-binding, persuasive
authority is typical of transnationalism, and is sometimes justified in trans-
nationalism’s own terms. From a different perspective, however, this bifurca-
tion between a transnational judiciary and U.S. policies means that this
transnational court could not grant a remedy.300
The United States ceased its policy of interception with no process as
early as May 8, 1994.301 The Clinton administration did not do this because
of judicial intervention. Rather, it was more sophisticated policymaking,
enforcement, and human rights networks that allowed it to change policy.
300. The Inter-American Commission therefore does not meet the ancient condition which the com-
mon law drew from Roman law: Ubi jus, ibi remedium (“Where there is a right, there is a remedy”).
301. See Gwen Ifill, Clinton Grants Haitian Exiles Hearings at Sea, N.Y. Times, May 8, 1994, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/1994/05/08/world/clinton-grants-haitian-exiles-hearings-at-sea.html?src=
pm.
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The Administration sought to obtain a network of “safe haven” zones for
Haitians in the Caribbean. When Caribbean states refused to resettle the
refugees, Clinton sent them to Guantanamo.302 In June of that year, the
United States started processing Haitians’ asylum claims aboard Comfort, a
Naval Ship deployed in Jamaican territorial waters.303 The framework al-
lowed refugees access to asylum but simultaneously removed them from
U.S. territories, stripping them of procedural rights.304 With his options for
controlling the refugee flood severely limited, the President committed the
United States to quickly restoring democratic government to Haiti.305
The exodus of Haitian refugees slowed and finally stopped with the Sep-
tember 1994 invasion.306 The Haitian model that migrated across global
fault lines between developing and developed countries was not one of re-
turns with no process.307 It was a model of offshore process—with reduced or
eliminated judicial oversight—that became the leading model worldwide.308
In Hirsi, the same bifurcation is subtler. The court did step in against
such bifurcation;309 but alter the facts of Hirsi to imagine another version of
the same scenario. In this version, the flag on the vessel intercepting the
Eritrean and Somali migrants belongs to Tunisia or Libya, not to Italy.
Would the result of the case be the same? Under domestic Italian law, that
vessel would no longer be considered to be under Italian jurisdiction. This
simply amounts to an adjustment in the terms agreed upon between en-
forcement networks. Granted, ECtHR suggested that de facto control might
be on par with de jure jurisdiction. But it is difficult to imagine that a court
would hold a state conducting enforcement by proxy to be responsible for
refoulement. Especially, for example, if the Italian “experts” are no longer
physically present on the boat conducting enforcement and give their in-
structions or recommendations from afar. Like taxes, human rights become
obligations that can be cleverly and legally avoided.
This “adjusted” model is not a speculative or theoretical one. As de-
scribed above, it is the model that was implemented by Frontex “joint oper-
302. See Partrick Gavigan, Migration Emergencies and Human Rights in Haiti, Paper Prepared for the
Conference on Regional Responses to Forced Migration in Central America and the Caribbean (Sep.
30–Oct. 1, 1997), available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/gavigane.html.
303. See Bill Frelick, U.S. Refugee Policy in the Caribbean: No Bridge Over Troubled Waters, 20-FALL
Fletcher F. World Aff. 67, 69 (1996).
304. See in this context, Koh’s observation (made precisely in this context) that “a fine line separates a
desirable policy of temporary safe haven from a counter-productive one of indefinite arbitrary detention.”
Koh, supra note 62, at 1020. R
305. Gavigan, supra note 302. R
306. This was known as the “safe haven” policy. For an analysis of this policy, see generally T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Safe Haven: Pragmatics and Prospects, 35 Va. J. Int’l L. 71 (1994).
307. The Clinton administration returned to the policy of intercepting Haitian boat people and sum-
marily returning them without a hearing. See Bill Frelick, U.S. Refugee Policy in the Caribbean, supra note
303, at 67. R
308. The level of adjudication that was applied varied, from “shipboard adjudicators” to some access
to U.S. courts.
309. Hirsi, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Grand Chamber No. 27765/09), at 80.
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ations” both in the Mediterranean and off of the western coast of Africa. In
other words, in Hirsi, ECtHR reviewed an obsolete model, an Italian relic of
the past. This “primitive” version of the leading European model for inter-
ceptions at sea included components of both de facto and de jure sovereignty.
These allowed the European court to reach out and re-aggregate the disag-
gregated governmental competences; the use of force and its review by
courts were joined together. But in more sophisticated Europeanized en-
forcement networks, these components were “cleaned” by using foreign-flag
boats.
Transnationalism allows not only for a bifurcation and disaggregation
among judicial and executive agencies of various kinds, but also their re-
aggregation in ways that a unitary vision of sovereign competences would
not expect. This is clear in the regulation that allowed Frontex to send
armed border guards to Greece from various EU Member States. The regula-
tion provided that civil liability for the misconduct of RABIT teams would
not be ascribed to the states that sent their border guards to participate in
these teams.310 Rather, as the regulation states, “[w]here guest officers are
operating in a host Member State, that Member State shall be liable in accor-
dance with its national law for any damage caused by them during their
operations.”311
Knowingly sending unauthorized migrants into inhuman and degrading
detention conditions may presumably constitute a tort under the law of all
EU Member States. However, the “host country” (Greece) is the only one
that can be held liable.312 A potential plaintiff who is exposed to inhuman
and degrading treatment by border guards coming from a variety of coun-
tries, some of which have efficient judicial systems and deeper pockets than
Greece, will have to sue Greece. This also explains the composition of the
multi-national border guard teams. Under the regulation, every team per-
forming enforcement activities must have at least one border guard from the
“host Member State,” retaining formal responsibility over the operation.313
Moving to criminal liability, here one immediately finds a similar immunity
constructed through the same kind of “jurisdictional jockeying.”314 High-
ranking officials enjoy the immunity of international organizations, once
again severing them from judiciaries.315
310. Council Regulation 863/2007, art. 10b(1), 2007 O.J. (L 199) 30, 38.
311. Id. (emphasis added).
312. This is not true when such damage is caused by “gross negligence.” See id. at art. 10b(3).
313. Id. at art. 10(3).
314. The term is borrowed from Lauren Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes
in World History 1400–1900, at 3 (2001).
315. See Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 343, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115)
47, 194 (stating that “[t]he Union shall enjoy in the territories of the Member States such privileges and
immunities as are necessary for the performance of its tasks, under the conditions laid down in the
Protocol of 8 April 1965 on the privileges and immunities of the European Union. The same shall apply
to the European Central Bank and the European Investment Bank.”). See also Protocol on the Privileges
and Immunities of the European Communities art. 11, Apr. 8, 1965, 2006 O.J. (C 321 E) 318, 321
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An interesting version of this bifurcation between transnational judiciar-
ies and executives emerges from another case mentioned in passing above. In
early 2011, a little more than a year before ECtHR released Hirsi, it handed
down M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece.316 Like Hirsi, M.S.S. seems to be a mani-
festation of the merits of transnational legal process. Here, too, the idea that
international agreements and cooperation can bifurcate executive action
from judicial review is addressed head-on.
As briefly noted in Part II, M.S.S. pierced through one veil that severed
executive power from judicial review (the Dublin II Regulation), but the
more sophisticated veil remained out of reach (the Frontex Regulation). As
Human Rights Watch pointed out, Frontex during its presence in Greece
was knowingly involved in exposing about 12,000 migrants to inhumane
and degrading treatment in Greek detention facilities.317 Belgians could
serve among the “guest officers.”318 After M.S.S., Belgium was enjoined not
to participate in this abusive system. Ironically, it could still send its border
guards to Greece on the Frontex mission to do the same thing from up
close.319
Of course, Frontex’s RABIT deployment in Greece was not the issue that
came before the court. The applicant was not a victim of this operation, and
no evidence was brought before the court regarding this particular issue. But
in many ways, that just restates the problem. The transnational condition
allows such functional separation between disaggregated executives and ju-
diciaries. In this context, notice the similarity between the arrangement in
Greece, where border patrols had to have at least one Greek border guard,
and the Italian maritime arrangement; boats with foreign flags conduct en-
forcement activities based on European priorities.
In the wake of Sale, it was pretty much settled that sovereign states could
contract out many of their capacities, including jurisdiction. Disaggregated
sovereignty allowed effective control to be granted to a foreign executive
agency. Casting a domestic enforcement policy as international would thus
(“Representatives of Member States taking part in the work of the institutions of the Communities, their
advisers and technical experts shall, in the performance of their duties and during their travel to and from
the place of meeting, enjoy the customary privileges, immunities and facilities.”).
316. M.S.S. v. Belgium, App. No. 30696/09 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011).
317. Human Rights Watch, supra note 157, at 1. R
318. Frontex operatives are chosen from a pool including EU countries, in addition to Norway and
Iceland; the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark did not participate in Frontex’s founding regula-
tion. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 157, at 11 n. 2. R
319. Or, as Bill Frelick of Human Rights Watch put it: “It’s a disturbing contradiction that at the
same time that the European Court of Human Rights was categorically ruling that sending migrants to
detention in Greece violated their fundamental rights, Frontex, an EU executive agency, and border
guards from EU states were knowingly sending them there.” HRW Report: Frontex Exposes Migrants to
Abusive Conditions in Greece, Migrants at Sea (Sept. 22, 2011, 4:09 AM), http://migrantsatsea.word-
press.com/tag/bill-frelick/.
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bifurcate it from domestic judicial review, even if it were thereby made
more complicated administratively.320
2. Courts as Disaggregation Accelerators
But this story is not one about “bad” executives and “good” judiciaries.
Saying that transnational courts have tried to uphold absolute rights, while
transnational executives have spun networks that circumvent courts, misses
the ways in which both institutions are implicated. The second pattern con-
stituting the dialectic of transnationalism is that, precisely when they try the
hardest to protect rights beyond territorial borders, courts acquire the most
significant role in providing the conditions for the rights’ further violation.
When courts review policy and enforcement directed towards unautho-
rized migrants, they provide guidelines to policymaking and enforcement
networks on how to push policies beyond the courts’ jurisdiction. Transna-
tional judicial review becomes less about protecting rights, and more about
ensuring that a particular agency over which the court has jurisdiction will
not violate rights. The price of this kind of judicial review can be that mi-
grants’ rights will be violated by other agencies (the powers of which are
beyond courts’ reach). In such cases, transnational courts become “disaggre-
gation accelerators”; they structurally reinforce the bifurcation between
transnational policies and courts.
Though Hirsi reviewed an obsolete Italian model of disaggregation that
already had a more sophisticated European alternative, it contributed to un-
derstandings of how to evade judicial review in future cases. By saying that a
state must not turn back asylum seekers with boats under their de jure or de
facto control a court is also inviting such policies, as long as they can be
conducted with no such control. This invitation to transfer more capacities
to developing countries was echoed in Australian policymaking networks.321
Indeed, the political process that M70/2011 generated, still very much
underway, provides a fascinating case of a court becoming a disaggregation
320. From this perspective, the division of the world into sovereign states provides dominant states
with opportunities for implementing policies at home that rely on costs abroad, contrary to the assertion
that formal sovereignty restrains power. For instance, Nico Krisch argues that, as a general matter:
The sovereign equality of states has, since the 17th century, become a building block of inter-
national legal system, and even though it embodies only a very formal notion of equality, it
poses significant obstacles to powerful states. This is true, on the one hand, for the rules on
jurisdiction that flow from it: par in parem non habet imperium prevents the direct governance of
other states by means of international law.
Krisch, supra note 12, at 377. But of course, direct governance is often an unwanted liability. R
321. The Houston expert panel, which will be discussed immediately below, vetted against turning
back unauthorized migrants at sea, noting, inter alia, that ECtHR has held that a person will be subject
to a state’s jurisdiction where the state exercises effective control over a person exterritorialy. It recom-
mends that unauthorized migrants will be turned back only after “changes in the understandings that
exist with regional states.” Australian Government, supra note 1, at 54. R
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accelerator. The main players in this process are Australian government
agencies. But other countries in the region are also constantly engaged with.
When the Australian High Court found in M70/2011 that the offshore
processing framework was illegal, the decision immediately became a
blueprint for another offshore processing framework. Mere days later, the
Australian government began to explore its options.322 The Australian Solic-
itor General’s opinion initially concluded that this might not be possible in
light of the High Court’s decision.323
Ten days later, Dr. David Benett, former Australian Solicitor General,
intervened in the debate.324 Benett pointed at a path we are already familiar
with both from Slaughter’s work and from Europe; deeper engagement with
intended offshore processing countries would push human rights perform-
ance in those countries to a level acceptable to the court.325 In other words,
Australia should purchase more aspects of these countries’ sovereignty:
[T]here is no legal reason why steps could not be taken with Na-
uru, Papua New Guinea or Malaysia (or indeed any other willing
322. In the hours after the High Court’s emphatic decision that the Government’s proposed “Malay-
sian Arrangement” is legally invalid, Immigration Minister Chris Bowen declared that the result was
“profoundly disappointing” and intimated that the High Court had “applied a new test” which varied
from the previous understanding of the law relating to “third country processing.” Former Prime Minis-
ter Julia Gillard added to these comments the following day, saying that the High Court’s decision
“basically turns on its head the understanding of the law in this country.” She singled out Chief Justice
Robert French, stating that “his Honour . . . considered comparable legal questions when he was a judge
of the Federal Court and made different decisions to the one that the High Court made yesterday”
(presumably alluding to Ruddock, 110 FCR 491). See Transcript of Press Conference on High Court
Decision, Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (Austl. Gov’t) (Aug. 31, 2011), http://www.minis-
ter.immi.gov.au/media/cb/2011/cb171159.htm; Transcript of Joint Press Conference on Malaysia Agree-
ment, Prime Minister of Australia (Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.pm.gov.au/press-office/transcript-joint-
press-conference-brisbane-1; Greg Weeks: Attacking the High Court: a Comment on the Malaysian Solution Case
and its Aftermath, UK Constitutional Group (Sept. 3, 2011, 12:11 PM), http://ukconstitutionallaw.
org/2011/09/03/greg-weeks-attacking-the-high-court-a-comment-on-the-malaysian-solution-case-and-
its-aftermath/.
323. The opinion stated:
We would have confidence that the power conferred by s 198A would be available to be
exercised to take asylum seekers from Australia to Nauru only if it were able to be demon-
strated to the satisfaction of an Australian court: first, that appropriate arrangements were in
place to ensure practical compliance by Nauru with its obligations under the Convention and
the Protocol; and, secondly, that Nauru in its treatment of asylum seekers and refugees com-
plied in practice with human rights standards acceptable at least to the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees. These are complex issues of fact and degree requiring detailed
assessment and analysis. Even when that assessment and analysis was complete, the issues
might well be the subject of contested evidence. In the absence of a detailed assessment and
analysis of these issues, we are unable to form a view as to whether either of the two conditions
we have identified would be capable of being demonstrated to the satisfaction of an Australian
court.
Gageler, supra note 264, ¶ 3. R
324. David Bennett, Offshore Processing still Possible Despite High Court Decision, Sydney Morning
Herald, Sept. 12, 2011, http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/politics/offshore-processing-still-possible-de-
spite-high-court-decision-20110911-1k40s.html.
325. Id.
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partner country), which would enable the minister to declare
them satisfactory. It is significant that Nauru has now acceded to
the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the Proto-
col Relating to the Status of Refugees. Much attention to detail
would be required. In particular, any agreement with Australia
should, unlike the agreement with Malaysia, be expressed to be
legally binding.326
On the day the op-ed was published, former Australian Prime Minister
Julia Gillard announced that the government would introduce legislation to
“provide for the government to proceed with transfers under the Arrange-
ment with Malaysia.”327 In the next few months, the coalition in the Austra-
lian Senate drafted a bill with the advice of Bennett, who concluded that the
final draft provided more protections for asylum seekers and was “less likely
to be subject to complex judicial proceedings.”
In June 2012, the Australian government attempted to pass a new bill
providing for offshore processing, and failed.328 At this impasse, Gillard
commissioned yet another expert opinion on offshore processing. Angus
Houston, former Chief of the Defence Force, led the new “expert panel.”329
The resulting report, which the Australian government has since endorsed,
recommended “high level and broad-ranging cooperation with Indonesia
and Malaysia in particular.”330 Thus, it laid out in detail what had to be
done to meet the requirements of the Australian High Court, introducing an
even deeper disaggregation.331
326. Id.
327. Press Release, Prime Minister of Australia & Minister for Immigration, Legislation to Restore
Migration Act Powers (Sept. 12, 2011), http://www.pm.gov.au/press-office/legislation-restore-migration-
act-powers.
328. One of the amendment’s objectives was to “affirm that offshore entry persons, including offshore
entry persons in respect to whom Australia has or may have protection obligations, should be able to be
taken to any country designated to be an offshore assessment country, and the designation of a country to be
an offshore assessment country need not to be limited by reference to the international obligations or domestic law of
that country.” Explanatory Memorandum for Migration Legislation Amendment (The Bali Process) Bill
2012, Parliament of Australia (2012) (italics not in original), http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Bus-
iness/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=r4747. The Act also provides that in such as-
sessment, the Australian minister must consult with UNHCR (whose recommendations are not binding),
such consultation being distinctly “transitional.” Id. As required by Human Rights (Parliamentary Scru-
tiny) Act 2011 (Austl.), a “Statement of Compatibility with Human Rights” is appended to the proposal.
The statement concludes with an interesting paragraph that once again illustrates the crucial role of
horizontal networks (in Slaughter’s terms), stating that “[t]he Bill is compatible with human rights
because, to the extent that it engages human rights and seeks to limit the level of protection currently
offered under existing legislation, it does not limit those rights as they may be considered through
administrative practices.” Id.
329. Houston to Lead Asylum Policy Panel After Senate Rejects Bill, ABC Radio Australia, http://www.
radioaustralia.net.au/international/2012-06-28/houston-to-lead-asylum-policy-panel-after-senate-rejects-
bill/968696, (June 29, 2012, 12:04 AM).
330. Australian Government, supra note 1, at 12. R
331. Id. at 31.
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The trajectory of M70/2011 provides an outstanding case study illustrat-
ing the strange way in which transnationalism defeats its own human rights
commitments. The Australian High Court wrote what is perhaps the most
powerful defense of the absolute obligations of human rights in the short
history reviewed above. The decision seems to include profound articulations
of the ethics of conviction of human rights. But with some diplomatic work, its
prohibitions were found to leave significant opportunities for policymaking
networks that would not violate the rules that the court set out. With their
re-articulation in the Houston report, the court’s findings were reformulated
in terms of an ethics of responsibility. Asylum seekers could now be detained
offshore for years, with significantly reduced procedural rights. They would
be granted access to asylum, but the chance that they would be exposed to
absolutely prohibited policies such as refoulement or inhumane and degrading
treatment would probably increase. This goes back to the first pattern de-
scribed above—the bifurcation of judicial and executive capacities—and to
Blackmun’s words.332
Furthermore, after M70/2011, significant evidence shows that incentives
for preventive interceptions have increased.333 Such interceptions rely on for-
eign enforcement agencies blocking people from access to asylum, just as
Frontex “joint operations” do. On July 24, 2012, Jakarta agreed to joint
navy patrols between the two navies, to take place between Java and Christ-
mas Island.334 As explained in the context of Hirsi, it is doubtful that any
court will be able to help future asylum seekers who are intercepted by
foreign agencies under this cooperative model.
When Judge Giovanni Bonello of the ECtHR wrote recently in a
landmark case that “jurisdiction hangs from the mouth of a firearm,”335 he
was precisely on the mark, but perhaps not for the reasons he thought. The
judgment, given vis-à-vis activities of the UK military in Iraq, stands for the
proposition that governments that acceded to ECtHR cannot wield un-
332. Sale, 509 U.S. at 208.
333. See, e.g., Australia Poised to Strike a Boat Deal with Indonesia, Sydney Morning Herald (Aug. 1,
2012), http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/political-news/australia-poised-to-strike-boat-deal-with-indone-
sia-20120801-23e3q.html; George Roberts, Aus Authorities to be Given Free Reign in Indon Waters, ABC
News, http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2012/s3557883.htm (Aug. 1, 2012, 8:03 AM).




Jurisdiction flows not only from the exercise of democratic governance, not only from ruthless
tyranny, not only from colonial usurpation. It also hangs from the mouth of a firearm. In non-
combat situations, everyone in the line of fire of a gun is within the authority and control of
whoever is wielding it.
Al-Skeini, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 55721/07, ¶ 28.
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checked force extraterritorially.336 But there are subtler implications to this
proposition that are appropriate in the present context.
Outside the borders of sovereignty, guns precede law. Imagine that trans-
national executive and judicial networks are two webs placed one over the
other. As the logic of the judicial web is to follow only the places where the
executive web wields force, some parts of the executive will systematically
be spun first and remain uncovered by judicial networks. Jurisprudence
helps executives and policymakers better understand where enforcement vac-
uums will appear next.
Recall the original dictum to which Judge Bonello alluded: Chairman
Mao’s assertion that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.”337
This assertion sounds invidious to any ear accustomed to the terminologies
of liberal democracy. But as democratic government does not extend beyond
its own borders, extraterritorial jurisdiction flows from violence in areas
where enforcement vacuums exist. The result is that there is plenty of room
to exercise policies abroad—even in order to advance domestic agendas—
without exposure to judicial review. This does not mean that policies will be
rid of violence. Rather, it simply means that developing countries that are
beyond the court’s jurisdiction will wield such violence on behalf of devel-
oped countries. As we have seen above, getting them to do that does not
normally require violence, but only economic power. High-minded judicial
opinions thus become guidelines explaining how not to be held responsible
for human rights violations. They may impose extra costs on executive agen-
cies. But there is no real hope to prevent future violations from happening,
or even to hold perpetrators accountable.
This, of course, does not mean that the international terrain is lawless.
Where judicial networks are absent, policymaking networks reign, with
their financially driven dynamics through which international law trans-
forms disparate interests into common ones. The interests of developing
states thus seem to converge with those of developed states.
Transnationalism structurally reproduced unchecked powers, but this is
of course not the result of nefarious intentions. One must, however, bear in
mind that extending all branches of government equally to new territories
abroad, something that might promise democratic checks and balances,
would not be transnationalism or disaggregation at all. It would simply be
an annexation of new territories, transforming them into parts of a unitary
sovereignty.
336. See Marko Milanovic, European Court Decides Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda, EJIL Talk! (July 7, 2011),
http://www.ejiltalk.org/european-court-decides-al-skeini-and-al-jedda/.
337. Mao Tse-Tong, Problems of War and Strategy, in Selected Works, Vol. II 224 (1938).
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3. The Conviction/Responsibility Substitution Effect
But is the disaggregation of sovereignty we now see in Australia norma-
tively objectionable? Many Australians are presumably celebrating the new
policies.338 Instead of allowing them to drown at sea, Australia will now be
able to save asylum seekers and process them outside of the country. The
argument is one we have seen throughout the cases above. It was voiced by
the Bush administration in front of the U.S. Supreme Court,339 and was
raised again before the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights.340 It
was raised by Italy in Hirsi,341 and Frontex raises it regularly with respect to
the maritime enforcement activities of which the agency is in charge.342 As
countless migrants have lost their lives drowning in the last two decades, it
may seem like there is something to this argument.
The world that it heralds, however, is one in which normative judgments
are always relative. The only ethical reasoning that counts is the pragmatism
of an ethics of responsibility.
What can be said for this pragmatism, and for the policies recommended
in the Houston Report? If developing countries like Papua New Guinea,
Indonesia, and Nauru will improve their asylum capacities with the new
framework, it is conceivable that the world population of refugees will bene-
fit. The model might be thought of as a sophisticated version of the regional
solutions James Hathaway and Peter Schuck suggested in the 1990s.343 At
the time, there was growing dissatisfaction among scholars and policymak-
ers with the Refugee Convention, which had already been deemed a relic of
the post-war era.344 Disaggregation and transnational legal process in this
optimistic vision can represent a more pragmatic way of dealing with what
seems to be a regularized problem: “mixed flows” of refugees and other
migrants seeking a way out of developing countries.
The underlying moral dilemma appeared in the question posed to the
High Court in M70/2011. The issue the court discussed was whether the
338. In a poll published in July 2012, 60% of the Australians asked answered that the government
was “too soft” on asylum seekers, while only 12% thought the government policy was “too tough.” See
Essential Report: Too Soft or Too Tough on Asylum Seekers, Essential Vision, July 9, 2012, http://essentialvi-
sion.com.au/too-soft-or-too-tough-on-asylum-seekers.
339. See Sale, 509 U.S. at 163–64. Justice Stevens reiterated the U.S. government’s position, accord-
ing to which “allowing Haitians into the United States for the screening process . . . would have posed a
life-threatening danger to thousands of persons embarking on long voyages in dangerous craft.” Id.
340. The Centre for Human Rights, supra note 236, ¶ 182. R
341. Hirsi, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Grand Chamber No. 27765/09), ¶ 13.
342. See Frontex, http://www.frontex.europa.eu/operations/types-of-operations (last visited Mar. 2,
2013) (“Saving lives at sea and intercepting both migrants and the people who smuggle them go hand in
hand.”).
343. See generally Peter Schuck, Share the Refugees, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1994, http://www.nytimes.
com/1994/08/13/opinion/share-the-refugees.html; James C. Hathaway, Making International Refugee Law
Relevant Again: A Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection, 10 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 115
(1997). On the affinity between Koh’s transnationalism and Schuck’s proposals, see Koh, supra note 62, R
at 1023.
344. See generally Schuck, supra note 343; Hathaway, supra note 343. R
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Australian government had power to conclude its bilateral arrangement
with Malaysia.345 In the background, however, lay another question, totally
absent from the legal discussion, but present in any consideration of the
facts on political or moral terms. The deal was a swap in humans. Four
thousand people, already determined to be bona fide refugees, were to be
transferred from Malaysia to Australia and resettled in Australia over a pe-
riod of four years. In return, Australia would send 800 asylum seekers for
refugee status determination procedures in Malaysia. Even if, as the court
found, there was a danger that the fundamental rights of some of these 800
would be violated, the potential benefit also seemed to be large; the 4,000
refugees living in limbo in Malaysia would now have a chance to recom-
mence a dignified life. By upholding an absolute understanding of human
rights, the High Court denied them these hopes. By adopting the perspec-
tive of an ethics of conviction, the court abandoned serious considerations stem-
ming from an ethics of responsibility.
However, attached to the tail of this providential vision is a catastrophic
one,346 which would predict that even the most perfect offshore arrangement
would invite foreseeable human rights violations.347 This can be called the
“Greek effect.” A country that is transformed into a stepping-stone to the
developing world quickly attracts large numbers of people. It may have all
of the necessary legal provisions to protect refugees. But with no real capaci-
ties to implement them, that country’s legal obligations—even if initially
met—can quickly turn into a dead letter.348 Now, the stronger neighboring
country’s court can no longer effectively intervene. Many who otherwise
345. Plaintiff M70/2011 v. Minister for Immigration and Citizenship; and Plaintiff M106/2011 v.
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, [2011] HCA 32, (Austl.), ¶ 1.
346. Paraphrasing Adi Ophir, The Two-State Solution: Providence and Catastrophe, 8 Theoretical Inq.
L. 117 (2007).
347. Amir Tejo, No Time Wasted in Asylum Seekers’ East Java Escape, Jakarta Globe (July 31, 2012),
http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/no-time-wasted-in-asylum-seekers-east-java-escape/533881. This
report reflects the recent confusion of Malyasian authorities with respect to requirements to detain mi-
grants in humane conditions. After 66 asylum seekers were rescued in July 2012 by Malaysian authorities
from the tiny island Gogoa, they had all escaped. Id. The asylum seekers were stranded for seven days on
the island. Id. When they were transferred to Malaysia—or so recounts an immigration officer named
Dwi Widodo—there was not enough room in existing facilities to detain them. Id. “ ‘As we were trans-
ferring them from the Coast Guard headquarters to the detention facility and the hotel, there were
arguments,’ Dwi said. ‘Many of them insisted that they be moved to a hotel. Taking advantage of the
heated situation and the limited number of immigration officials, the asylum seekers escaped.’” Id.
348. Oona Hathaway explains the underlying problematic in very clear terms:
The more the government of a state expects to face domestic enforcement of the state’s interna-
tional commitments, the more likely it is to expect to be required to change its practices to
abide by international law if its practices are not already consistent with that law. And the
more likely a state is to change its practices to abide by international law, the more costly and
hence less attractive committing to it will appear. States that are more likely to engage in
domestic enforcement of the terms of international legal agreement are therefore less likely to
commit to them in the first place, all other things held equal. In other words, generally speak-
ing, the more likely an international agreement is to lead to an improvement in a state’s
practices, the less likely the state will join it.
Hathaway, supra note 224, at 499. R
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would have had a chance to gain protection are returned to persecution. A
pattern of systematic abuses, typical of the transnational condition,
reappears.
As discussed above, the Houston Expert Panel Report provides the most
striking example of how this may happen. Responding to M70/2011, the
Houston report minimizes legal language, speaking instead in the language
of “reasonableness, fairness, and humanitarian need.”349 It urges that “prac-
ticality and fairness should take precedence over theory and inertia; and that
the perfect should not be allowed to become the enemy of the good.”350 In
its assertion that “[a] strategic and comprehensive response needs to reflect
circumstances as they currently exist and are likely to develop rather than
what they have been in the past,”351 it speaks in more than just a hint
against the Refugee Convention. What this should be read to say is that the
Convention presents the past, when racial and political persecution moti-
vated its framers. “[T]he circumstances as they currently exist” (which the
Panel alludes to but does not spell out) are, first and foremost, global dispar-
ities of wealth. These have displaced asylum seekers and economic migrants
alike, sending them all into orbit from the developing world to the devel-
oped one.352
The central and truly most intriguing proposal of the Houston Report is
the “no advantage principle,” meant to offset incentives to seek asylum in
Australia.353 According to this proposal, offshore detention periods will be
extended so that asylum seekers do not gain from unauthorized entry. This
reflects yet another aspect of the substitution effect. Human dignity is un-
derstood in terms that allow policymakers to believe that they protect asy-
lum seekers from themselves: “The incentives and disincentives we
recommend complement each other. In our view, they need to be pursued in
that comprehensive and integrated context as the most effective way of dis-
couraging asylum seekers from risking their lives on dangerous maritime
voyages to Australia.”354 The extent to which the proposal moved toward
the disaggregation of sovereignty is most clearly expressed in its recommen-
dation that all of Australia’s territory could be excised from Australia’s sov-
ereignty for the purpose of migration.355 The proposal thus takes the Pacific
Solution to its logical extreme.
These measures deal yet another blow to the idea that law should be
grounded in universal justice. In its claim to defend human rights, transna-
tional law has ended up fully instrumentalizing human rights. Cost-benefit
solutions like those of the Houston Panel always beg questions about whose
349. Australian Government, supra note 1, at 7. R
350. Id.
351. Id. at 10.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 14.
354. Id. at 8.
355. See id. at 17. This has since been implemented by Prime Minister Julia Gillard.
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costs and whose benefits are to be considered. When such analysis occurs
within a state, it may sometimes have considerable merits; the underlying
premise is that policies are designed to maximize benefits and minimize
costs for all members of the polity (although how to do so fairly is another
question). But on the transnational plain they have no such analytic integ-
rity. Are costs for citizens and for migrants really comparable? And how are
migrants defined for the purposes of such measures? (How about those who
may be on the way?) There is a slippery slope here that may lead us to
believe that all humans should be taken into account, but that of course also
doesn’t make sense.
In the final analysis, behaviors that from one perspective are described as
humanitarian appear from another perspective as violations of the most fun-
damental of rights.356 For one thing, asylum seekers aiming to reach Austra-
lia have made abundantly clear how the policies put in place by the Houston
Expert Panel look from their perspective. As Australian offshoring resumed,
and in the following months, many different groups have engaged in hunger
strikes, measures of self-harm, and detention riots.357 Through a Facebook
group, they aim to reach worldwide audiences in their protest against the
Australian policies.358 In these conditions, parts of Australia’s networks, no-
tably the UNHCR, are starting to respond negatively.359 The Pacific Solu-
tion script is replayed all over again.
The same dynamics occur in Europe. Systematically exposing people to
inhumane detention, as Frontex does in Greece, is traditionally thought to
be a rather egregious breach of international law.360 But the agency contin-
ues to proudly operate under the flag of human rights. Indeed, in its Work
Program for 2010 to 2013, the agency “identified ‘humanity’ as one of the
core values which shall be endorsed, shared, lived and performed by each
member of staff and which shall form the foundation of Frontex activities at
356. The importance of the imperative to prevent countries from taking such action is illustrated by
Article 7(1)(e) of the Rome Statute (which established the International Criminal Court): “imprisonment
or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law,”
when “part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge
of the attack” is defined as a crime against humanity. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
art. 7(1)(e), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (July 17, 1998).
357. Nauru is waiting to explode in wake of asylum seeker unrest, The Australian (Nov. 7, 2012), http://
www.news.com.au/national-news/nsw-act/nauru-is-waiting-to-explode-in-wake-of-asylum-seeker-unrest/
story-fndo4bst-1226511796636.
358. The group is called “Ir,Sr,Irq,Afgh in nauru 2012” (standing for Iranian, Sri Lankan, Iraqi and
Afghan asylum seekers on Nauru Island. Ir,Sr,Irq,Afgh in nauru 2012, Facebook group, available at http://
www.facebook.com/.
359. See, e.g., Phil Mercer, UN Criticizes Australian Offshore Asylum Camp, Voice of America (Febru-
ary 4, 2013), http://www.voanews.com/content/un-criticizes-australian-offshore-asylum-camp/1596562.
html; George Roberts, UN Fears Aust Asylum Regime ‘Another Road to Indefinite Detention,’ ABC News
(November 14, 2012), http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2012/s3632233.htm.
360. Under Article 7 of the Rome Statute, when inhumane treatment is inflicted “as part of a wide-
spread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack,” it is
defined a “crime against humanity.” Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7, July 17
1988, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
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all levels.”361 The language might make one smile. But if law stands for an
ultimate prohibition of a certain kind of state violence—and at the same
time authorizes it—legality itself is thrown into crisis. This crisis is not
something that attacks law from the outside—say by its political or eco-
nomic subversion. The crucial lesson of the dialectic of transnationalism is that
it arises from law’s own transnational structure.
One might ask whether there really is something so unique in the so-
called dialectic of transnationalism. After all, the “dialectic” scenario is famil-
iar from introductory classes on judicial review. The government introduces
a bill and passes it through the parliament, relying on a majority. The court
strikes it down, deeming it unconstitutional. Government lawyers go back
to the drafting table, and propose a bill that will achieve the same policy
goals but will not be caught in the net of judicial review.
But if rights-based judicial review is in question, we would like to think
that a new bill would pass muster only if it reduces the violation of rights.
Only a new bill that does not violate absolute rights at all should be deemed
legitimate. But rights-based judicial review of refugee and migration issues
in transnational courts often simply shifts the location of violations. Next
time, they are likely to happen where the court will not have jurisdiction, no
matter how expansively defined. The difference between the domestic and
the international context is, crucially, not one of degree but one of category.
In the domestic context, all branches of government are united by their
responsibility to uphold the same law; but this cohesiveness immediately
collapses once we step over the border or out of the judiciary’s jurisdiction.
VI. The Normativity of Transnationalism
A. The Politics of Human Rights
What, then, does the dialectic of transnationalism leave of transnational-
ism’s hopes for a better world?
This Article has taken no position on the question as to whether absolute
rules of human rights law should have any binding moral claims upon us as a
philosophical matter. Similarly, this Article does not offer justifications—if
indeed there are any—for legal rules that are grounded in an ethics of convic-
tion. Weber thought that an ethics of conviction is a necessary component of
political life.362 But it is doubtful if he would deem it appropriate to formu-
late an ethics of conviction as a form of law.
361. Preamble to the Cooperation Arrangement between The European Agency for the Management
of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union and The
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, May 26, 2010, available at http://fra.europa.eu/sites/
default/files/fra_uploads/891-Cooperation-Agreement-FRA-Frontex_en.pdf.
362. See Weber, supra note 18, at 92 (“ ‘Here I stand, I can do no other.’ . . . [T]his is a situation that R
may befall any of us at some point, if we are not inwardly dead. In this sense an ethics of conviction and
an ethics of responsibility are not absolute antitheses but are mutually complementary, and only when
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The idea that there are certain policies and categories of behavior to which
no human should be subjected is by no means self-explanatory. Indeed, it
may not be easy to explain at all, if by that we refer to a series of deductive
or inductive operations. As others have suggested, absolute human rights
rules may be best explained as articles of faith.363 Weber illustrates what he
means by an ethics of conviction with the example of a prophet.364 For better or
worse, by binding states to absolute rules, human rights law invites each and
every one of us to partake in a modern form of prophecy.
This last Part of the Article speaks to members of the secularized religion
of human rights, for whom the tenets of this faith have purchase. As many
faiths do, this faith imbues the lives of its adherents with a sense of mean-
ing. In the last two decades, transnationalism’s normative claims have been
particularly important in the production of such meaning. It operationalized
moral commitments, allowing the committed to believe not only that they
understand the world, but also that they can change it. Harold Koh had his
own version of this old Marxian message:
[I]f my question is ‘how is international human rights law en-
forced?’, my answer is simple. International human rights law is
enforced, I would say, not just by nation-states, not just by gov-
ernment officials, not just by world historical figures, but by peo-
ple like us, by people with the courage and commitment to bring
international human rights law home through a transnational le-
gal process of interaction, interpretation, and internalization.365
Such words push some of us to believe that we can do something to real-
ize universal values. In governmental agencies, in NGOs, and in law school
clinics, considerable resources are dedicated to the operationalization of this
faith. If the normative claims of transnationalism have proven over time to
be false, it would seem like transnationalism’s agendas should change
considerably.
The tendency to replace absolute rules of international law with prag-
matic policy solutions is not new. It grows from a post-war suspicion to-
wards any political philosophy that claimed access to absolute truths about
human nature. Much of the most important political theory of the twentieth
century articulates this suspicion. These theories present, in different ways, a
narrative about how such absolutism led to the consolidation of totalitarian
power—and the worst human rights abuses.366 Though human rights are
taken together do they constitute the authentic human being who is capable of having a ‘vocation for
politics.’ ”).
363. See, e.g., Martti Koskenniemi, What Should International Lawyers Learn from Karl Marx? 17Leiden
Journal of International Law, 229 (2004) (critiquing theological tendency).
364. Weber, supra note 18, at 85. R
365. Koh, supra note 33, at 1417. R
366. See generally Hannah Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism (1973); Friedrich Hayek, The
Road to Serfdom (2010); Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (1969).
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often thought to be an integral part of this post-war legal consciousness,
they too have been subjected to the same critique that rejects any kind of
absolutism.367
Unrelenting commitment to absolutist legal rules may sometimes lead to
human rights crises. But in a post-Cold War world, that twentieth century
story is far from being the only possible road to oppression. Our story of a
global crisis in migrant rights generated by affluent democracies around the
world is largely one about the lack of such commitments; it is a story of the
displacement of such commitments by international agreements and con-
tracts governing flexible cooperative networks. Pragmatic policy solutions
are operative in the continuous exposure of unauthorized migrants from de-
veloping countries to inhumane and degrading treatment and refoulement.
The inadequacy of transnationalism may disillusion those who have
looked to human rights for a source of meaning and a justification for politi-
cal engagement. As an afterthought to the main critical thrust of this Arti-
cle, this last Part offers a typology of three possible ways to deal with this
loss of meaning. Whether articulated or tacitly assumed, these have long
existed in discussions among lawyers, policymakers, and citizens of the
world. Each response adopts some of transnationalism’s insights, as well as
some of its critique. Each of the three responses retains the idea that law
must allow a space for an ethics of conviction. As Weber knew, by leaving
room for an ethics of conviction in our law, we might not only be saving the
human rights project, but also saving ourselves.
None of the options is a fully satisfying way out of the predicament de-
scribed above; enforcing human rights would, in many cases, still spell their
further violation. At best, this typology can offer a few signposts that can
help members of the human rights community make their choices. This
typology includes: (1) the return to sovereignty, which reformulates human
rights law as constitutional law (which could include treaty law); (2) radical
disaggregation, which embraces self-help human rights remedies that mi-
grants and refugees have pursued; and (3) critical absolutism, which asserts
absolute human rights rules only when they are politically viable. These
three options are discussed in more detail below. Though they all have cer-
tain merits, the last one appears to be the most compelling.
1. Back to Sovereignty
Slaughter and Koh did not recognize the dark sides of transnationalism,
but other legal theorists did understand its potential normative pitfalls. One
of them who responded early on to the transnationalist call for the disaggre-
gation of sovereignty was Benedict Kingsbury. In a 1998 article entitled
Sovereignty and Inequality, Kingsbury defended the older international legal
367. See generally Martti Koskenniemi, The Effects of Rights on Political Culture, in The EU and Human
Rights 99 (Philip Alston ed., 1999); Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia.
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consciousness centered on sovereignty.368 Returning to the positivist legacy
of sovereignty, Kingsbury argued that its disaggregation would increase
global inequality. His critique focuses on transnationalism’s movement from
status to contract, which he believes disempowers populations in the devel-
oping world. The more traditional idea of sovereignty would allow citizens
of impoverished countries fuller access to international legal processes
through citizenship and political participation.369 Transnationalism, on the
other hand, threatens to privatize politics in developing countries, while
maintaining the public nature of sovereignty in developed ones.370 The call
for a return to sovereignty that Kingsbury and others have voiced posits two
related agendas in order to offset “disaggregated violence”: one is democra-
tizing transnational legal processes, and the other is reviving democratic
accountability in the traditional form of constitutional norms.
Since this early critique, Kingsbury has led a workgroup at New York
University Law School on international administrative law.371 The group
directly addresses the bifurcation of transnational judiciaries and executives,
focusing on the democratization of transnational legal processes through
analogies to domestic administrative law.372 In so doing, it has been influen-
tial in articulating, for example, the disadvantages of opaque negotiations
for bilateral agreements (highlighted above).373 It has also criticized the role
368. See generally Kingsbury, Sovereignty and Inequality, supra note 13. See also Kingsbury, Legal Positiv- R
ism as Normative Politics, supra note 25. R
369. Kingsbury, Sovereignty and Inequality, supra note 13, at 623. R
370. See Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart, supra note 13, at 27 (“Thus, from the perspective of smaller R
developing countries, global regulatory institutions including the WTO, IMF, World Bank, and U.N.
Security Council might already appear to be “administering” them at the bidding of industrialized
countries, which are generally subject to far less intrusive external regulation.”).
371. The term the group uses is global administrative law, but here I use the word “international” to
signal openness to other scholarly engagements as well. “As a matter of provisional delineation, global
administrative action is rulemaking, adjudications, and other decisions that are neither treaty-making
nor simple dispute settlements between parties.” This loose definition captures much of the activities
this Article has attempted to conceptualize. See Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart, supra note 13, at 17. The R
steps domestic institutions have taken to impose checks on international organizations demonstrate the
link between the idea of returning to sovereignty and the program of global administrative law. Id. at
31–33. And in the context of global administrative law, “an international order based on individual or
economic rights may be too close to Western, liberal conceptions to be universally acceptable. Emphasiz-
ing the organizing role of state sovereignty may prove superior in coping with the challenge of diver-
sity.” Id. at 51. See also Benedict Kingsbury, The Administrative Law Frontier in Global Governance, 99 Am.
Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 143 (2005).
372. See, e.g., Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart, supra note 13, at 16 (discussing the “accountability R
deficit” of Transnationalism, and proposing “two different types of responses: first, the attempted exten-
sion of domestic administrative law to intergovernmental regulatory decisions that affect a nation; and
second, the development of new mechanisms of administrative law at the global level to address decisions
and rules made within the intergovernmental regimes.”).
373. B.S. Chimni has pointed to international organizations, and singled out UNHCR in particular
in this context. See Chimni, Globalisation, Humanitarianism and the Erosion of Refugee Protection 16 (Refugee
Studies Centre, Working Paper No. 3, 2000); Chimni, The Meaning of Words and the Role of UNHCR in
Voluntary Repatriation, 5 Int’l J. Refugee L. 442 (1993); Chimni, Globalization and Refugee Blues, 8
Journal of Refugee Studies 298 (1995); B.S. Chimni, The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies: A View from the
South, 11 Journal of Refugee Studies 350 (1998). See also Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart, supra note
13, at 21. R
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of technical expertise in international law making,374 which the Article al-
ludes to above.
Having mapped out the workings of transnational networks, one can im-
agine what changes could be proposed in policymaking and enforcement
networks from a perspective informed by administrative law. Frontex, for
example, would look different if it would adhere to doctrines like “natural
justice” in deportation or detention decisions.375 Add democratic public par-
ticipation in negotiations on readmission agreements, and the result comes
close to a re-aggregation of disaggregated networks in the form of demo-
cratic sovereignty.
This naturally leads to a response that counters transnationalism’s harms
with a return to democratic constitutionalism. A return to sovereignty aims
to “break free” from the dialectic process this Article has described. This
means reintroducing the idea that human rights are constitutional rights.
According to this approach, absolute human rights prohibitions can and
should be heightened expressions of popular will. We would not expect
democratic constituencies to agree to measures that violate human rights, if
those rights would be defined as profoundly their own.376 In a recent illumi-
nating book, French legal historian Patrick Weil showed how in the United
States, the right to citizenship rose to the level of an absolute right through
the development of constitutional doctrine.377
David Singh Grewal makes related arguments in his book Network
Power.378 Grewal argues that rather than voluntary networks or “coalitions of
the willing” (which this Article has referred to as “human rights net-
works”), the best way to ameliorate the injustices of disaggregated sover-
eignty is through “re-engagement” with sovereignty.379 For Grewal,
national politics remain the preferable arena for making normative claims,
even claims with regard to international legal regimes. Drawing on exam-
ples of the reassertion of national languages in the face of language loss380
374. See, e.g., Kingsbury, The Administrative Law Frontier, supra note 371, at 151. R
375. Global administrative law “focuses in particular on administrative structures, on transparency,
on participatory elements in the administrative procedure, on principles of reasoned decisionmaking, and
on mechanisms of review.” Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart, supra note 13 at 28. With respect to Frontex R
and other enforcement networks, this can be achieved through what they call “the bottom-up approach.”
Id. at 55.
376. Evidence shows that popular sentiment is oftentimes against receiving asylum seekers, however.
See, e.g., Duncan Graham, Asylum Seekers, Welcome to Transit Indonesia Year, The Jakarta Post (Aug. 2,
2012), http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/08/02/asylum-seekers-welcome-transit-indonesia-year.
html (“[C] ould these Australian relocation ideals work? The more important question is: Would Indo-
nesia agree? The plans have been conceived in isolation without input from the Indonesian people. Even
if the government agreed, at what political cost?”).
377. Patrick Weil, From Conditional to Secured and Sovereign: the New Strategic Link Between the Citizen
and the Nation-Sate in a Globalized World, 9 Int. J. Const. L. 615 (2011); Patrick Weil, The Sover-
eign Citizen (2012).
378. See generally Grewal, supra note 36. R
379. Id. at 191–92.
380. Id. at 170.
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and the reestablishment of national monetary regimes, he emphasizes the
potential for liberation that citizenship still has under conditions of
globalization.381
The various articulations of an approach calling for a return to sovereignty
have common tenets. They assume that transnationalism can be understood
almost exclusively through its emphasis on contract (or international bilater-
alism).382 Rules such as the protection against inhumane treatment are con-
sidered to be extremely thin, having little or no bearing on a conversation
about global power relations. In Sovereignty and Inequality, Kingsbury nods
toward the role of human dignity in transnationalism, only to dismiss it.383
By emphasizing power relations, however, these criticisms are left in a
difficult position. In order to produce more egalitarian programs, existing
power relations must be overthrown. But those relations are precisely what
rendered sovereignty so fragile for citizens of these countries in the first
place. That is the case in the examples Grewal invokes; some groups simply
can’t afford to preserve their own languages or have their own independent
economies. Highlighting human rights as separate from constitutional
rights, on the other hand, is meant to make persuasive claims in the name of
all human beings, including people that are simply too disempowered to
challenge the structure of global power relations.384 In an imperfect world in
which more people are displaced, the thin protections granted by the right
to asylum or to protection from inhumane treatment are sometimes more
important than one’s citizenship. It is not by chance that Weil is able to
381. Id. at 191. See also Martti Koskenniemi, What Use for Sovereignty Today? 1 Asian J. Int’l L. 61,
69–70 (2011) (“But one of [sovereignty’s] meanings is the one it receives in polemical confrontations
over the sense and direction of “globalization”, over the emergence of transnational networks of private
interest, and the occupation of the spheres of politics by economic and technical vocabularies with their
expert systems and embedded preferences. In such contexts sovereignty expresses frustration and anger
about the diminishing spaces of collective re-imagining, creation and transformation of individual and
group identities by what present themselves as the unavoidable necessities of a global modernity. Against
those, sovereignty articulates the hope of experiencing the thrill of having one’s life in one’s own
hands.”).
382. Thus, Grewal talks about “coalitions of the willing,” emphasizing volition rather than convic-
tion. Grewal, supra note 36, at 190. R
383. Kingsbury, Sovereignty and Inequality, supra note 13, at 623 (“These different approaches all allow R
greater scope for the substance of international law to be influenced by ‘global public policy’. This policy
spans managed trade, market liberalism, protection of intellectual property and wildlife, civil rights,
public participation and a range of other values favoured in the political West. It encompasses a commit-
ment to some basic equality among human beings, but it is not at present a strongly egalitarian policy.
The commitments of the various advocates differ, but the aggregate of forces pushing to shift legal
thought from a normative-status view of sovereignty to a functional-contractual view are not at present
accompanied by a corresponding impetus to ameliorate and manage problems of inequality.”).
384. That is why pleas like B.S. Chimni’s may sound hopeless. Cf. Chimni, Globalisation, Humanitari-
anism, supra note 373, at 16 (“[T]he humanitarian community needs to work towards getting the North- R
ern states to change their non-entrée policies. Today, there is a passive acceptance of the erosion of core
principles of refugee protection and rights in the name of spurious realism. While there is no wishing
away the difficulties in altering the course of Northern states, there is no alternative either to educating
and mobilising people against the policies of exclusion.”) See also Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart, supra
note 13, at 52 (“In order to address the central problems of accountability, global administrative law R
might have to devise ways to empower and include people and their representatives from the South.”).
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show the rise of an absolute right to citizenship within U.S. constitutional
law.385 Would the same process be possible in Haiti?
A return to sovereignty aspires to a heroic obliteration of the dialectic of
transnationalism. As David Kennedy pointed out, however, a call for a return
to sovereignty may be meaningless; after all, for developed states, the disag-
gregation of sovereignty is not a negation of sovereignty but rather a way of
realizing it.386 Though seemingly liberating, a program of returning to sov-
ereignty therefore does not give much of an answer to the most pressing
question raised by unauthorized migrants and refugees: What are the reme-
dies that are available for those whose citizenship simply grants them no
rights at all?
2. Radical Disaggregation
In 1986, Robert Keohane had already anticipated many of the theoretical
underpinnings of Slaughter’s disaggregated sovereignty. Keohane wrote:
“The anarchic structure of world politics does mean . . . that the achieve-
ment of cooperation can depend neither on deference to hierarchical author-
ity nor on centralized enforcement. On the contrary, if cooperation is to
emerge, whatever produces it must be consistent with the principles of sov-
ereignty and self-help.”387 But if even sovereignty in the 1990s came to be
understood as un-hierarchical and decentralized, principles of “sovereignty
and self-help” must not only apply to states. As the example of the EU
shows, these principles can go “all the way up,” to international organiza-
tions;388 but with regard to the rights of migrants and refugees, principles of
sovereignty and self-help can also go “all the way down,” to the actions of
individuals.389 Stopping at any particular level of the ladder can be only a
strategic and political choice; it is never a natural or analytically necessary
choice.
“Radical disaggregation” therefore embraces transnationalism’s norma-
tive aspirations, taking its networked structure to the logical extreme. It
aims to disaggregate global power relations “all the way down,” abolishing
all distinctions between private and public power. While proponents of a
“return to sovereignty” argue that we have seen too much disaggregation,
proponents of this position say the problem is that disaggregation has not
385. See generally Patrick Weil, The Sovereign Citizen: Denaturalization and the Origins
of the American Republic (2012).
386. See generally James Der Derian, Michael W. Doyle, Jack L. Snyder and David Kennedy, How
Should Sovereignty be Defended? in Politics without Sovereignty 187 (Christopher J. Bickerton, Philip
Cunliffe and Alexander Gourevitch eds., 2007).
387. Robert O. Keohane, Reciprocity in International Relations, 40 International Organization 1, 1
(1986).
388. See Joined Cases C-402/05 & C-415/05, Kadi v. Council of the European Union, 2005 E.C.R. II-
3533.
389. Roberto Unger’s experimentalism can be understood as one such proposal. See generally Roberto
Unger, What Should Legal Analysis Become? (1996).
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gone far enough.390 Radical disaggregation takes the “anarchic structure” Ke-
ohane wrote about and claims it as its own.391 It is the logical extension of
the transnationalism Slaughter and Koh espoused, even if they did not antic-
ipate it.
This approach has already been hinted at above, in the discussion of trans-
national human rights networks. Looking back at twenty years of transna-
tionalism, one should ask whether there is anything in world politics other
than endless intertwining networks. Slaughter’s answer was negative, yet she
thought that transnationalism could have normative content. For that to be
true, both a standard transcendent to politics and (presumably) an institu-
tion that upholds it are required. As we have seen, human rights rules fur-
nished the former, but transnational courts failed to serve as the latter.
Radical disaggregation holds that while human rights should be defended,
this task is the burden of all networks at once. Transnational judiciaries are
only one type of network among many. But how are we to judge whether a
particular condition is an enforcement of rights or a violation of them?392
Like a return to sovereignty, radical disaggregation is an attempt to break
free from the dialectic structure of transnationalism. But for people who
adopt this approach, realizing the relentless power of disaggregation does
not allow for a return to sovereignty. Reconstructing the democratic ideal of
popular will as a privileged normative standpoint may no longer make sense.
What remains of the question as to whether something violates or enforces a
right is, above all else, a matter of one’s own judgment.393 Take a good look
at the worst human rights violations you have access to, and decide which
conditions are too evil for any human being to suffer; rely on yourself to
know them when you see them. In a world in which no court or sovereign
state has a real monopoly on violence—or on answering a question about the
scope of absolute rights—the only tribunal that remains is that of the mind.
In the migration context, radical disaggregation is particularly interesting.
It invites us to recognize that, overwhelmingly, not only governance but the
movement of migrants and refugees too has been organized in networks.394
390. See, e.g., Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, Failed States, or the State as Failure? 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1159,
1192 (2005) (arguing that “nonstate” arrangements, including administration by a regional body such as
the EU, the African Union, or the UN, are sometimes preferable to statehood for “failed states”).
391. From the start, a global anarchy and the hierarchies it creates were emphasized in transnational
legal theory. Slaughter adopts in this context the idea of “negarchy,” originally coined by Daniel
Deudney. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 Eur. J. In’l L., 503,
535 (1995); Daniel Deudney, The Philadelphian System: Sovereignty, Arms Control, and the Balance of Power in
the American States-Union, circa 1781–1861, 49 Int’l Org. 191 (1995).
392. See also David Kennedy, The Forgotten Politics of International Governance, 2 E.H.R.L.R. 117 (2001).
393. Alvarez remarks on the way this individualism already exists in Slaughter’s theory. As he states
it, Slaughter quite simply puts “individuals (along with other groups in society) in the place realists
reserved for states.” However, as he emphasizes, Slaughter does not go all the way—her theory only
“comes close to espousing liberalism freed of unitary state actors.” Alvarez, supra note 3, at 239. R
394. Anthropologists and sociologists have shown this most effectively. See, e.g., Saskia Sassen, Ter-
ritory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages 291–93 (2006); Hans
Lucht, Darkness before Daybreak: African Migrants Living on the Margins in Southern
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Like governance networks, migration networks are intertwined with other
networks: smuggling and trafficking networks on the one hand, and poli-
cymaking and enforcement networks on the other.395 In a comprehensive
account of the relevant networks, even Western Union should be considered.
And if, as Koh says, “[i]nternational human rights law is enforced . . . not
just by nation-states . . . but by people like us,”396 there is no analytic reason
to think that the “us” includes only activists whose rights are relatively
protected. To the contrary, it becomes necessary to consider that migrant
and refugee networks, whether acting legally or illegally under domestic
law, may be enforcing the human rights of their members. Think, in this
context, of an Iranian asylum seeker who, during a recent criminal trial
against them in an Australian court, thanked two Indonesian people smug-
glers for saving his family.397 If state violence is disaggregated, there is no
longer any a priori distinction between state violence and the violence
wielded by smuggling networks in terms of who enforces and who violates
human rights. Realizing that all of these networks are ultimately bundled
up in one web demands that we consider unauthorized migrants not merely
as objects of human rights policy. They are actors participating in generat-
ing it.
In addition to the self-help of migrants and refugees seeking to enforce
their own rights, think also of the refugees who may fall in your own personal
jurisdiction. If you will not help enforce the rights of a refugee, it may be
Italy Today (2012); Naor Ben-Yehoyada, Mediterranean, Becoming and Unbecoming: Fishing, Smug-
gling, and Region Formation between Sicily and Tunisia since WWII (March 22, 2011) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard Univ.).
395. Smuggling is particularly important in this context, because while it victimized migrants and
refugees, it also at times supports them, and hence enforces their rights. Here is one quotation from
Frontex’s website, reflecting how one rights group in Greece feels its efforts are in fact co-opted by
smugglers: “ ‘We have become a tool of the smugglers and part of this game,’ EUObserver quoted
Kenneth Brant Hansen from the Greek Council for Refugees in Athens as saying. ‘Of course we are not
happy about this situation; on the other hand we cannot refuse to reunite families, especially when it
involves minor children,’ he continued, going on to explain that the men involved were ‘professional
Afghan smugglers.’ ” See Four Seasons: The Changing Seasons of Migration, Frontex, http://frontex.europa.
eu/feature-stories/four-seasons-Q2GtQL. On the other hand, states too are often beneficiaries of smug-
gling networks, which compose an informal but important part of their economies while transgressing
their laws. Hence, Simon Harvey can ask the “simple” question: “is smuggling oppositional to law?”
Simon Harvey, Smuggling the State into Transgression, 2 Static 1, 2 (2006). As Harvey points out, it is
“not just petrol, electronics and guns that are smuggled but also identity and voter registration cards,
high school and university diplomas, and birth certificates: there is a thriving trade in identity shifting.”
Id. at 5. The latter, as Frontex’s “language analysis” exposes, is particularly important for those hope-
lessly wanting to leave their own countries. Thus, “smuggling produces an organization that doesn’t so
much transgress state power as contests its criteria of regulation.” Id. See also Janet McGaffey, The
Real Economy of Zaire (1991); Coluccello and Massey, supra note 102, at 81–82 (emphasizing the R
roles of migrant choices, as well as the relevance of age-old customary norms in the shaping of smuggling
networks).
396. Koh, supra note 33, at 1417. R
397. Rebecca Puddy, Asylum-Seeker Thanks Accused at People-Smuggling Trial for Saving his Family, The
Australian (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/immigration/asylum-
seeker-thanks-accused-in-people-smuggling-trial-for-saving-his-family/story-fn9hm1gu-12264462
57324.
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the case that no court or executive agency ever will. This is the kind of
situation that rescuers of Jews during the Nazi regime in Germany had
confronted.
The trouble with radical disaggregation is that, just like returning to
sovereignty, it relinquishes the hope of making a universal normative claim.
Individuals and social movements that forward their own interpretations of
“human rights” do not purport to have binding force on others. An ongoing
struggle between the strong and the weak is what remains. The weak are
bound to lose.
3. Critical absolutism
Human rights practitioners and activists, well aware of the promises as
well as the limitations of transnationalism, provide yet a third perspective.
Rather than trying to eliminate or break free from transnationalism’s dy-
namics, many have attempted to work within its constraints. This means
intervening in them strategically, while insisting—whenever intervention
does occur—on a realization of the universal aspiration of human rights.
This strategy is a more modest version of transnational legal process. While
responding to the perils of the transnational condition, it rejects the two
other approaches proposed above. It stems from a belief that it is possible to
study the structural blind spots of transnational judgments like M.S.S.,
Hirsi, or M-70/2011, address them in ways that will successfully articulate a
universal claim, and remain politically viable at the same time.398
Jurisdiction limitations necessarily prevent courts from introducing a uni-
versal revolution. But the fact that human rights law introduces legal obli-
gations toward all humans is not to be taken lightly. Human rights can be
useful in pushing courts and other networks to establish provisional, tempo-
rary articulations of an ethics of conviction. This can happen when precarious
coordination is established between executive and judicial networks.
The basic premise of this approach is that “human rights,” at least as an
abstract concept, are uncontroversial within transnational networks of judi-
ciaries and executives alike. The idea that a finite list of rights is defined in
absolute terms is something no one within these networks can openly re-
fute.399 Even with respect to those who justify torture under certain circum-
stances, presumably there are certain policies they would never deem legal,
for example, genocide, slavery, or the extra-judicial killing of non-citizens
outside of a security or war-related context.
398. Transnational public law litigation is premised on the belief that “judicial victories will force
amelioration of the harsh executive position” and that “legitimation of executive action” will only occur
if courts “rebuff” transnational public lawsuits. Koh, supra note 62, at 1009. Recognizing tragic dialectic R
repletion, on the other hand, means considering precisely how such victories are often times part and
parcel of such “legitimation” processes.
399. Think of the perhaps more familiar arguments about torture in the context of United States
security; the position that torture is defined narrowly is heard much more often than the alternative idea
that torture should be permitted.
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This agreement on a premise that absolute prohibitions do exist (regard-
less of whether there is agreement on what they are) allows human rights to
serve as a stepping-stone for discussion: what is the scope of such prohibi-
tions? And which forum can adjudicate their violation? Once access is
granted to corridors of power—whether through courts or other branches—
there are always opportunities for persuasion, and there is always a possibil-
ity for surprise. As described above, however, there is also a second step in
which violations can reappear somewhere else across the network;400 and in
which a surprising success story can provoke an even more surprising back-
lash. Critical absolutism tries to take into account the possibility of both types
of surprises.
Human rights law offers the language of conviction and the language of
responsibility in one toolkit. In the first phase, we might try to foresee when
pushing a court or another institution to uphold human rights will have,
overall, results that may be helpful for those we aim to help. This phase is
characterized by cost-benefit reasoning and a cold, realistic view toward the
incentives of actors in the real world. It is an application of an ethics of
responsibility.401
Once cases are selected, particular aggregates of networks—judicial, exec-
utive, or other—may still be in the position both to recognize claims of
conviction and to act upon them. The universal moral claim of human rights
is articulated in order to create a disturbance in the ways in which violations
are reproduced by networks.402 The dialectic of transnationalism, which has so
far looked like a gradual unfolding of a human rights crisis, may for a mo-
ment be reversed; with the mediation of the right transnational institution
at the right time, it may, temporarily, transform into the unfolding of moral
truth. If one were to challenge, for example, the bifurcation of executive and
judicial networks upon which Frontex is premised, it would be necessary not
only to point out its involvement in absolutely prohibited actions; before
that, it would be important to consider what the political ramifications of a
positive judgment would be, and to carefully decide how, where, and when
to go forward.
400. This sense of tragedy does appear to some extent in Koh’s descriptions of transnational public law
litigation, but my proposal here is to more fully theorize it into a general account of the transnational
condition. Koh’s more personal account of tragedy is expressed in paragraphs like this one: “As our plane
left Guantanamo after each visit, I had silently asked that I would never have to go back again . . . . But
now, more than a year later, tents housing more than 16,000 Haitians stretched as far as the eye could see
on the Guantanamo airstrip. As the plane landed, my head filled with grim thoughts of Sisyphus and his
boulder, back at the bottom of the mountain.” Koh, supra note 62, at 1007–08 (emphasis added). R
401. David Kennedy believes that such cost-benefit reasoning should be all that human rights should
offer. By endorsing an ethics of responsibility all the way through, he relinquishes human rights as an
ethics of conviction. See David Kennedy, The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?, 15
Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 99, 102 (2001).
402. Cf. Mann, supra note 55 (proposing two-tiered test with respect to international criminal R
jurisdiction).
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But there is also another ironic form in which this juxtaposition of convic-
tion and responsibility can be employed politically. Athenian lawyer Elektra
Koutra initiated an amusing example of such irony, illustrating some of the
most poignant aspects of critical absolutism. After M.S.S. was released, Koutra
visited all of Athens’s major European embassies with her clients, asylum
seekers from Afghanistan. Once in the embassies, they argued that the asy-
lum seekers had the right to stay there until the respective countries
processed their asylum claims.403 The action relies on the old international
legal custom according to which embassies are outside of the jurisdiction of
the state they are in and can therefore be places of asylum.404
When Koutra argued that sending her clients out of the embassies would
potentially expose them to inhumane and degrading treatment, she chal-
lenged the bifurcation between judiciaries and executives in Europe. If Euro-
pean countries “used” Greece for the purposes of border enforcement (with
the Dublin II Regulation), asylum seekers should also have access to Euro-
pean countries. This challenge would not have been possible if it were not
for the way that ECtHR promoted disaggregation in M.S.S. But it also de-
manded an additional act of imagination.405
If, as one commentator recently said, what is sometimes most distressing
in the U.S. immigration debate is “the failure of any participant in the
argument, justice or advocate for either side, to affirm the simple humanity
of Arizona’s several hundred thousand undocumented residents,”406 that can
only be because there is room for arguments stemming from obligations to-
ward all humans in the United States, too.
Transnational executives reiterate that they are entitled to close borders so
long as they protect human rights. The approach that this Article contem-
plates, however, turns on the premise that in current global conditions, that
task just might be impossible. It therefore identifies opportunities for chal-
lenging policymakers, leaving them with two options: either treat people as
humans and risk changing who you are (in terms of the composition of the
population) or give up human rights and risk changing who you are (in
terms of constitutive commitments). The first path is the one critical absolu-
tism tries to lead us in. The second is the path transnationalism took in the
history outlined above, from Sale to M70/2011. A very thin line cuts be-
tween them.
403. See EU Embassies Activism for Asylum Seekers in Athens Greece 26/01/11, Youtube, http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=0JtweUbrAhY (Jan. 30, 2011).
404. This is still a matter of doctrinal debate. See generally Gregor Noll, Seeking Asylum at Embassies: A
Right to Entry Under International Law? 17 Int’l J. Refugee L. 542 (2005).
405. The Afghan asylum seekers were sent out of the embassies, but their asylum requests were
accepted. See EU Embassies Activism for Asylum Seekers in Athens Greece 26/01/11, supra note 403. Although R
an attempt like this is unlikely to bear fruit in terms of remedies for the clients, it is effective in exposing
the inconsistencies between coexisting governmental networks.
406. Linda Greenhouse, The Lower Floor, N.Y. Times (May 2, 2012).
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This existential challenge is not available in the vocabularies of a “return
to sovereignty” or “radical disaggregation.” These approaches abrogate a
claim for universality by positing the will and judgment of particular com-
munities as the final benchmark for what “human rights” might mean.
Practitioners provoking this challenge take a risk. They rely on both options
as being equally undesirable.
Indeed, this phenomenology of danger is an inherent part of an ethics of
conviction. It is implicit in the way ECtHR interpreted absolute prohibitions
under Article 3 ECHR: “even in the event of a public emergency threaten-
ing the life of the nation,” no justification, exception or balancing test is
permitted.407 The relevant doctrine holds that a law-abiding nation should
die—whatever that may mean—rather than resort to inhumane practices.
Critical absolutism tries to push nations to prove the veracity of such
promises, while keeping in mind how incongruent such a promise is with
the self-preserving nature of political power.
Rules that one must die rather than violate are familiar from religious
contexts.408 This imagination of absolute imperatives is planted in the midst
of a transnational legal structure that—as Jessup knew—collapses the pri-
vate/public and domestic/international divides.409 Within the endless move-
ment in an intertwined network of treaties, agreements, and institutions,
critical absolutism requires us to stop. It upholds rules that are thought to be
at the top of a normative pyramid, just to jump from there right back into
the thoroughly networked, globalized politics, which is the only politics we
now have. It aims to provide a point of view from which one can critically
assess the structure as a whole, while still acting in it.
VII. Conclusion
Contrary to what Koh thought in the wake of Sale, transnational law has
made it more difficult, rather than easier, to adhere to Blackmun’s call and
to hear the voices of refugees. Contrary to Slaughter’s idea of harmonious
global cooperation, transnational law has grown into a headless body, many
organs of which it is almost impossible to see; they are webs of overlapping
407. Cf. Kahn, supra note 52, at 274–75 (explaining that in Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, R
“The life of the nation—the popular sovereign—is maintained through the death of the individual.”) See
also Paul Kahn, Putting Liberalism in Its Place (2008) (providing a more general theory of sacrifice
in the context of American constitutional culture, where the demand of self-sacrifice is often the way in
which law bestows meaning to the life of those bound by it.)
408. In the Jewish religion, these are rules that are backed by the command “Yehareg Ve’Al Yaavor”
(One should “get killed rather than transgress”). See Moshe Halbertal, On Sacrifice 58 (2012). See
also Martti Koskenniemi, The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics, 70(1) Mod. L.
Rev. 1, 30 (2007) (“I often think of international law as a kind of secular faith. When powerful states
engage in imperial wars, globalisation dislocates communities or transnational companies wreck havoc on
the environment, and where national governments show themselves corrupt or ineffective, one often hears
an appeal to international law.”).
409. Jessup, supra note 21, at 2, 26. R
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jurisdictions and contradictory obligations. At the fault lines between the
developing and the developed world, this body of law produces a global
human rights crisis, while proclaiming a commitment to human rights.
The distinction between domestic and international law has long been
displaced, and visions of a world court or constitution remain as far as ever
from realization. In this context, transnationalism has adopted a thoroughly
pragmatist orientation. By doing that, it relinquishes the idea that some law
should rest on a universal standard. With no identifiable hierarchy between
transnational branches of government, it may seem that there is no norma-
tive measure for assessing a commitment to human rights.
If there is a normative measure for the most fundamental commitments of
law, it can only be one that would apply equally to all humans. From 1993
to 2013, unauthorized migrants and refugees have embodied such a mea-
sure. Their continued demand to be heard confronts policymakers, judges,
and citizens of the world with an unavoidable question: what are the rights
that accrue to all humans? With that, they redefine human rights law as a
global Grundnorm.410
Critical absolutism, the approach identified in this Article as a way of up-
holding such a global norm, has complicated relationships with the two
other responses to the failures of transnationalism: the return to sovereignty and
radical disaggregation. On the one hand, critical absolutism might look like one
institutional articulation of radical disaggregation; it is only because of
processes of disaggregation that one can voice claims beyond the purview of
political membership. On the other hand, it might seem parasitic upon a
return to sovereignty: only when absolute rules comport with constitutional
rules and popular political commitments will the auspicious moments for
change occur. Only then will such interventions have real effects on the
ground, and grant remedies to those who need them.
Both of these points are valid. Critical absolutism is, among other things, a
realization that in the contemporary moment we may very well be caught
between these two options.
410.  On the apparent lack of a Grundnorm in contemporary international law, see generally Andreas
Fischer-Lescano and Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmenta-
tion of Global Law, 25 Mich. J. Int’l L. 999 (2004).
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